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ABSTRACT 
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by Sara Nassar El-Khalili 
under the supervision of Dr. Hussein Amin 
May/2011 
 
The awareness function of the mass media is at the heart of civic engagement, which is 
fundamental for a country in transition to democracy such as Egypt. This study examined the 
agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows on attitudes towards civic 
engagement among the Egyptian elite.  
This primary research linked agenda-setting theory to civic engagement. Through setting the 
salience of news and creating sociopolitical awareness, agenda-setting establishes the first 
step in civic engagement, creating an informed citizenry.  
A primary content analysis of the three most popular Egyptian nightly television talk shows 
before the Jan.25
th
 revolution: Masr Ennharda (Egypt Today), Al Ashera Masa’an (10 PM), 
and 90 Deqeeqa (90 Minutes), was conducted to measure the media agenda. A total of 78 
episodes of talk shows were coded from October 6 to November 10, before the 2010 
parliamentary elections. A primary survey was conducted among a purposive sample of the 
Egyptian elite (356 participants) to examine the public agenda and the relationships between 
exposure to talk shows, agenda-setting, and civic engagement.  
The findings support an agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows at the 
first and second levels. Participants cited talk shows as their main source of information for 
the news issues they listed. Respondents’ perceptions of the November 2010 parliamentary 
elections also corresponded with talk shows’ framing of the elections. The first outcome of 
the agenda-setting impact on both levels is sociopolitical awareness, which represents the first 
and most basic level of civic engagement.  
One of the primary findings of this study is the significant positive correlation between 
perception of talk shows as civically engaging and attitudes towards civic engagement. This 
study also found a positive relationship between exposure to nightly television shows and 
attitudes towards civic engagement. A five-point civic engagement scale was created to 
measure the overall level of civic engagement among participants, which found that the elite 
sample surveyed is civically engaged. 
This study proceeded with conducting qualitative interviews with experts, producing 
recommendations for talk shows in order to play a more active role in fostering civic 
engagement in Egypt.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Civic Engagement and Democracy 
Citizen participation is the core of all existing and emerging democracies. The 
freedom of citizens to participate in government and engage in their communities is 
crucial to the success of democratic government. Democracy as defined by the 
Encyclopedia Britannica means “rule by the people.” The origin of the term is derived 
from the word „demokratia‟ in Greek. The word „demos‟ represents people and the 
word „kratos‟ represents rule. Therefore, in a democracy, citizens rule. Ultimate 
power lies in citizens who have the right to vote and elect people to represent them in 
free elections. To participate effectively as citizens, democratic theory emphasizes 
that citizens must be able to acquire sufficient political information to be able to 
convey their interests, assess their problems and vote (Moy, 1998).  
An informed citizenry is essential to bring about change in policy and society 
in general. Hopkins (1992) emphasized that education represents the real drive for 
mobilization. When people comprehend an issue and share information with others, 
they can take action and influence policy. For citizens to take action, they have to be 
informed first which is acquired through the mass media or direct engagement. The 
term civic engagement describes how citizens participate actively in civic affairs. It is 
about deliberations and activities intended for specific public issues or challenges 
yielding social change (Adler and Goggin, 2005).  Active citizenship and a strong 
civil society encompass a lot of power and potential that aims at solving problems in 
countries, whether they have established or emerging democratic systems (Edwards, 
2004). When citizens collaborate and organize their collective effort at solving social 
problems, they help in creating a stronger civil society.  Civil society organizations, 
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journalists and intellectuals advocate publicly for democracy through meetings, 
demonstrations and the mass media. 
For the Arab world, lack of civic engagement and political apathy constitute a 
major problem. Not a single Arab country is considered a full democracy (Martin, 
2010). Although revolutions have swept a number of Arab countries beginning with 
Tunisia and Egypt and extending to Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, most Arab 
countries represent variations of authoritarian rule. The Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions succeeded at toppling the heads of their regimes and achieving many 
changes as a result of citizen pressure. Although signs of optimism about the political 
future of Arab countries exist, the road to democracy is rocky because they have a 
long history of authoritarian rule.   
1.2 Egypt‟s Political Environment  
A look at the political environment in Egypt before and after the revolution 
explains why civic engagement is essential to democratize the country which has a 
population of 85 million with 34 percent under 30 years of age. The Egyptian youth 
uprising that swept the country on Jan. 25 snowballing into a revolution that included 
citizens from all walks of life is a result of growing public dissent piling up over the 
past decade. Although Egyptians never took to the streets in millions as they did 
during the Jan.25
th
 revolution, they still expressed their frustration with the regime in 
mass demonstrations over the past few years. The piling up of anger was obvious in 
the increasing number of street sit-ins and demonstrations especially in front of the 
Egyptian parliament and the deadliest demonstrations of 2008 in the city of Mahalla 
over the shortage of bread (El-Shorbagy, 2010, personal interview). 
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According to the 2010 annual report of Freedom House International (FHI), 
Egypt scored 6 on political rights, just one point higher than the lowest score of 7.  
The country also scored 5 on civil liberties. The freedom organization ranks countries 
on a scale of one to seven, with one representing the top level of freedom and seven 
representing the lowest. Egypt‟s low scores on both civil liberties and political rights 
translate into a “not free” status by the freedom organization (FHI, 2010). 
In his book Egypt and the Egyptians in Mubarak‟s Reign, Amin (2009) 
described Egypt as being in “distress”. Amin explained that people complain about 
corruption and deficiencies across several platforms including economic, political, 
educational, cultural, and social platforms. In addition, Egyptian citizens also 
complain about the general quality of life. Ever since he assumed power in 1981 after 
President Anwar Sadat was assassinated, former president Mubarak had the 
emergency law in effect (McGann, 2008). The government claims that the law is 
implemented only in cases of terrorism and drug crimes. However, authorities make 
use of the emergency law to clamp down on political activists and members of the 
opposition. The same law is used to disperse and arrest peaceful demonstrators in 
opposition to the regime.  
Inequality and political misrepresentation plagued the country‟s democratizing 
process for decades. Egypt‟s corrupt political system for years ensured that the former 
ruling National Democratic Party, recently dissolved by a court decision after the 
revolution, holds the majority of parliament. Despite the fact that Egypt witnessed its 
first presidential elections in 2005 after former President Mubarak endorsed a 
constitutional change, the former amendments restricted the nomination of non-NDP 
presidential candidates. Under the 1971 constitution which was suspended by the 
military council and amended into a temporary constitutional declaration after the Jan. 
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25
th
 revolution, a candidate must be nominated by a party that holds a minimum of 
five percent of parliament seats, making it impossible for opposition parties to 
nominate candidates. The recent amendments, however, allow candidates to run for 
presidency. Women were also misrepresented in parliament as only 70 seats were 
given to women in the 454-seat parliament. Coptic Christians also hold only 10 
percent of parliament seats (FHI, 2010).  
Listing many of Egypt‟s shortcomings on political and civil liberties before the 
revolution, it‟s necessary to establish a strong civil society and active engaged 
citizenry to overcome such problems and help transform Egypt into a full democracy. 
The idea of civil society and its democratizing potential has been very popular over 
the past 15 years. The European Union and the United States view civil society as 
paving the way for democratizing authoritarian countries especially the Arab region 
(Abdalla, 2008). Although civil society is regarded as the democratic catalyst in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Abdalla (2008) doubts the western high 
expectations that a strong civil society will eventually lead to successful Arab 
democracies.  
Abdalla justifies such doubts by citing examples of the former Egyptian regime‟s 
tight control over NGOs in Egypt through strict policies and regulations that represent 
a constraint to the autonomy of civil society. Egypt‟s Law of Association exemplifies 
such constraints on NGOs. The Ministry of Social Affairs must approve NGO board 
members. The ministry also has the right to dissolve NGOs on grounds such as 
threatening national unity or receiving donations from foreign countries which 
discourages citizens from being actively involved in the Egyptian civil society (FHI, 
2010). 
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1.3 Civic Engagement in Egypt 
Low political participation and general apathy used to paint a gloomy image of 
the political and social picture in pre-revolution Egypt. According to the EHDR 
(2010) report, civic engagement defined by EHDR as “volunteerism, social integrity 
and political participation” is very low among youth in Egypt with fewer than three 
percent of youth participating in volunteer work. Charity work comprises 64 percent 
of the nature of volunteer work among Egyptian youth. According to McGann (2008), 
Egyptians contribute to the strength of charity organizations because Muslims are 
obliged under religion to pay zakat or charity money every year. This form of 
engagement becomes very obvious in the holy month of Ramadan where Muslim 
charity is usually at its peak.   
Other international Muslim and Coptic Christian communities also engage in 
charities to develop Egypt‟s education, health system and help the country‟s poor. In 
addition to charitable activities, a portion of youth provides training and assistance to 
poor people through providing them with loans to start small-scale projects. 
Volunteers also educate the needy in an effort to eliminate their illiteracy. Despite the 
fact that there are positive signs of philanthropy with most civic engagement 
revolving around charity in the Egyptian society, a fifth of Egyptians still live in 
poverty (McGann, 2008).  
As for political participation, youth membership in political parties is very low, 
with only 2.2 percent active youth members. However, this is dramatically changing 
after the Jan.25
th
 revolution as many members of the youth are currently at the stage 
of joining or establishing political parties. Although voter turnout has been very low 
in past Egyptian elections, almost 18 million Egyptians took to the polling stations 
after the revolution to cast a yes or no vote over a set of constitutional amendments. 
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The experience and level of participation was unprecedented in Egyptian history. 
However, only 18 million citizens voted out of the 45 million eligible voters. This 
means that 27 million Egyptians didn‟t participate (Saleh, 2011).  
Lack of participation in former elections is mostly attributed to the fact that 
Egyptians used to have a general feeling of mistrust knowing that the election process 
is tainted by fraud (Ibrahim, 2010, personal interview). Incidents of voter intimidation 
in past elections also discourage voters. However, low voter turnout is not limited to 
elections. According to official government statistics, only 25 percent of eligible 
voters participated in the national referendum regarding the former amendments to the 
Egyptian constitution in 2007 (FHI, 2010).  Participation was minimal in the 2007 
referendum despite the degree of importance of such amendments and how they 
directly affected citizens' lives.  
Although the majority of Egyptians shared lack of participation, general political 
apathy and lack of political efficacy, most citizens still preferred democracy to any 
other form government. The World Values Survey poll conducted in Egypt and other 
Arab countries found that more than 85 percent of respondents consider democracy 
the best option for effective government. Also, 80 percent of the respondents 
expressed their rejection to the authoritarian regimes (Rutherford, 2008).  
The 2005 Civil Society Index Report for Egypt described civil society as being 
still at an “embryonic stage” (p.82). The report also described the Egyptian civil 
society as being in a weak condition due to limited participation among citizens, 
limited resources and a restrictive political environment. Although civil society 
organizations have strong civic values, the promotion of such values is very limited 
and doesn‟t have a significant impact on policy. Despite that, the year 2005 witnessed 
a breakthrough for Egyptian civil society when its organizations were permitted by 
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the former regime to monitor the 2005 parliamentary elections. This also reflected on 
the media coverage which started to give enough exposure to civil society 
organizations, highlighting their role as watchdogs, monitoring their reports and often 
interviewing them. This significant role played by the media helped foster civic 
engagement values in Egyptian society.  
1.4 Media and Civic Engagement in Egypt 
According to Amin (2002), media in Egypt need to overcome many political, 
cultural and economic challenges to bring about change. Although the media is 
currently witnessing more freedom after the revolution, issues such as occasional 
cases of military torture of civilians are considered very sensitive, controversial and 
out of discussion. Like other Arab media, Egypt‟s media struggled for years as it 
functioned in “a censorial political culture” (Amin, 2002, p.125). However, Amin 
(2002) asserts that new communication technologies will empower the media and 
pressure regimes to change, making censorship an obsolete idea in an environment 
where journalists find other alternatives for reporting. 
 Although Egypt went through decades of strictly authoritarian media where all 
media institutions were strictly owned by the state, that system is starting to change. 
The proliferation of independent media including privately-owned newspapers and 
Egyptian satellite channels such as Dream and Mehwar transformed media in Egypt. 
Such independent channels enjoy more freedom than state-owned channels but they 
still broadcast from the state-owned Media Production City. Rugh (2004) describes 
Egypt‟s media as going through a stage of transition, moving gradually away from 
authoritarianism. The logic for classifying Egyptian media as “transitional” under 
Rugh‟s four-type typology of the Arab media is a result of Egypt‟s media undergoing 
many changes in the past decade. Rugh (2004) described the transition as shaky and 
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didn‟t clearly indicate whether the transition will be heading toward a new democratic 
media system. However, Egyptian media experts believe the media will open up, 
corresponding with the democratization of the political system especially after the 
Jan. 25
th
 revolution (Allam, 2011). 
Theoretically, freedom was guaranteed for the media under the former 1971 
Egyptian constitution. As stated in Article 48 of Egypt‟s constitution: “freedom of the 
press, printing, publication and mass media shall be guaranteed.” The same article 
prohibited all forms of censorship by stating that “censorship of newspapers as well as 
their control, suspension or suppression by administrative methods is prohibited” 
(Egyptian Constitution 1971, amended 2007). However, despite such formal, legal 
and constitutional guarantees, media content in Egypt was subject to government 
control. Although private media existed in Egypt, it was subject to strict regulations 
and state interference. Journalists were subjected to high fines and in some cases 
prison sentences especially if they were charged with tarnishing the reputation of 
Egypt or threatening national security (Rugh, 2004).  
In October 2010, an outspoken government critic was fired from his position as 
editor-in-chief of the independent daily Al Dostour newspaper which he also co-
found, allegedly over an article that Mohamed El-Baradei wrote. Before being fired 
from Al-Dostour newspaper, Ibrahim Eissa was also forced to quit hosting his nightly 
television talk show Baladna Belmasri (Our Country in Egyptian) broadcast on the 
private satellite channel OnTV. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) released a 
statement expressing its concern over firing Eissa from Al-Dostour. CPJ reported it 
was alarmed by “the deterioration of press freedoms in Egypt ahead of November's 
parliamentary elections and next year's presidential vote” (CPJ, 2010). The former 
government also suspended in September the popular talk show Al-Qahera Al-Youm 
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(Cairo Today) hosted by journalist Amr Adeeb on the Orbit Showtime Network 
(OSN). Adeeb was quoted by CNN Arabic as saying “political reasons” were behind 
his show‟s suspension (CPJ, 2010). Egypt‟s Media Production City stated that OSN 
owes the city EGP 5 million, claiming this was the sole reason behind the suspension 
of the show without prior notice (Abdoun, 2010). The show and its host Adeeb went 
back on air shortly after Egyptian revolutionists succeeded at overthrowing former 
President Mubarak and his regime. 
In addition to satellite channels and privately-owned newspapers such as Al 
Dostour, Al Shorouk and Al Masry Al Youm, the internet is also playing the role of a 
catalyst in paving the way for the democratic transition. Many experts refer to the 
Egyptian revolution as the “Internet” or “digital” revolution. With internet users 
soaring to 17 million in 2010  compared to 10.5 million in 2008 at a penetration of 
21.2 percent (Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2010), it‟s becoming harder to suppress 
freedom of expression or hold information from the public. Even with an estimated 6 
million users in 2007, citizens were able to influence the media and policy agendas by 
reporting police brutality and mass sexual harassment incidents on the internet within 
the same year. Egypt‟s mainstream media denied the mass sexual harassment 
incidents at first but when the news leaked to the world through the internet, the 
media later admitted the incidents and reported the events.  
In a separate incident where the non-traditional media set the policy and 
mainstream media agendas, Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas exposed in 2007 an 
incident of police brutality and posted the video of policemen torturing a minibus 
driver on YouTube. The video sparked a "media feeding‐frenzy that ultimately forced 
the government to prosecute the kind of conduct that has long been condoned” 
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(Pintak, 2009, p.1). The policemen were accused of torture and were sent to prison, 
which was considered a great victory for activists in Egypt.  
In addition to the role played by bloggers and internet users in general in 
liberalizing the Egyptian media, several television talk shows also appeared on state-
owned and independent channels providing ordinary citizens with a channel that 
carries their voices, opinions, as well as concerns. Emphasizing the watchdog role and 
adopting a more liberal approach in discussing Egyptian affairs, television talk shows 
play a role in spotting the government‟s inefficiencies (El Demerdash, 2010). 
According to talk show host and journalist Moataz El Demerdash, ordinary citizens 
resort to talk shows to voice their concerns and demand their rights. They turn to 
television talk shows hoping for a solution to their problems. El Demerdash who used 
to host 90 Deqeeqa (90 Minutes) which began broadcasting on Mehwar channel in 
August 2006, said talk shows have inspired Egyptians to ask for their rights, 
influencing the government to take action. He emphasized that change will take place 
in Egypt overtime and will be witnessed by new generations.  
Talk show coverage of Egypt‟s 2010 rain flood crisis sets the example of how 
popular talk shows such as Al Qahera Al Youm and 90 Deqeeqa managed to mobilize 
the public to help save the country‟s rain-flood victims. Al Qahera Al Youm hosted by 
Amr Adeeb, raised EGP 50 million after launching a media campaign to rebuild the 
flood-hit areas in Aswan and Sinai. Talk show hosts repeatedly called on citizens help 
in any way they can. The result was that of collaboration between ordinary citizens, 
civil society organizations and media. Such collaboration raised millions despite 
government restrictions (Panel discussion, 2010) as Egyptian law prohibits collecting 
donations before acquiring the approval of the Egyptian Ministry of Social Solidarity. 
Violation of the law leads to a penalty of up to seven years in prison. However, in the 
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case of the rain floods, the government let the media and civil society members 
handle the situation because it didn‟t have the resources to handle the crisis on its own 
(Panel Discussion, 2010). The rain flood crisis exemplifies how Egypt‟s authoritarian 
media system is changing and how media empowered civil society in that special 
case.  
Even before the rain floods crisis, the power of citizens and media was 
exemplified in 2008 when thousands of protestors marched to the streets of the 
Egyptian coastal city of Damietta against plans to establish an Agrium petrochemical 
site that would lead to environmental hazards affecting the health of the city‟s 
residents (Hussein, 2008). The issue was heavily reported by the Egyptian media 
especially television talk shows where several Damietta residents appeared voicing 
their concerns. The media described the petrochemical site as the “factory of death”. 
The issue of the Agrium site illustrates how citizens took collective action and 
succeeded at enforcing their rights regardless of state and business interests. After 
multiple petitions, sit-ins, and demonstrations accompanied by heavy media coverage, 
the government took the decision to relocate the Agrium plant. The Damietta case 
also illustrates how the media could empower citizens even under authoritarian 
regimes. Active citizens in this case communicated their interests and needs through 
media which gave enough attention to their legitimate demands, generating pressure 
on the government to respond.  
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1.5 Statement of the Problem: 
Considering the relatively low level of citizen participation in Egypt even after 
the revolution and the need to create a civically engaged society that would lead 
Egypt in its democratic transition, it‟s essential to study if the media play any role in 
fostering civic engagement and creating an informed citizenry. Active citizenship is 
important to push forward the transition to democracy. To achieve real democracy in 
Egypt, citizens have to be engaged and publicly heard through the mass media and 
other forms of direct engagement. Egyptians need to be informed about political 
rights and encouraged to practice those rights to lift their country up which has been 
suffering from a state of decline for decades.   
Media all over the world play a significant role in spreading awareness and 
political knowledge among people. Such a role has always been attributed to the 
traditional news media, especially newspapers. However, in Egypt, where the 
mainstream media was mostly controlled by the government and traditional news on 
state-owned channels still broadcast mostly protocol news and bows too much to 
authority, Egyptians found new channels to voice their concerns. Mainly through the 
internet and television talk shows. This study is concerned with the latter because the 
television penetration in Egypt exceeds by far the internet penetration. Also, the 
popularity of nightly television talk shows is rooted in their ability to break 
sociopolitical boundaries by addressing controversial issues (Lee, 2002). Such ability 
becomes very significant in a country like Egypt, where talk shows address 
controversial issues holding politicians and officials accountable. 
The proliferation of talk shows revived the interest of Egyptian citizens in 
news and current affairs (Menassat, 2008).  “Talk shows became the most popular 
programs in the history of satellite channels, with each channel trying to be unique 
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and exceptional, and covering the most controversial topics” (Menassat, 2008). The 
significance of talk shows in creating political awareness in the Arab world is 
discussed by Sakr (2007) who asserts that talk shows in the Arab world legitimize 
disagreement on political issues which helps in establishing the groundwork for a 
“pluralistic political culture”. Talk shows also address citizens‟ concerns and open 
new channels of communication between the populace and the ruling elite (Lee, 
2002).  
This research study aims at examining whether television talk shows foster 
civic engagement through creating sociopolitical awareness. The theoretical 
foundation applied in this research is the agenda-setting theory. The theory is applied 
to determine whether Egyptian talk shows influence the public agenda of news 
priorities. Through setting the salience of news and creating sociopolitical awareness, 
agenda-setting establishes the first step in civic engagement. Moon (2008) found that 
the theory of agenda setting goes beyond the salience of issues and attributes to 
include influence on action. When the media sets issue priorities among the public, 
the public eventually starts thinking about these issues, and this process of thinking is 
most likely to lead to action (Moon, 2008). Based on Moon‟s (2008) research which 
linked the media‟s agenda-setting function to civic engagement in the US, it is 
important to examine whether the agenda-setting function of a popular media genre 
such as television talk shows in Egypt is linked to civic engagement attitudes. Having 
an informed and engaged citizenry is important to the success of any democracy and 
is crucial in the case of an emerging democracy such as Egypt. As Amin (2002) 
emphasized there is a serious “need to build the foundation of a civil society” in order 
to replace “fear with responsibility and censorship with freedom” (p.134).   
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
The current research on Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic 
engagement applies agenda-setting as a theoretical foundation.  
2.1 Agenda-Setting Theory 
Introduced by Donald Shaw and Maxwell McCombs in 1972, agenda-setting 
theory was the outcome of their seminal research study conducted during the 1968 US 
presidential elections. The scholars‟ main hypothesis was as follows: The mass media 
influence the priority or salience of news issues among voters during a political 
campaign. The agenda-setting effect results from the press selectivity in reporting 
news. By choosing what to report, the news media establish the priority of significant 
issues in the minds of people, setting the initial step in opinion formation (McCombs 
& Reynolds, 2009). McCombs and Shaw conducted their survey among voters in 
Chapel Hill in North Carolina asking them to list the main news topics. 
Simultaneously, the researchers content-analyzed the major sources of news that the 
voters listed. The ranking of news issues was determined by the number of stories 
dedicated by the media to each topic. The high correlation between the agenda of the 
media and the agenda of the voters in that study supported an agenda-setting effect.  
Hundreds of studies were conducted since the Chapel Hill study on similar 
agenda-setting effects of the mass media, all providing a build-up of evidence in 
support of the effect of the media agenda on the public agenda (McCombs & 
Reynolds, 2009). Although McCombs and Shaw initiated the theory in their original 
1968 Chapel Hill study, scholar David Weaver joined them in their one-year panel 
study of the US presidential elections in 1972. Weaver was also the main author of 
Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Election (McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, 
1997). The three scholars continued their research contributions and development of 
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agenda-setting theory. Historically, origins of the thinking behind agenda-setting 
theory dates back to the 1920s when Walter Lippmann summarized the agenda-setting 
idea in the book Public Opinion, in the introductory chapter titled “The World 
Outside and Pictures in Our Heads.” Although Lipmann didn‟t use the exact term 
agenda-setting, he summarized the idea behind such an effect. “His thesis is that the 
news media, our windows to the vast world beyond our direct experience, determine 
our cognitive maps of that world” (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009, p.2).  
Although Lipmann is considered the intellectual father of the theory, the core 
idea behind the agenda-setting effect appeared in several writings also before the 
Chapel Hill study. As cited in Severin and Tankard (2001), Lan, K. & Lang, G.E. 
(1959) stated the same idea of the theory when they wrote that the news media have 
an impact on the public attention to specific issues. They added that the mass media 
build images and present objects influencing people‟s thinking and feelings. Also 
cited by Severin and Tankard (2001) is the famous statement by Bernard Cohen 
revolving around the same idea of agenda-setting. Commenting on the power of the 
press, Cohen (1963) wrote that the press “may not be successful much of the time in 
telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what 
to think about” (Severin and Tankard, 2001, p. 222). 
2.2. Levels of Agenda-Setting 
The first level of agenda-setting tackles what‟s covered in the media or what 
items are on the agenda of the mass media. The process by which the media focus on 
specific issues ignoring others is called priming. The priming function constitutes the 
first level of agenda-setting, which happens when the media establish salience or issue 
priorities for the public. “The salience of an issue on the public agenda is defined by 
the percentage of people who regard that issue as the MIP [most important] facing the 
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state in a particular year” (Tan & Weaver, 2009). Therefore, the first level involves 
the issues on the agenda or the list of topics in order of priority. Cited in Ghanem 
(1996), Price and Tewksbury (1995) defined priming as “the tendency of audience 
members to evaluate their political leaders on the basis of those particular events and 
issues given attention in recent news reports” (p.5). 
The second level of agenda-setting theory deals with how the media present or 
frame issues as opposed to what the media present in the first level of agenda-setting 
(Severin &Tankard, 2001). This level of agenda-setting which involves the framing of 
issues deals with media attributes of each issue which consequently influence the 
public agenda of attributes. Therefore, the second level of agenda-setting effects 
“examines how media coverage affects both what the public thinks about and how the 
public thinks about it” (Ghanem, 1997, p.3). Becker & McCombs (1978) examined 
the attributes‟ agenda in the news media portrayals of candidates during the 1976 US 
presidential elections. The researchers found a strong connection between the media 
frames or portrayals and the public‟s description of the candidates which represents 
the public‟s attributes agenda (cited in Ghanem, 1997).  
The attributes of a topic are the frames or viewpoints presented by the media 
for each issue. Frames are defined by Entman (1993) as the media‟s focus on some 
sides of an issue while ignoring other sides. Framing focuses on the way issues are 
covered making agenda setting at the second level an examination of how such frames 
affect the public‟s perception (Ghanem, 1997). At the second level of agenda-setting, 
media frames or attributes represent the independent variable. Ghanem (1997) broke 
frames covered by the media into four main categories: topic, the presentation of the 
topic, the topic‟s cognitive attributes and finally its affective attributes. The topic is 
what‟s covered in the news item. The presentation is the size and placement of the 
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news item. The cognitive attributes are the details included in the news item. The 
affective attributes include the tone of coverage. Takeshita (1995), cited in Ghanem 
(1997) defined the four dimensions on the attribute agenda as problem definition, 
attributed causes to the problem, evaluations or moral judgments of the problem, and 
finally the proposed solution to the problem. 
Hundreds of research studies have applied agenda-setting theory. Although 
most of the research conducted so far examined the agenda-setting affect during 
elections, researchers have also explored the agenda-setting effect beyond election 
studies. For example, Holbrook and Hill (2005) cited by McCombs & Reynolds 
(2009) studied the agenda-setting effect of crime drama using data gathered from 
experimental research. They found that viewers of crime dramas shared growing 
crime-related concerns which consequently affected their opinions about the 
president. In this case, crime dramas set the salience of crime issues among viewers 
which affected their attitudes towards the president. 
More recently scholars have extended the effect of the agenda-setting arguing 
that the news media may also show people what to think. By establishing this salience 
of news issues and influencing the public‟s picture of their surrounding world, the 
news media may also influence people‟s attitudes towards these issues and 
consequently influence action. When the media establish this salience, specific issues 
become the center of “public attention, thought, and perhaps even action” (McCombs 
& Reynolds, 2009, p.1). Future research on the agenda-setting theory application is 
moving beyond studying the formation of media agendas to considering how it can be 
applied by media to improve society (Severin and Tankard, 2001).  
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2.3. Agenda-Setting and Democracy 
 Mass media play a pivotal role in the democratic process of any country 
(McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997). The agenda-setting function of the media is 
central to comprehend the dynamics of established and emerging democracies.  
Tan and Weaver (2009) studied agenda setting by examining public opinion at 
the level of the state and legislative policies. The researchers found a positive 
correlation between the newspaper and public agendas in five states in the United 
States over a period of 14 years. Citing Jones and Baumgartner (2005), the 
researchers noted that the legislature acquire, understand and prioritize information as 
a result of media exposure. The media also help in shifting the priority of policy 
issues by giving attention to different topics over a period of time (Tan and Weaver, 
2009). Therefore, the media influence policy, pushing for change in favor of the 
public good. 
Moon (2008) applied both the agenda-setting theory to media use and civic 
engagement. Moon‟s dissertation entitled “Agenda-Setting Effects as a Mediator of 
Media Use and Civic Engagement: From What the Public Thinks About to What the 
Public Does”, examined both first and second level effects of agenda setting. The 
researcher tested the impact of each level on cognitive and affective attitudes, 
measuring attitude strength as opinion at the first level and the strength of emotions at 
the second level. Moon‟s study extended the theory of agenda setting to go beyond 
the salience of issues to include influence on attitudes and behaviors. After 
conducting a content analysis of the New York Times and NBC‟s nightly news along 
with analyzing secondary survey data on civic engagement applying the theory of 
agenda-setting and the OSOR model, Moon concluded that setting the public agenda 
influences the public to think about these issues and this process of thinking leads to 
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attitude change and consequently action. Therefore, the findings of Moon‟s study 
support that using media to seek information has a positive impact on engagement. 
This influence is especially significant in newspaper usage (Moon, 2008). The 
researcher linked agenda-setting effects to engagement asserting that the process 
which begins with media use end up with potentially significant consequences that 
lead to informed and possibly engaged citizenry.  
The agenda-setting effect on attitude strength can be explained as follows: 
“Since the mass media (from an agenda-setting perspective) tend to stimulate more 
thinking and learning about objects and attributes in people‟s minds, one might 
consequently expect that this increased thinking would lead to strengthened attitudes” 
(Kiousis, 2005, p 7, cited in Moon, 2008, p.37). Because attitude predicts behavior, 
any change in attitude leads to behavioral change. According to the theory of agenda-
setting in light of Moon‟s study, the news media influence people on what and how to 
think about issues. This leads to a change in attitude strength which will further lead 
to behavioral change or action. 
The following two figures used in Moon‟s (2008) study illustrate how the 
agenda-setting function of the media influences civic engagement.  
 
Figure 2.3a First level agenda-setting impact on civic engagement  
(Moon, 2008, p.43) 
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Figure 2.3b Second level agenda-setting impact on civic engagement  
(Moon, 2008, p.45) [sic] 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1. Defining Civic Engagement 
“Civic engagement is gaining an awareness of your civic role and participating 
actively, nurturing competencies and civic skills to function as a citizen: One who 
knows his rights or responsibilities and takes action in forwarding their rights and 
responsibilities” 
         (Al Shimi, 2010) 
 
The term civic engagement encompasses a broad variety of activities. The term is 
divided into two words civic and engagement. According to the Merriam Webster 
dictionary, the word civic comes from the Latin civis which means citizen. 
Engagement means involvement or commitment. According to Adler and Goggin 
(2005), the term civic engagement describes several diverse viewpoints of citizenship 
and different types of activities associated with it. Adler and Goggin (2005) list 
several definitions for civic engagement. The first on the definitions‟ list is 
community service which emphasizes voluntary individual participation within local 
communities. The second definition views civic engagement as a collective action 
where individuals join hands acting as active citizens to influence their society. Some 
scholars also merge this collective actions definition of civic engagement with 
political involvement. Under this definition, civic engagement is seen as producing 
collective activities that are political or involving governmental action 
 Thorson (2005) defines civic engagement as the participation of people in 
their civic environment. This environment constitutes the “public sphere” where 
people communicate their civic or public affairs leading to common goals. Therefore, 
civic engagement is not limited to what‟s political. It encompasses people‟s social 
environment in its entirety. It also includes all aspects that lead to democratic 
citizenship from discussion to decision making. This also involves interest, 
knowledge and attitudes about public affairs. As Thorson (2005) puts it, the question 
22 
 
of civic engagement “must take into account at least four kinds of human response: 
civic interest, knowledge, attitudes, and behavior” (p. 206).  
Putnam (2000) divides the term into formal and informal civic engagement. 
Informal societal activities include visiting friends and playing games. Formal social 
activities involve more organized community and political participation. There isn‟t 
any consensus between scholars over the definition of civic engagement, the term 
mostly refers to how citizens participate and engage in their communities to improve 
living conditions for themselves and for other people. Delli Carpini (2004) defines 
civic engagement as “individual and collective actions designed to identify and 
address issues of public concern.” Civic engagement can be divided into two forms of 
participation, political and civic participation. The former involves individual actions 
that aim at government such as voting or calling for a change in public policy. The 
latter refers to voluntary activities that aim at helping others in a community (cited in 
Thorson, 2005). 
“Civic engagement doesn‟t only involve voting … it means other things like being 
aware of social ills, being involved, and working with associations that improve our 
daily life. It goes from associations that deal with motherhood to electoral 
monitoring” (Hamdy, 2010, personal interview). 
3.2. Media and Civic Engagement 
Numerous research studies demonstrate a positive correlation between civic 
engagement and media information use. News is considered the pivotal means that 
connects people to the civic world. Studies which examined strategies of information-
processing also support that the dynamic processing of information transmitted 
through media has an essential role to perform in several aspects of political 
engagement such as learning, interest and participation. Numerous studies found that 
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attention to news had a positive influence on enhancing political knowledge, and 
hence promotes participation (Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004).  
Boyd (2010) found positive correlations between adolescents‟ media use for 
political information and civic engagement. The findings of Boyd‟s (2010) study 
significantly associate media use with fostering civic skills and participation. In 
addition, the findings also support that the use of television to acquire news is more 
dominant than the use of the Internet for the same purpose (Boyd, 2010). 
Similarly, Shah, McLeod & Yoon (2001) found positive influence of print, 
broadcast and the Internet media news use on civic engagement. The study found that 
the information use of the media is positively related to social capital as opposed to 
the entertainment use which is negatively related with social capital. The researchers 
also found that using the internet to exchange information had a strong influence on 
interpersonal trust and hence civic participation when compared to the traditional 
news media.  
Political communication scholars assert that discussion of public affairs 
among citizens is the foundation of democratic participation.  Several recent research 
studies have supported the normative theory of political discussion by finding a strong 
correlation between political discussion and participation. Through political 
discussion, citizens develop more knowledge and comprehension of political issues 
and therefore become more integrated into their communities and more eager to 
participate (Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004). 
Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim (2004) analyzed the dynamics of political 
discussion as an influence on mobilization. The analyses touched upon several 
features of political discussion including the frequency, diversity and the desired 
effect which includes the form of engagement and participation.  The researchers 
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found that frequent and attentive discussions of political issues among individuals, is 
positively related to political involvement.  
In his article Watching Television and Civic Engagement: Disentangling the 
Effects of Time, Programs, and Stations, Hooghe (2002), examined the relationship 
between watching television and political attitudes. Hooghe‟s findings emphasize the 
need to examine programming preferences among viewers. The results of the study 
demonstrate that the type of programs people watch and not just the time of television 
exposure determine whether the impact on civic values and attitudes is positive or 
negative.  The researcher didn‟t find any evidence to support television‟s negative 
effects. He found strong relations between the medium and attitudes towards social 
capital. The findings of Hooghe‟s study support a positive relation between news 
programming and such attitudes. Hooghe (2002) suggests that the amount of exposure 
to television, political orientations and type of programs influence civic engagement.  
Hooghe‟s (2002) findings also support a negative relation with regards to 
entertainment programming and social capital attitudes. “This could imply that 
commercial stations, especially, cultivate a less civic-minded value pattern among 
their viewers” (Hooghe 2002, p.2). Several scholars disagree with the negative effects 
that are attributed to television viewing, arguing that results of such studies are not 
significant. Other studies demonstrate positive effects to television viewing.  
Baum (2002) asserts that scholars have ignored the impact of the 
entertainment media on political participation or policymakers, arguing that the soft 
news media provide an alternative access to information to a large number of viewers 
who wouldn‟t learn about sophisticated issues if it wasn‟t for their exposure to the 
entertainment-oriented media. In other words, the presence of the soft news media 
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offers a broader access to political and public information to a huge population 
segment that refrains from tuning to the traditional news media.  
Baum (2002) studied viewers‟ consumption of soft news in the entertainment 
media and its relation with political knowledge. The study concluded that individuals 
not interested in politics attend to public affairs and crisis news when presented in an 
entertainment context or in a soft news format. Consequently, opinions of politically 
apathetic audiences who tune to the entertainment media differ from the politically   
active people who get their information from the traditional news media. Although 
some scholars argue that the entertainment-oriented media is mainly concerned with 
sensationalism, drama, gossip and celebrity news, Baum (2002) demonstrated that the 
entertainment-oriented media also discuss significant political, public, affairs and 
foreign affairs in the United States. Accordingly, “public scrutiny” is raised which 
could possibly affect policy (Baum, 2002). 
Entertainment and information can complement each other and are not 
necessarily competing for audience attention. Citing Garber (1994), Lee (2002)notes 
that adding drama to news might attract uninterested viewers who would ignore a new 
story if it was strictly informative. Therefore, adding an element of entertainment will 
stimulate viewers' thinking and hold their attention. Such wider penetration of 
political knowledge transforms the politically disinterested public into an attentive 
public especially during crisis situations.  
There is an ongoing scholarly debate over the negative impact of television on 
civic engagement. Scholars like Putnam (2000) blame television over the decline in 
civic life in the United States. In his book Bowling Alone, Putnam argues that the 
erosion in America‟s social cohesion is linked to the rise in television viewing with a 
particular emphasis on entertainment programming. Putnam argues that the time spent 
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viewing television replaces the time that people dedicate to political participation and 
civic activities. In other words, television viewing reduces active citizenship leading 
to a decline in civic engagement and political participation. Putnam blames television 
for the civic participation decline in the United States.  
According to Hooghe (2002), negative statistics on America‟s decline in voter 
turnout from 1960 to 2000 support Putnam‟s argument. Statistics also show a 25 
percent decline in civic group involvement among American citizens. Television 
critic Neil Postman wrote that television was “amusing” Americans to “death”. Also, 
after a series of studies on television‟s cultivation effects, George Gerbner found that 
watching television cultivates insecurity among viewers especially those who are 
heavily exposed to the medium. Such feelings of insecurity translate into distrust and 
withdrawal from society leading to a general misperception of the world as a meaner 
place than it actually is. Gerbner referred to this phenomenon as the “mean world 
syndrome” (cited in Hooghe, 2002). 
Although Putnam blamed television for the decline in civic engagement, he 
asserts that other informational media usage promotes engagement. Newspaper 
reading doesn‟t have a negative impact on cohesion and therefore may actually 
promote civic engagement. However, statistics also depict a decline in the news use of 
media. Other scholars agree with Putnam about the general negative role of television 
but argue that television viewing may have a positive role if the medium is used for 
seeking information. Some see television as giving viewers the opportunity to learn 
about significant current events and political debates thus promoting awareness and 
civic engagement. Watching informative content such as news and current affairs 
programs may reinforce and promote political participation and civic engagement 
(Hooghe, 2002). 
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Norris (2001) stressed that research should not be limited to examining the 
number of hours people spend watching television, authors should also take into 
account the nature of programs people are watching. Norris (2001) associates 
watching news on television with an interest in politics and an increase in political 
participation. The researcher, however, emphasized that credibility does play a very 
important role because people are more likely to be encouraged to participate if they 
find their source of information credible (cited in Hooghe, 2002). Other researchers 
assert that the channel people watch plays a role in triggering civic engagement. 
According to many scholars, public broadcasting should mostly promote civic values 
as opposed to commercial channels which are entertainment driven and thus reduce 
civic engagement (cited in Hooghe, 2002). 
Civic values are fundamental to the public sphere. Habermass sees a rational 
public sphere as a key to civil society in a liberal democracy. A civil society provides 
space for individuals to express, communicate, and debate their ideas freely. An 
“idealized civil society” involves social movements that break the limits of their 
specific spheres in an attempt to appeal to other spheres and gain their attention and 
support. The structure of this ideal civil society is based on a series of bipolar notions 
such as good and bad or democracy and counter-democracy (Alexander, 2000). In 
1998, Alexander developed a set of “binary codes” that apply to liberal-democracies 
on a universal level. The codes that characterize civil society‟s democratic discourse 
include characteristics such as activist, autonomous, rational, reasonable, control, 
realistic, calm and sane. The opposite set of codes in democratic discourse which 
restrict civil society and hinder the freedom allowed by a democracy, include 
passiveness, dependence, irrationality, hysteria, excitability, passion, unrealism and 
madness (Alexander, 2000). 
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3.3. Talk Shows 
“Talk shows have increasingly become sites where news, entertainment, and political 
power converge.” - Bernard Timberg  
 
A large number of politicians either call or appear on television talk shows to 
respond to citizens‟ calls and debate issues of public interest, establishing channels of 
virtual communication between the general public and policy makers.  Politicians‟ 
appearances on talk shows since the 1990s created wide interest in this television 
genre, inciting communication scholars to study the political and social impact of 
television talk shows (Timberg 2002). In 1997, Schumuckler quoted estimates of 
American talk show viewers as reaching 14 million per day (cited in Johnson, Smith, 
Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun, 1999).  
Talk shows substituted traditional news by providing social, political and 
public affairs information in a simplified entertaining way that is easy to grasp by the 
ordinary citizen, forming an information-entertainment blend often referred to by 
communication scholars as infotainment. This blend or infotainment is observable in 
the increase of drama in news stories and the frequent appearance of political figures 
on talk shows (Lee, 2002). Although the primary function of talk shows is to 
entertain, many viewers see talk shows as an informative source on several issues and 
many talk show hosts see their mission as providing information that serves the public 
in an entertaining way (Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun, 1999).  
The popularity of talk shows is rooted in their ability to break sociopolitical 
boundaries by addressing controversial issues and holding politicians and officials 
accountable. Talk shows address citizens‟ concerns and open new channels of 
communication between the populace and the ruling elite. Many politicians appear on 
talk shows to clarify their points of view on several issues. Most importantly, they 
appear on such shows for exposure, publicity and to spread their political agendas to a 
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wide audience (Lee, 2002). Politicians‟ appearance on talk shows dates back to 1968, 
when former US President Richard Nixon appeared on Laugh-In, a variety show 
(Moy, Xenos, and Hess, 2005). However, former U.S. President Bill Clinton was 
named the first “talk-show President” after appearing as a presidential candidate on 
Donahue, The Arsenio Hall Show, and MTV. 
Former president George W. Bush and presidential candidate Al Gore also 
appeared on many talk shows during their campaigns. In addition, when U.S. 
President Barak Obama wanted to publicize for his new political and economic plans 
to a significantly sizeable audience, he appeared on the “Tonight Show”, NBC‟s late-
night television talk show (Lloyd, 2009). Reuters predicted that the president‟s 
appearance on the late night television talk show “will give him a high-profile stage” 
(Mason and Colvin, 2009).  
According to television critic Robert Lloyd (2009), Obama‟s appearance on a 
late night comedy talk show is unprecedented and is considered the first for a sitting 
president. Lee (2002) asserts that by spreading out the political agenda and connecting 
people to politics, infotainment may help in diminishing the disparity in political 
participation among citizens (Lee, 2002). Therefore, infotainment may be perceived 
as providing a democratizing impact by giving viewers unconventional options to 
access political knowledge.  
Infotainment media such as talk shows are considered a phenomenon that 
serves as a significant source of news and political information that may sometimes 
lead to a change in attitude (Moy, Xenos, and Hess, 2005). Many political candidates 
have used such shows to emphasize their personality away from politics to reach and 
attract potential voters. Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) studied the priming effects of 
late-night comedy talk shows which have become an extension to the traditional news 
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media as they include political information and may sometimes mobilize the public to 
participate in politics. The researchers studied the effects of The Late Show with 
David Letterman and the Tonight Show with Jay Leno during the 2000 US 
presidential campaign to determine whether viewing late-night comedy shows 
influenced how viewers evaluated the presidential candidates who appeared on the 
show. Viewers of the shows based their evaluations of candidates on their character 
traits after their appearance on the shows. The researchers found that viewing late 
night comedy influenced viewers‟ perceptions of candidates Bush and Al Gore. 
 Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) applied the priming function of agenda setting 
in their study of the effects of late-night comedy talk shows on viewers evaluations of 
presidential candidates. The researchers examined the priming-effect to understand 
how media content influences viewers‟ judgments and attitudes following their 
exposure to the talk shows. Citing McCombs & Shaw (1972), the researchers defined 
priming as excessive media coverage that increases the salience of a particular issue 
among viewers.  
3.4. Definition, History and Development of Talk Shows 
A talk show is a “television show that is entirely structured around the act of 
conversation itself” (Timberg, 2002, p.3). Different forms of talk shows share specific 
basic elements: They all have groups of guests and they all include audience 
participation whether a visible in-studio audience or an invisible audience (Tolson, 
2001). Although conversations on talk shows seem unstructured, they are preplanned. 
Many interviews on talk shows are prepared for in advance by carefully selecting 
guests and screening questions (Timberg, 2002). However, regardless of such highly 
structured interviews, conversations on talk shows still seem spontaneous and are still 
characterized by immediacy and being in the present-tense.   
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To differentiate between television talk in general and talk shows, Timberg 
(2002) explains that television talk involves all kind of talk and is much broader than 
talk shows. Television talk is seen on a variety of programming including cooking 
programs, live court hearings, and beauty pageants. However, talk shows are 
characterized by several other features. They are presented by one or more hosts who 
guide their guests by setting limits, tones and directions of the conversation. The talk 
show revolves around the host who speaks to millions of viewers as if speaking to 
each individually. Once the talk show becomes a success, the host turns into a 
celebrity. The host acts mostly as managing editor and exercises great control over the 
show (Timberg, 2002).  
Talk shows have become a valuable commodity for many parties. For 
advertisers and executives, the host is the brand name that sells. For the hosts, the 
more their talk shows become successful, the higher their salaries. In 1991, Johny 
Carson of the Tonight Show received around 30 million dollars from NBC and Oprah 
Winfrey‟s worth reached 900 million dollars in 2000 (Timberg, 2002). For the guests, 
appearance on the talk show is based on the celebrity status and impact of the host 
which brings them wide exposure. According to television critic Robert Lloyd (2009), 
President Obama selected the Tonight Show in particular because it is “the Great 
American Talk Show” and its host Jay Leno is “a kind of president of the United 
States himself” (Lloyd, 2009). 
Munson (1993) traces the roots of talk shows to the coffeehouse gatherings of 
people in 18
th
 century England. Such salon-like gatherings involved talk about a 
variety of issues including news, arts and philosophy. The development of printing 
supported this talk tradition as magazines carried commentaries by writers who 
participated in the coffeehouse discussions. Magazine names such as “Town Talk” 
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and “Chit Chat” which emerged during this period reflected the influence of ordinary 
citizen talk. This talk tradition remained and developed until the spread of radio on 
the late 1920s.  
According to Munson (1993), the first radio talk show was aired in 1921. 
Radio historians noted that the talk show‟s main theme was farming as it was 
transmitted over WBZ for rural dwellers of Springfield, Massachusetts in the US. 
Radio talk shows diversified in content as the medium itself grew bigger reaching 
wider audiences. However, talk shows in the late twenties lacked the interactivity 
between the host and audience that is popular today. Back then the talk show focused 
on the host talking to the audience about his daily experiences followed by interviews 
with experts on a specific topic.  
More forms of talk shows with more room for audience participation started 
appearing in 1933 (Munson, 1993).  Such shows were more tied to people‟s problems. 
For example, The Voice of Experience talk show which broadcast from 1933 to 1940 
encouraged audience members to donate to poor people. The program‟s host was a 
social worker named Dr. Marian Sayle Taylor and her method reflected the economic 
problems of that period.  The interview format or “man on the street” talk shows also 
emerged during that period, introducing a new form of spontaneous interviews with 
people (Munson, 1993).  
The popularity of a talk show is built on the host-audience relationship. The 
more the host establishes rapport with his audience, the higher the show‟s popularity. 
Other key factors that determine the show‟s popularity include “audience participation 
and emotional involvement” (Scott, 1996, p.86). For example, radio call-in shows 
attract many audience members to call the show and engage in the discussion. Other 
viewers experience this form of engagement vicariously through listening to other 
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callers. In television talk shows, a big portion of the interaction is limited to the guests 
or the in-studio audience. However, some television talk shows still provide room for 
callers to interact with the programs such as Larry King who welcomes call-ins (Scott, 
1996). 
The expansion of audience participation talk shows was rooted in the growing 
importance of public opinion during this period as people were interested in finding 
out what others think. However, this period of audience participation didn‟t survive 
past the 1940s. This is because when World War II erupted, these shows were 
censored by government officials for fear of opinions that may disrupt public order. 
As a result, interest in radio talk shows plunged as the program‟s lacked their 
informality and spontaneity.  
This period referred to as the golden age of radio soon ended not only because 
of lack of interest in censored talk shows but also as a result of the audience shifting 
away to television (Munson, 1993).  Television talk shows emerged out of the success 
of radio talk shows. The early generation of television shows migrated from radio to 
television in the late 1940s. Although such shows were not exactly talk shows, they 
are considered the beginnings of television talk because they featured short interviews 
with celebrities in addition to variety shows (Scott, 1996).    
In his book Television Talk: A History of the TV Talk Show, Timberg (2002) 
provides a detailed account of the historical cycles and development of television talk 
shows which emerged in 1948. Timberg (2002) divides the history of television talk 
shows into five cycles or periods. The first cycle (1948-1962) was marked by 
experimentation that extended into the early 1950s, consolidation from the mid to late 
1950s, and network control dominated by CBS and NBC. The founders of television 
talk shows were the successful radio hosts whose reputation as successful radio star 
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hosts attracted advertisers, raised funds and paved the way for their new television 
shows. The founding talk show hosts include Edward R. Murrow and Arthur Godfrey 
from CBS, Dave Garroway, Arlene Francis, Steve Allen and Jack Paar from NBC, 
and Mike Wallace from DuMont.  These founders came out of a variety of radio 
traditions such as news, variety talk, humor, live theater, quiz shows and sketch 
comedy.  
This period was a time for experimenting and creating new form of talk shows 
suitable for the television industry which boomed during that era. During the period 
from 1948 to 1953, television penetration in the United States boomed expanding 
from one percent to 53 percent. Towards the end of the 1950s, television‟s penetration 
climbed reaching 90 percent. The founders of television talk shows all went off the air 
by 1962 due to lack of independence and tensions with corporate directors who were 
submissive to advertising and government pressure. For example, Jack Paar walked 
out of The Tonight Show after network supervisors censored a “harmless” joke from 
his show without prior notice. Edward R. Murrow also walked out of CBS because his 
investigative reports were considered problematic by network executives (Timberg, 
2002).  
The second cycle (1962-1974) marked the increase in network consolidation 
and power creating new challenges. The three large networks joined forces. Network 
executives exercised strict control of the talk shows content for fear of upsetting 
advertisers and sponsors. Video tape provided network directors with more power and 
control over live programming as they can run recorded shows on videotape as live. 
Talk show hosts like Barbara Walters, Johnny Carson, and Mike Wallace who had the 
skills to sustain and manage their careers in this new corporate system emerged as 
stars during that period.  Although the networks had the biggest market share of talk 
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shows, some nationally syndicated talk shows managed to emerge and survive besides 
the networks during that period. Television during that period played a powerful role 
in American politics. The presidential debates of 1960 between Nixon and Kennedy 
were “major television talk events” (Timberg, 2002, p56).Towards the end of the 
1960s, late-night talk shows became very popular and more profitable providing more 
competition from syndicated shows to the networks.   
The third cycle (1974-1980) is a period of transitions.  Independent stations, 
PBS, syndicators and cable acted as a real challenge to network dominance in the 
industry. Syndicators produced the shows and sold them to stations and networks. 
New production technologies and low costs attracted investors to produce the 
syndicated talk shows. The early 1970s marked a rise in talk about civil rights, 
women‟s public and political participation, the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam 
War. A series of talk shows tackled these issues often influencing each other to 
compete and provide their audiences with the news on demand. Talk shows changed 
during that period with on air confrontations and critical debate on the rise, as the 
control of networks loosened due to competition from syndication, independent 
stations and cable.   
The fourth cycle (1980-1990) is described as the post-network era. New stars 
of television talk shows rose to fame through national syndication instead of 
networks. Names like Oprah Winfrey, Arsenio Hall, Sally Jessy Raphael, and Geraldo 
Rivera appeared through such national syndicated shows. Such new star hosts marked 
the new wave of recognition to previously misrepresented social classes. Winfrey and 
Hall were African Americans and Raphael and Rivera were Hispanic Americans. 
Their presence changed the scene in the talk show world. Talk shows were no longer 
limited to representing the White middle class. This era marked an interest among 
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television marketers to seek out new audiences including women and different ethnic 
and racial minorities and represent them on the shows. The representations of 
minorities and women were still very stereotypical (Timberg, 2002).   
The fifth cycle (1990-1995) featured news content as entertainment. During 
this period, the lines between news and entertainment started to blur. New formats of 
talk shows appeared as a result of the cable expansion such as reality programs and 
infotainment. Many talk show products appeared such as sports talk, comedy, news 
talk, and specialized talk shows covering topics such as health, homes, cooking and 
religion. In the early 1990s, most talk shows were produced by cable or syndication. 
Talk shows expanded vigorously and producers had to develop new ways to keep the 
old shows fresh. Talk shows were integrated with other communication forms such as 
websites. Major talk show hosts like Oprah and Rosie established their own 
magazines (Timberg, 2002).  
 Timberg (2002) notes that each cycle in the history of talk shows carries with 
it cultural and economic changes that shape the television industry as well as the 
genre itself. New formats of television talk shows are seldom to appear but 
modifications of talk show subgenres take place to stay abreast of new developments 
in the broadcast industry. Such developments carry with them several changes 
including blurring the traditional lines separating news from entertainment, starting 
from the 1980s.The content of television talk shows, is influenced greatly by the 
programming schedule. The time of the day determines the nature of the show, 
whether its entertainment or news-orientated, because different parts of the day mean 
different audiences that the show must appeal to. Timberg (2002) divides the talk 
show genre into three main subgenres: late-night, daytime, and morning talk shows. 
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Late-night entertainment talk shows follow the format of The Tonight Show 
hosted by Jack Paar and Steve Allen from 1954 to 1961. This popular type involves a 
celebrity host talking with a single primary guest with secondary guests close by. This 
form of talk shows is rooted in friendly, informal and humorous chats between the 
host and his guests. David Letterman added new innovations to the late-night 
entertainment talk show format by adding political satire and stand-up comedy. Jay 
Leno and other hosts followed Letterman‟s approach in hosting late-night talk shows.   
The second subgenre, the day-time talk show was found by Arlene Francis 
who started this format as a forum for education and providing service to the public 
through discussing family, home, women issues and public concerns. The daytime 
audience-participation talk show is based on the format of The Phil Donahue Show 
broadcast from 1967 to 1995. Donahue‟s television show is based on the success of 
his Conversation Piece, a call-in show broadcast on Radio from 1963 to 1967.  The 
show‟s format is based on the interaction between the studio audience and guests. 
Audience members comment or address questions to celebrity or expert guests, 
creating an interactive type of program.  
Viewers of daytime talk shows are mostly non-working women staying at 
home. Shattuc (1997) noted that because daytime talk shows attract a large audience 
of female viewers, they provide women with the opportunity to express their opinions, 
share their problems, and discuss their private lives in public. Shattuc emphasizes the 
effect of daytime talk shows on feminism. Famous followers of Donahue‟s successful 
format include Oprah Winfrey who appeared in the 1980s attracting more viewers and 
wide interest in daytime television talk shows. However, as the form became more 
popular it attracted imitators to shift from content that serves the public to purely 
entertainment and tabloid commercial standards. Such daytime tabloid talk shows 
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include Jerry Springer, Rickie Lake and other reality talk programs.  As for the 
morning show, it adheres to a magazine format like that of Dave Garroway‟s Today 
Show of 1952. The morning show presents a mixture of news and entertainment. 
3.5. An Overview of the Political Impact of Talk Shows 
The significance of television talk shows lies in the fact that the genre is the 
center of substantial public discussion and scholarly debate, which produced opposite 
opinions regarding the nature and significance of these programs (Tolson, 2001, p.3). 
Previous studies produced two different views of talk shows (Lee, 2002). Some 
scholars describe the kind of talk on talk shows as “trash talk” while others regard 
them as valuable channels for public discourse. Critics see them as producing nothing 
but heated debates that only serve an entertaining purpose, failing to reach the 
functions of politically oriented journalism. Whereas, supporters of talk shows see 
them as channels for public opinion expression and democratic deliberation (Lee, 
200).   
Critics of the controversial TV genre argue that talk shows „desensitize‟ 
viewers‟ perception of human sufferings, raise naïve opinions about complex issues in 
society, and distort the audience perception of reality (Tolson, 2001). Abt and 
Seesholtz (1994) argue that talk shows cross the lines of traditional structures of 
social order, stating that the genre blurs the lines between reality and fiction, personal 
and public, and normal and abnormal (cited in Tolson, 2001). They assert that talk 
shows undermine moral and traditional values by providing exposure to abnormal 
subcultures such as presenting homosexuals or deviants. By breaking social stigmas, 
talk shows make what‟s out of the ordinary seem acceptable (Tolson, 2001).  
According to Tolson (2001), some scholars associate talk shows with 
fakeness, sensationalism, and misrepresentation of reality. In 1999, the Guardian 
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reported that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) suspended a researcher and 
two producers of the talk show Vanesssa following a disclosure that some guests were 
fakes. In the United States, the Jerry Springer show was the center of attention and 
criticism when the talk show was held responsible for influencing the murder of a 
homosexual who appeared on the show in 1995. The family of the victim filed a 
lawsuit against Time Warner and Telepictures Productions. In this particular case, the 
talk show was held responsible for influencing someone to commit murder 
representing an extreme case of allegedly exploiting participants and subjecting them 
to danger (Tolson, 2001). A national debate in the US concerning tabloid talk shows 
hosted by Jerry Springer and Ricki Lake erupted in the mid-1990s. A “talk summit” 
led by the former US secretaries of health, education and human services was 
organized with the talk show hosts and sponsors urging them to control the talk in 
their shows (Timberg 2002).  
On the other hand, supporters of the controversial television genre see talk 
shows as a public forum on political and social issues (Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, 
Orrego, & Yun, 1999). Ordinary citizens can contact the program and voice their 
concerns or express their opinions through phone or email. Talk shows offer 
audiences a chance to publicly express their opinions, making the genre unique in its 
discursive dynamics. The popularity of talk shows is rooted in the enjoyment of 
seeing and hearing ordinary citizens engage in informal types of talk (Tolson, 2001).  
Participation by ordinary citizens is a key element of talk shows. Therefore, the genre 
provides a channel for opinion expression influencing public opinion formation 
(Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007). Nevertheless, critics of talk 
shows regard infotainment as affecting the seriousness of political talk and trivializing 
politics. 
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Lee (2002) noted that critics also argue that using entertainment in news 
supersedes significant information because infotainment weakens reasonable political 
discussion. However, such criticisms are based on the perception that entertainment is 
competing with information for attention (Lee, 2002). A study of a radio talk show in 
Hong Kong conducted by Lee (2002) found talk shows extremely critical of the 
government and people in power to the extent that talk show hosts in Hong Kong 
represent the public by speaking on behalf of them (Lee 2002). Therefore, talk shows 
are a blend of both views. They can be a forum for public opinion and an entertaining 
medium at the same time. Results of the Lee‟s study support that talk shows provide 
listeners with information on politics and the chance to express their opinion and 
voice their criticism of policy (Lee, 2002). In addition to seeing or hearing the voices 
of ordinary citizens, talk shows act as significant sources of news, playing a role in 
forming an “informed public opinion” and thus promoting “active democratic 
citizenship” (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007, p.13).   
Young and Tisinger (2006) studied the effect of late-night comedy on young 
television viewers. The researchers examined whether young viewers use late-night 
comedy talk shows as a substitute for traditional news sources. They also studied the 
role the programs play in providing political information during election time. 
According to the study‟s findings, young people tune in to late night comedy shows 
which play an obvious role in U.S. presidential elections. Late-night comedy talk 
shows seek to play a significant role in politics (Young and Tisinger, 2006). The 
researchers explored a report published by the Pew Research Center (2000) about the 
information sources U.S. citizens use during election time. The report demonstrated 
that 34 percent of respondents aged 18 to 29 receive political information from late-
night talk shows (Young and Tisinger, 2006).  The press and other news programs 
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picked the report and released stories and commentaries on the role late-night shows 
play as a source of political news for America‟s youth.  
Davis and Mares (1998) studied the effects of viewing talk shows on 
adolescents because this population is thought to be the most vulnerable to these kinds 
of shows (cited in Tolson, 2001). Testing four effects types, the researchers surveyed 
a number of 282 students at high school. Their study contradicted with the earlier 
findings of Abt and Seesholtz. Their results supported only the hypothesis that “talk 
shows might distort viewers‟ sense of reality” (Tolson, 2001, p.10). In other words, 
teenagers tend to overestimate teen-related problems in reality. However, findings of 
the study showed that exposure to talk shows encouraged teens to take issues more 
seriously, promoting „moral judgment‟. 
Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan (2007) studied the influence of 
daytime talk shows on political opinion formation, using the agenda-setting and 
cultivation theories as a theoretical framework to their study. To determine the effect 
of talk shows on political opinion formation the researchers conducted a telephone 
survey of 596 adults. The researchers tested the relationship between talk show 
viewing and viewers‟ support for government help in family problems. They 
specifically selected family issues because previous content analysis studies of 
daytime talk shows showed that this theme of discussion is the most recurrent topic of 
discussion (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007).    
In addition, they also tested the relationship between perceptions of reality in 
talk shows to viewers‟ support for government help in family issues. Findings of the 
study support the researchers‟ hypothesis that talk shows influence political opinion 
formation. There is a positive relationship between exposure to talk shows and 
forming political opinions. The researchers also found that the more the perception 
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that talk shows present real issues, the higher the influence on forming political 
opinions among viewers. With regards to the cultivation effect of talk shows, the 
researchers found that heavy viewing of such shows results in a mainstreaming of 
opinions. Despite viewers‟ different political orientations, liberal or conservative, the 
more viewers are exposed to the show and the more real they perceive it, the more 
their opinions become consistent (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007). 
Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim (2004) studied the role of talk shows in political 
engagement among young adults. The researchers selected their sample based on a 
2004 Pew Center survey which indicated that adults under 30-years-old seek 
nontraditional media sources for political information. Young viewers are believed to 
be more influenced by exposure to talk shows due to their heavy exposure to the 
entertainment media, low interest in politics, and lack of follow up on political issues. 
The survey also suggested that Americans are more likely to watch talk shows instead 
of network news during election time. Therefore, the researchers tested the 
relationship between talk show viewing and several forms of political engagement 
including political efficacy, trust and voting possibility (Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 
2004). They conducted a secondary analysis of a national phone survey of 1,600 
respondents. Findings of the study show that talk shows influence young adults‟ 
political engagement. The researchers also studied whether source credibility plays a 
role in young people‟s political engagement. The findings support that viewing talk 
shows and trust in the show messengers influences voting likelihood (Kwak, Wang & 
Guggenheim, 2004). 
Ross (2004) studied the effect of election call-in programs on public 
participation in the politics. The researcher conducted a case study on Election Call, 
broadcast on BBC radio and TV for almost two weeks before Britain‟s general 
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elections in 2001. The mission of the program is to target the apathetic British public 
to achieve a higher voter turnout. Although the voting turnout barely reached 60 
percent, it was much higher than expectations. The researcher studied the impact of 
Election Call because it promotes dialogue between politicians and audience callers. 
About 250 callers contact the program each day, 12 of which get on air to ask 
politicians their questions (Ross, 2004).  According to Ross (2004), television 
represents the “real public space in which politics occur and through which citizens 
comprehend the political process” (p.786).  Viewers, listeners and participants in call-
in programs perceive the talk show genre as a “public sphere” where different 
opinions are expressed and alternative voices are heard (Ross, 2004, p.786). 
Ross (2004) surveyed audience callers because some scholars argue that 
citizens who call such programs are not representative of the population because they 
might be politically active in the first place. Findings of the study demonstrated that 
regardless of their political ideology 92 percent of the callers felt they were 
representing the public in general or speaking on behalf of other fellow citizens when 
they posed questions to politicians on the program. In addition, 76 percent of the 
callers took the decision to call the program in order to voice a “pubic disquiet”, 
dissatisfaction or cynicism about policies, and politicians‟ lack of interaction with 
people and from the public‟s real world (Ross, 2004).  Also, 54 percent of the callers 
wanted to speak to a specific politician or party member in particular. Only 10 percent 
of the callers said they called to express their anger over a personal incident (Ross, 
2004). Regardless of being critical of politicians and expressing criticism on air, 
callers felt positive about their interaction with politicians on the show. Also, 82 
percent of the respondents said Election Call contributes to the process of democracy 
because it allows interaction with politicians, a chance for public engagement, holds 
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politicians accountable, clarifies positions on policies, and allows the dissemination of 
issues that are not very popular.   
Several studies that conducted content analyses of late night talk shows found 
consistent results in terms of content tone on political figures and political issues, 
which is mostly negative (Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). A study conducted by 
Niven, Lichter, & Amundson (2003) found that leading political personalities 
including presidential candidates and the president are common targets for jokes on 
late night television talk shows (cited in Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). Moy & 
Pfau (2000) also found that talk shows provide negative coverage of politicians and 
Young (2004) found that most talk shows focus on the shortcomings of presidential 
candidates (cited in Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). Cited in Ross (2004), Barker 
and Knight (2000) argue that negative media messages are more significant in 
producing attitude change than positive media messages. Several media studies 
suggest that the audience tend to agree with the views of the program presenter (Ross, 
2004). 
Baum (2005) examined the impact of interviewing candidates running for 
presidency on television talk shows. To determine the reasons behind the talk shows 
coverage of the presidential elections and the candidates‟ choice to appear on 
entertainment talk shows, the researcher selected the 2000 U.S. elections as a case 
study. Baum conducted a content analysis of talk shows coverage of the elections.  
Furthermore, the researcher carried out a survey to explore the impact of such 
interviews on political attitudes and voting. Results of the study reveal that talk show 
viewers who lack political awareness tend to prefer the candidate from the opposition 
party compared to viewers who are not exposed to talk shows and who also enjoy 
more political awareness. 
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Davis and Owen (1998) found a positive correlation between exposure to 
daytime talk shows and the viewers‟ estimation of teen related problems. Their 
findings showed that daytime talk show viewers overestimate the frequency of teen 
pregnancy, runaways, and sexual activity. Testing an agenda-setting effect, the 
researchers found that the agenda of talk shows influenced the public agenda (Davis 
and Owen, 1998).   
Hamo (2006) studied the democratizing impact of Israeli talk shows. The 
researcher analyzed lay or anonymous guests‟ discursive positioning on the popular 
Israeli talk show Live.  According to Hamo (2006), US studies on participation in talk 
shows found that marginalized persons purposively seek the chance to appear on talk 
shows to have their social problems heard in public. However, what lay people often 
risk is misrepresentation and a limited participation. Simon-Vandenbergen (2004) 
studied the discursive positioning of lay participants on British television talk show 
and found that they were represented as “inferior in the public sphere” (cited in Hamo 
2006).  
Similar results were found by Penz (1996) after studying daytime talk shows 
in America and finding the participation of lay persons to be very controlled by the 
program host. The researcher examined several dimensions of the dialogue including 
speaking turns (cited in Hamo 2006).  Hamo (2006) examined the social roles of lay 
people analyzing power relations between the talk show host and the guests. The 
researched examined natural and institutional discourse. The findings of Hamo‟s 
study indicate that anonymous guests‟ access to public discourse in talk shows is 
curbed by limitations and control. According to Hamo (2006), the findings of the 
study provide a cynical look at the talk shows‟ potential for democratization. 
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According to Munson (1993), talk shows tackle a wide-range of topics 
including significant political discussions, anecdotes, and touching personal stories.  
Talk shows function differently in different cultures (Thompson, 2004). 
Instead of creating a worldwide liberal-democracy model, talk shows in different 
countries create a special democratic model for each society. Thompson referred to 
studies comparing talk shows in the United States America and Germany. The data 
revealed varied content based on the cultural differences between democratic 
societies. Talk shows in America center around the host‟s personality, but German 
talk shows are hosted by moderators and do not carry the name of an individual host 
like American talk shows. Also, American talk shows present the personal 
experiences of ordinary guest, experts and celebrities. Whereas, guests on German 
talk shows represent the group point of view and not the individual. Both American 
and German talk shows are similar in the fact that they voice national debates 
(Thompson, 2004). 
Studying the participation of audiences on television talk shows, Livingstone 
and Lunt (1994) see such shows as giving people a chance to engage in a public 
discussion that is rooted in experiences and feelings. In addition, talk shows provide 
the ordinary public with an opportunity to dare the power of experts (cited in Lee, 
2002).  Leurdijk (1997) examined talk radio in the Netherlands and found that they 
illustrate the contradiction between people‟s experiences and the official policy (cited 
in Lee, 2002). 
Livingstone and Lunt (1992) who analyzed European shows to determine why 
ordinary people would want to appear on such shows wrote that talk shows are a 
“cultural forum in which the viewer-as-citizen may participate in public debate”. Talk 
shows influence societies through empowering ordinary citizens and marginalized 
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people. For example, Gamson (1999) noted that homosexual guests used their 
appearance on talk shows to win public exposure and serve their cause. It‟s clear that 
talk show participants grab the chance to present their individuality and define their 
identities.  Livingstone and Lunt (1992) and Gamson (1999) agreed that there three 
types of guest who appear on talk shows: The political citizens who discuss political 
and social issues, the victimized guests who bring money to these shows through their 
highly viewed stories and the individuals who aspire for exposure to achieve self-
actualization. 
Trepte (2005) studied the motives behind viewers‟ participation in television 
talk shows as guests. The researcher analyzed audiences of German talk shows 
applying the theory of symbolic self-completion to determine the reasons why guests 
participated in the shows. The researcher found that realizing one‟s self is a primary 
motive behind viewers wanting to participate as guests. Other reasons include 
therapeutic talking and confessing on talk shows. Trepte (2005) conducted two 
studies. The first research study was conducted by interviewing more than 60 viewers 
of talk shows. The second study involved an experiment with exactly 33 participants. 
Findings of the study suggest that individuals who wish to participate as guests on talk 
shows do so because they strive for “self-realization and self-symbolizing.” 
Dixon and Spee (2003) analyzed talk on the Flemish talk show Jan Publiek, 
applying two theories namely speech act theory and Bakhtinian genre theory. The 
researchers wanted to test the assumption that television talk shows provide “ordinary 
participants” with the chance to express their opinions, identities and feelings to serve 
their own aims, contributing to democratic discourse. The researchers are optimistic 
about the type of therapeutic discourse often implemented through television talk 
shows such as Oprah Winfrey or Jan Publiek. When ordinary people on the show start 
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narrating their personal stories, a conscious and active discussion follows which 
transcends beyond the boundaries of the television studio leading to off air 
discussions that engage citizens. Dixon & Spee (2003) assert that such scenario is 
democratic. 
Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) agree that former studies on 
talk shows demonstrate that viewers use them to seek advice. This excessive existence 
of expert guests endorses the idea that talk shows are a means of advice to their 
viewers. The researchers assert that research studies must be conducted to measure 
the effectiveness of advice delivered by experts on talk shows. Because television talk 
shows are influential, researchers must be concerned with their content to examine 
what‟s being presented to the audiences. Because talk shows describe themselves as 
public forums that transmit significant information to their audiences, assessing the 
quality of experts and content of their advice is very important. The researchers note 
that quantitative research conducted on the content of television talk shows is very 
limited. Analyzing educational topics on talk shows, for example, is very important. 
Such topics tackled by talk shows highlight the genre‟s public service function. 
Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) point out Oprah Winfrey‟s vow to 
focus on significant issues to help her viewers. However, the researchers also note 
that topics presented on talk shows are selected mostly to entertain and attract 
audiences rather than educate them.   
Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) conducted a content analysis 
of 78 transcripts of eight television talk shows. The primary research question is to 
determine the percentage of participation of experts by counting their speaking turns.  
The researchers also coded the qualifications of experts to determine whether they 
were credible enough to offer viewers advice.  In addition, the nature of advice itself 
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and whether it solves people‟s problems or clarifies issues was also coded. Results of 
the study showed that experts were used in one half of the sample of talk shows 
examined in the study. This supports that experts are an integral part of talk shows. As 
for the qualification of experts, the research found that 29 percent of the experts are 
well trained with high academic degrees and 31 percent of the experts included 
writers and lecturers. Therefore, the research found that the experts were qualified to 
give advice to the public.  
Zhong (2004) conducted a case study on The Future Starts Now talk show that 
is part of the Dialogue series on China Central Television (CCTV), to investigate 
whether the show promoted real dialogue. Zhong (2004) defines real dialogue as a 
discussion between several parties that allows for a free exchange of ideas in order to 
achieve common grounds of understanding. After reviewing recorded conversations 
of the show to examine both form and presentation, the researcher found that the 
program employs a hierarchical model of communication. Central speakers are given 
more time, turns, rights to speak, and better physical presence in relation to the 
supporting speakers and studio audience. Opinions lack in diversity and are primarily 
in agreement with the official agenda (Zhong, 2004). The way the show is structured 
divides the speakers from the studio audiences emphasizing the former as an authority 
on information and the latter as speechless and passive recipients of information. 
Zhong (2004) asserts that the CCTV dialogue series failed to engage the audience in a 
participatory form of communication that is supposed to be liberal and democratic. 
Carpignano, Andersen, Aronowitz, and Difazio (1990) suggest that talk shows 
blur the space between the program and the audience, transforming the traditional 
public and creating new forms of audience participation (cited in Tolson, 2001). 
According to Tolson (2001), the work of Carpignano and his colleagues invokes that 
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the talk show genre is involved in constructing new kinds of public spheres. With 
reference to Habermass‟s public sphere, Tolson (2001) questions whether talk shows 
present a new public forum which allows diversity of opinion through debate and 
discussion.  
The diversity of opinion is evident in the genre‟s ability to deliver voices, such 
as those of women, which were marginalized in the classical public sphere. According 
to Habermass (1984), a public sphere is a forum that is not controlled by special 
interests and where public opinion can be created through rational discussion and 
debate “within an informed and democratic community of citizens”. According to 
Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), rational political debate is necessary for a working 
democracy (cited in Lee, 2002). Therefore, talk shows create an “electronic public 
place” in which discourse is exchanged and topics are discussed beyond any official 
political plan (Tolson, 2001, p.16).  
Livingstone and Lunt (1994) argue that talk shows perform confrontations 
between ordinary people or the audience who tell their personal stories and experts 
who frequently use institutional talk that only reflects what other experts are saying. 
The fact that ordinary people speak for themselves grants them credibility and 
authenticity, challenging the rationale of experts who speak for others. The 
researchers argued that instead of creating a public sphere or a place in which public 
opinion can be created, talk shows create an “oppositional public sphere”.  
Developed by Negt and Kluge (1990), the oppositional sphere refers to an 
environment where different discourses circulate and oppositional voices are 
expressed but without reaching a consensus. Tolson notes that although talk shows 
allow viewers to actively participate in discussions, a common conclusion or a clear 
popular opinion or decision that transcends the boundaries of the program is unlikely. 
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Consequently, the genre‟s role in the formation of a public sphere cannot be 
established.   
 The public sphere is not restricted to a specific place or medium but rather an 
outcome of a flow of public discourses throughout multiple channels which might 
include talk shows. Tolson (2001) draws the line between audience access to the mass 
media and influencing “civic public opinion”. Although there are cases that support 
the impact of talk shows like the impact of Oprah Winfrey‟s announcements on 
certain issues, the issue under debate is managed and controlled by the program host. 
Therefore, audience participants don‟t enjoy the absolute freedom to express their 
opinions or narrate their stories unless their information fits the show‟s agenda.  
According to Ross (2004), television represents the “real public space in 
which politics occur and through which citizens comprehend the political process” 
(p.786).  Viewers, listeners and participants in call-in programs perceive the talk show 
genre as a “public sphere” where different opinions are expressed and alternative 
voices are heard (Ross, 2004, p.786). 
3.6. Television Talk Shows in the Arab World and Egypt 
“Talk shows on Arab satellite television stations have been a forum for 
rollicking criticisms of Arab regimes and sharp discussion of taboo topics especially 
shows where listeners can call in with un-censorable opinions”    
  -The Associated Press (2008) 
The establishment of private Arab satellite channels in the 1990s brought a 
series of television talk shows which capture the interest of Arab viewers who are 
hungry for an independent media. According to Lynch (2006), Al-Jazeera‟s talk 
shows provide the Arab public with a space to openly debate issues. Political debates 
on talk shows cultivate contention and a pluralistic political culture. In 2003, Lynch 
argued that the format of Al-Jazeera‟s talk shows negates the idea that the television 
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medium creates a passive audience. Although state-television may not create an active 
audience because it only focuses on protocol news covering meetings and visits of 
heads of states, Arab television “political talk shows spark energetic arguments 
among viewers and seem to be encouraging critical argument” (Lynch, 2003, p.65). 
Lynch (2006) studied Al-Jazeera‟s most significant talk shows to assess the 
impact of Al-Jazeera talk shows on Arab politics. He analyzed 976 episodes of five 
programs between 1999 and 2004. The researcher also created a separate database for 
programs discussing Iraq and analyzed their content.  According to Lynch (2006), 
political talk shows reshaped the features of public opinion in the Arab World. The 
advent of Al-Jazeera news channel encouraged the emergence of a new environment 
of political debate in which new voices are heard that are in disagreement with the 
dominant regimes in power. A new public that challenged existing policies also 
emerged.  The channel offers multiple viewpoints on issues of discussion and call-in 
programs portray the worries shared by ordinary Arab citizens. Lynch found that in 
1999 alone, most talk shows on Al-Jazeera were critical of lack of democracy in the 
region.  
Al-Shami (2005) conducted a content analysis study on Al-Jazeera‟s talk show 
Minbar Al-Jazeera. His findings are in agreement with Lynch in that most of the 
issues raised by the talk show discussed Arab political reform. The total number of 
audience participation through phone, e-mail and fax reached 971 over a period of one 
year with 84.2 percent call-ins. The results show a huge gap in participation among 
genders with male participation reaching 95.7 percent and female participants at 4.3 
percent.  Most of the issues raised by the talk show revolved around Arab political 
reform, Iraq and Sudan. Abdel-Razek (2004) conducted a content analysis to describe 
the coverage of live Arab television talk shows. The researcher found that talk shows 
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heavily discussed social issues and political issues in the Arab world. Most issues 
revolved around women rights, human rights, women in Islam, and illiteracy.  
Youssef (2008) studied the agenda of two Egyptian television talk shows. In 
her unpublished master‟s thesis titled “Role of Private and State-owned Television 
Talk Shows in Setting the Agenda of Social Issues among the Egyptian Audience”, 
the researcher explored the agenda-setting effect of Al-Ashera Masa‟an talk show 
broadcast on the privately-owned satellite channel Dream 2 and Al Beit Beitak 
broadcast on the state-owned terrestrial and satellite channels. Youssef (2008) 
content-analyzed two months of talk show programming and conducted a survey 
among a purposive sample of talk show viewers in Cairo. The results showed a 
positive correlation between the talk show agenda and the viewers' agenda. The 
results also supported an intra-media agenda-setting influence between private-
channel talk shows and government-channel talk shows. Survey data revealed that 
around 98 percent of respondents watch talk shows to follow up on Egyptian affairs. 
Around 77 percent of respondents watch talk shows broadcast on Arab satellite 
channels including the Al Jazeera‟s Opposite Direction and Orbit‟s Ala Al-Hawa and 
Al-Qahera Al Youm.  
 Fathallah (2003) studied the exposure of the Egyptian elite to Arab television 
talk shows. The researcher used a non-random sample distributing his survey among 
200 Egyptian professors at four universities. The findings show that 86.2 percent of 
respondents watch Egyptian television talk shows because they cover local issues. 
Respondents also cited that talk shows provide an in-depth analysis of local issues. 
Viewers also cited lack of freedom and low credibility among the drawbacks of talk 
shows. 
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Mahmoud (2007) who studied Egyptian youth‟s dependency on talk shows in 
acquiring knowledge about Egypt‟s societal problems also found that Egyptian youth 
are highly dependent on talk shows as a source of information on social problems. A 
big percentage of respondents noted that talk shows on private satellite channels enjoy 
more freedom and discuss a variety of issues compared to talk shows on state-owned 
terrestrial channels. The results showed that 91 percent of the respondents said they 
found talk shows useful in learning about society problems. With regards to the 
popularity of talk shows, Al Bait Beitak (defunct) topped the responses as the most 
useful show followed by Al Ashera Masa‟an. 
The link between talk shows and political awareness in the Arab world is 
discussed by Sakr (2007) who asserted that talk shows in the Arab world legitimize 
disagreement on political issues which helps in establishing the groundwork for a 
“pluralistic political culture”. Therefore, it‟s essential to study the relationship 
between exposure to television talk shows and political engagement in Egypt. Mirazi 
(2010, personal interview) asserted that talk shows on Egyptian television channels 
are an effect of Al-Jazeera. 
 Many talk shows offer oppositional voices to the existing regimes and tackle 
sensitive social issues and taboos. According to AP (2008), one viewer called the talk 
show Al Ashera Masa‟an criticizing Egypt‟s former president Mubarak and 
wondering if the president is aware of soaring prices and other public concerns. Al-
Jazeera‟s talk show Al Ittijah Al Moákes (Opposite Direction) discussed police 
brutality in Egypt and several other Arab countries. In addition, a call-in talk show on 
LBC discussed the case of a Saudi woman who was raped by a gang but was sent to 
jail for going out with a man who is not related to her. The talk show shed light on 
sensitive and controversial issues dealing with Islamic law in Saudi Arabia.  Ahmed 
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Moslemani, who hosts Al Tabaa Al Oula (The First Edition) on Dream TV, was 
quoted by AP (2008) as saying talk shows provide citizen callers with the chance to 
humiliate their government. “These talk-shows were like a disaster to the 
government” (AP, 2008).  
Awareness of the impact of talk shows is evident in the amount of debate 
concerning talk shows and the nature of talk they deliver. Arguments for or against 
appear often in the local press or in online articles. Several talk shows aired on private 
satellite channels sparked waves of discussion or criticism in the local press. For 
example, a former talk show broadcast on Dream TV hosted by Hala Sarhan came 
under immediate flak after an entire episode dedicated to the discussion of sexual 
masturbation. Sarhan was also charged with harming the reputation of Egypt after she 
interviewed several Egyptian prostitutes on her talk show Hala Show aired on the 
Saudi-owned Rotana Cinema satellite channel (Shehata, 2007). The case erupted after 
the alleged prostitutes appeared on a talk show named 90 Deqeeqa claiming they were 
not real prostitutes. The young women said Sarhan allegedly paid them to appear on 
her talk show as real prostitutes. Dream TV also faced criticism after its live broadcast 
of Mohamed Hassanein Heykal speech at the American University in Cairo in which 
he discussed Egyptian political heritage (Menassat, 2008).  
The proliferation of talk shows in Egyptian privately-owned and state 
television which started in 2007 revived the interest of Egyptian citizens in news and 
current affairs (Menassat, 2008).  “Talk shows became the most popular programs in 
the history of satellite channels, with each channel trying to be unique and 
exceptional, and covering the most controversial topics” (Menassat, 2008). El Sherif 
(2010, personal interview) noted that the talk show format existed in Egyptian state 
television in the sixties. However, the content changed dramatically because the new 
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format of talk shows presents a diversity of opinions and discusses issues that were 
considered taboos in the past.  
Breaking such taboos started with Hala Sarhan‟s first talk show Ya Hala, 
which was “the Arab world's first American-style talk show” broadcast live on ART 
(Arab Radio and Television Network) in 1991. The now defunct show shocked the 
mostly conservative Arab audience when it started discussing sexual issues which 
were considered taboos in the Arab world. Sarhan was quoted by the Associated Press 
as saying she was the first “Arab woman to utter the word „sex‟ on television” 
(Hendawi, 2001). The talk show also discussed Arab government‟s relations with the 
United States, which was also considered a sensitive topic of discussion in the 
nineties.  
According to El Sherif (2010), television talk shows criticize the government, 
police and sometimes the president which is unprecedented in the history of Egyptian 
media. Talk shows proliferated in the Egyptian media following the success of Al 
Qahera Al Youm talk show which first appeared on the Saudi-owned Orbit Network. 
The show was introduced by Orbit following the success of Ala Al Hawa (On Air), a 
live call-in talk show which hit the airwaves in 1997. After years of Ala Al Hawa‟s 
and Al Qahera Al Youm‟s success, state-owned and privately owned Egyptian 
channels adopted the format. The first nightly television talk show that appeared on 
Egyptian state-owned television is Al Beit Beitak which now changed its name due to 
legal and copyright issues with the producing company into Masr Ennaharda. Two of 
the pioneering and popular talk shows that appeared on privately-owned Egyptian 
satellite channels are Al Ashera Masa‟an on Dream TV and 90 Deqeeqa on Mehwar.   
According to Hamdy (2010), not only did talk shows revolutionize Egyptian 
mass media by approaching taboo topics, they also provided a platform to all political 
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and social ideologies by approaching a multiplicity of issues daily. Talk shows are 
also “Egypt-centric” with most of their news content covering Egypt‟s relationship 
with others and community problems. Such a focus on local affairs was missing in the 
traditional media. Therefore, talk shows filled that vacuum by delivering day-to-day 
Egyptian news to people at home. Talk shows implement a journalistic informative 
approach but in an entertaining way (Hamdy, 2010, personal interview). 
Now every private satellite channel has its popular talk show. Although talk 
shows enjoyed relative freedom of expression and did tackle taboos and criticize the 
government, according to the Associated Press (2008), such on-air criticisms 
provoked Arab governments to issue restrictions on Arab television talks shows in 
2008. The Egyptian government, for example, went further to prevent new talk shows 
from hitting the air. Al Sa‟a or Clock TV cancelled a new talk show after objections 
from the Egyptian government which didn‟t want new critical voices (The Associated 
Press, 2008). To put that into effect, Arab information ministers approved a “Charter 
of Principles” in 2008 to regulate Arab satellite broadcasting. Many experts believe it 
was to silence these talk shows.  
The charter restricts criticisms of leaders and warns against airing content that 
would harm the reputation of a country or disrupt its social peace (The Associated 
Press, 2008). Critics of the charter say it was adopted to curb freedom of popular 
television talk shows, such as Al Qahera Al Youm, Al Ashera Masa‟an, 90 Deqeeqa 
and El Beit Beitak (90 Minutes, episode, 2008). On the other hand, supporters say it 
was developed to regulate television programming and set rules that they deemed 
essential. After months of debates, some Arab countries including the United Arab 
Emirates and Lebanon abandoned the charter. Although it was never really put into 
effect, it took a big share of media debates at that time. Talk shows started to enjoy 
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more freedom relatively until a few months before Egypt‟s November 2010 
parliamentary elections.  
To plan ahead for the parliamentary elections, the former Egyptian 
government cracked down on independent media including talk shows. The state 
suspended Al Qahera Al Youm talk show and found ways to remove outspoken 
government critic and journalist Ibrahim Eissa from his position as editor-in-chief of 
Al Dostour newspaper as well as from hosting his nightly television talk show 
Baladna Belmasry. Other talk shows started to exercise some self-censorship for fear 
of a similar fate. A special committee was also established by the former minister of 
information a month before the elections to monitor media performance during the 
elections. Television talk show host Mona El Shazly of Al Ashera Masa‟an received a 
warning from the committee after hosting two journalists who mildly criticized the 
former ruling NDP. This pre-election period is considered by many a setback for the 
freedom of independent media in general and television talk shows in particular. 
Mirazi (2010) asserted that in the few months before the 2010 parliamentary elections 
talk shows were asked directly by the government to host government officials. The 
also exercised a form of self-censorship for fear of following the fate of Adeeb and 
Eissa (personal interview). 
On the other hand, after the Jan.25
th
 revolution talk shows are witnessing an 
explosion in freedom of expression with one exception or red line remaining: the 
ruling military council. Although some talk shows still question army officers on air, 
many exercise self-censorship realizing that it‟s not smart to turn the people against 
the army at this critical stage in Egypt‟s history. Yet, military council members made 
their first live television interview on the popular talk show Al Ashera Masa‟an and 
appeared later on many talk shows, realizing they will be reaching millions of home 
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viewers. Egypt‟s new Prime Minister Essam Sharaf also gave his first televised 
recorded interview to two talk shows: Al Ashera Masa‟an and Akher Kalam. Some 
talk shows such as Akher Kalam and Baladna Belmasry started to integrate social 
media tools such as twitter to reach out to the audiences who send their questions to 
the host directly via twitter. Such shows gained immense popularity after the 
revolution at a time where the popularity of many talk shows along with their hosts 
plunged in the eyes of the public. It was simple, talk shows that supported the 
revolution gained sky rocketing popularity and talk shows which took the 
government‟s side lost their popularity and their credibility.  
Talk shows which gained popularity like Akher Kalam and Baladna Belmasry 
continue to play an important role in exposing corruption of the former regime and 
thereby exerting pressure on Egypt‟s transitional government and military council to 
press charges against such allegedly corrupt officials. A few episodes of Akher Kalam 
hosted by former Al Jazeera correspondent Yusri Foda on OnTV recently (May, 
2011) lead to the removal of Egypt‟s chief forensics doctor. The doctor was involved 
in writing a forged report on the killing of blogger Khaled Said at the hands of two 
plain clothes policemen in Alexandria last year. Akher Kalam hosted the doctor who 
reiterated the same lies about Said‟s death which angered the public. The show 
exposed more information and interviewed many experts who witnessed corruption at 
the forensics department.   
OnTV‟s other popular nightly talk show Baladna Belmasry hosted by Reem 
Maged was also given the credit for helping remove former Prime Minister Ahmed 
Shafik who was appointed by Egypt‟s ousted president Mubarak early during the 
revolution. Protestors were pressuring for the removal of Shafik who was removed 
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hours after he appeared on Baladna Belmasry where he showed little knowledge of 
the abuses of Egypt‟s former state security.  
Although shows such as Akher Kalam and Baladna Belmasry gained more 
popularity after the Jan.25
th
 revolution, the popularity of many shows and presenters 
plunged because they sided with the regime during the 18 days of the revolution. 
Egypt‟s popular talk show Masr Ennaharda broadcast on Egyptian state television, 
repeatedly showed celebrities crying over Mubarak and calling on the protestors to 
evacuate the square because they are destroying the country. Presenters of the show 
Khairy Ramadan and Tamer Amin refrained from calling the Egyptian uprising a 
revolution. Public anger was rising against Egyptian media corruption and lack of 
credibility witnessed during the revolution. However, soon after Mubarak stepped 
down, official media started appealing to the angry public by calling the Jan.25
th
 
uprising “our revolution”.  
Demonstrations in front of Egyptian television called for the removal of 
ERTU‟s top management and anchors perceived by the public as the regime‟s 
mouthpieces. After weeks of pressure, former information minister Anas El Fiqi was 
charged over allegations of financial and administrative corruption and is currently 
awaiting his trial in jail. Masr Ennaharda celebrity hosts Ramadan and Amin were 
also removed and a new team of young hosts took over. Despite such change in hosts, 
the show was suspended as its popularity continued to plunge. Masr Ennaharda was 
replaced with the new talk show Betawqeet Al Qahera (Cairo Local Time) hosted by 
Hafez Mirazi. 
Siding with the regime was not unique to the state media, as some television 
talk shows on private channels followed suit. Mehwar‟s 48 Hours talk show was also 
heavily criticized after hosting an alleged protestor from Tahrir Square saying that the 
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protests are funded by Iran. The alleged protestor‟s identity was later revealed and she 
was a journalist working for a state-owned newspaper. Several campaigns were also 
launched on Facebook calling for the removal of many talk show hosts.   
The controversial coverage of talk shows is not unique to the revolution. 
Although Egyptian television talk shows have considerably replaced the traditional 
news for many viewers, these shows still used to operate within restrictions set by the 
country‟s authoritarian rule. Fathy (2008) commented on the talk show coverage of 
the sixth of April 2008 strike that took place all over Egypt. The strike was organized 
at the grass root level demanding higher wages and denouncing shooting inflation 
rates.  
In Al-Dostour newspaper, Fathy (2008) wrote that talk shows received 
instructions from state security to tone down their coverage of the sixth of April 
strike. The “oral instructions” included framing the strike as a fiasco and blaming it 
on a few deviant opposition groups. Compared to the coverage of news agencies and 
satellite television news of the strike, talk shows failed to present a credible account. 
They also failed to portray the reality of the situation, leaning more towards the 
official point of view (Fathy, 2008). 
Describing 90 Deqeeqa‟s coverage of the strike as a “media suicide”, Fathy 
(2008) noted that the first story on the show‟s agenda was Egypt‟s Khamasin winds 
that usually lead to a sand storm.  The show then hosted a parliament member 
representing the former ruling NDP to talk about the failure of the strike.  As for the 
coverage of Al Ashera Masa‟an, the author noted that talk show host Mona El-Shazly 
tried to maintain a balanced coverage by broadcasting reports on the strike. But like 
90 Deqeeqa‟s former host Moataz El-Demerdash, El-Shazly toned down her talk 
about the strikes. Moving on to Al Qahera Al Youm hosted by Amr Adeeb, Fathy 
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wrote that Adeeb framed the post-riot destruction of Al Mahalla as the responsibility 
of some rebellious protestors, ignoring the role of security in aggravating the situation 
by clashing with the demonstrators.  
Although the coverage of the state-owned television talk show Al Bait Beitak 
remained pro the former regime as expected, talk show host Mahmoud Saad‟s 
comments came as a surprise to Fathy (2008). Saad attacked the current government 
and called its ministers “failures”, demanding that a government responsible for such 
incidents should resign (Fathy, 2008).  
Other media commentators also explored the coverage of talk shows of the 
same riots that erupted in Mahalla. Pintak (2009) emphasized that talk shows on 
Orbit, Dream and Al-Mehwar channels didn‟t broadcast graphic images aired by other 
channels such as Al-Jazeera. According to Pintak (2009), the managers of such 
channels said they received warnings from the government to “tone down their 
coverage and to make sure their talk shows included a heavy representation of the 
government‟s viewpoint.” 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
The current research study applies a triangulation of research methods by 
using two quantitative methods and one qualitative research method. To apply agenda 
setting theory, the media agenda was examined by conducting a content analysis of 
three television talk shows. To examine the public agenda as well as the correlation 
between exposure to talk shows and civic engagement, a survey was conducted before 
the 2010 Egyptian parliamentary elections. The qualitative methodology involves in 
depth interviews with media experts to examine their perception and futuristic outlook 
on the role of television talk shows and civic engagement in Egypt. The research was 
conducted before the Jan 25
th
 revolution. 
4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
There are three research questions and four research hypotheses in this study. 
4.1.1 Research Questions 
The research questions are answered by the qualitative part of this research. 
RQs: 
RQ1: How do experts perceive civic engagement in Egypt? 
RQ2: How do experts perceive the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows 
in fostering civic engagement in Egypt? 
 
RQ3: How do experts perceive the strategies that Egyptian nightly television talk 
shows should implement to foster civic engagement in Egypt? 
 
4.1.2 Research hypotheses:  
The four research hypotheses are covered by the quantitative part of this study. 
The quantitative methodology is based on a content analysis of television talk shows 
to examine the media‟s first and second level agendas and a survey to test whether 
talk shows have an agenda-setting influence on the public agenda of news priorities. 
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The survey also examines whether there is a relationship between exposure to 
Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes among viewers.  
 Hundreds of studies conducted worldwide support first-level and second-level 
agenda-setting effects of the media. In addition, studies conducted on talk shows in 
Egypt also support an agenda-setting impact of talk shows on the Egyptian public 
(Youssef, 2008).  Accordingly, the following two hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: Public perception of news priorities is most likely influenced by Egyptian 
nightly television talk shows‟ news agenda. 
H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ portrayal of Egypt‟s parliamentary 
elections is likely to influence viewers‟ perception of the parliamentary elections. 
Several research studies support that exposure to news and sociopolitical 
information is positively correlated with civic engagement (Kwak, Wang, & 
Guggenheim, 2004). A number of studies also support a positive impact of talk shows 
on political knowledge and participation (Baum, 2002). Accordingly, the following 
two hypotheses were formulated:  
H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic engagement, 
the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic engagement. 
Moon (2008) emphasized that an agenda-setting impact of the news media is 
linked to civic engagement. Accordingly, the following hypothesis was formulated. 
H4: There is a positive relation between exposure to Egyptian nightly television 
talk shows and civic engagement attitudes. 
According to this hypothesis the more the public is exposed to Egyptian 
nightly television talk shows, the more they are likely to have positive attitudes 
towards civic engagement through prioritizing socio-political awareness, participation 
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in sociopolitical discussions, public opinion expression, community involvement, and 
political participation.  
4.1.3. Independent Variables, operational definitions and levels of measurement. 
Exposure to talk shows: is defined by the level of dependency on talk shows as a 
source of news.  It is measured by the survey Question (8) by asking respondents how 
often they depend on different media sources for news about Egyptian affairs. The 
options include newspapers, television news, television talk shows, radio news, radio 
talk shows, magazines, and the internet. The answer categories are on the three-point 
scale always, sometimes, and never. The level of measurement is interval. 
Talk shows news agenda: defined as the news priorities covered by Egyptian nightly 
television talk shows. The news agenda is measured by coding the issues and news 
stories discussed by talk shows in the quantitative content analysis methodology. The 
level of measurement is nominal. 
Talk shows portrayal of the elections: It refers to the parliamentary election frames 
covered by talk shows. The issue examined is the Egyptian parliamentary elections 
held in November, 2010. The talk shows‟ attributes of the parliamentary elections are 
listed in the content analysis codebook. Several statements are coded to measure the 
talk shows‟ portrayal of the parliamentary elections in their advance election 
coverage. The level of measurement is nominal. 
Perception of the role of television talk shows: It refers to how viewers perceive the 
role of talk shows in promoting civic engagement. The variable is measured through 
statements on a five-point likert scale in the questionnaire from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. The level of measurement is interval. The statements in question (3) 
are as follows: 
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a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source of news about Egypt‟s affairs. 
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to participate in solving 
community problems in Egypt. 
c) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to make charitable 
contributions  
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage ordinary citizens to express their 
opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms). 
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create sociopolitical awareness. 
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my primary source of information about 
the Egyptian parliamentary elections held in November, 2010. 
g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage citizens to vote. 
4.1.4. Dependent Variables, operational definitions and levels of measurement. 
Public perception of news priorities: It‟s defined as the news issues perceived as 
important by the public. The word public refers to viewers of Egyptian nightly 
television talk shows. This variable is measured by question 5 in the questionnaire 
which asks respondents to list the five most important issues that are happening in 
Egypt recently. The question tests the first-level of agenda-setting to determine 
whether the public agenda corresponds with the talk shows‟ agenda. The level of 
measurement is nominal. Question 6 in the questionnaire is designed to measure the 
source of information for each topic respondents listed to determine whether their 
source was Egyptian nightly television talk shows. The issues listed by respondents in 
addition to the source for each issue were coded separately to determine whether talk 
shows have an agenda setting influence. Furthermore, the name of each source was 
also coded to determine whether the agenda-setting impact is coming from the three 
talk shows examined in this research. 
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Public perception of the parliamentary elections: is how the public perceives the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections. In agenda-setting theory, the public perception is 
defined as the election attributes or frames on the public agenda. This is measured 
through survey question 9 which lists statements regarding the elections on a 5-point 
Likert scale. This is to examine whether the public attributes of the parliamentary 
elections correspond with the talk show attributes of the parliamentary elections. The 
statements listed in question 9 in the survey are the exact statements listed in the 
content analysis codebook. Question 9 in the survey asks respondents to indicate their 
degree of agreement or disagreement with 22 opposite statements regarding the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections. Opposite statements were created to maintain 
balance and objectivity. The level of measurement is interval. The statements are as 
follows: 
1. The government‟s recent restrictions on private media have nothing to do with 
the elections. 
2. The elections will be fairly conducted. 
3. National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates are expected to hold the majority 
of seats in parliament. 
4. Judicial supervision is important to prevent election fraud. 
5. The elections are expected to be peaceful. 
6. It‟s important to have independent monitors. 
7. Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation. 
8. Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by 
the government. 
9. Women must have equal representation in parliament. 
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10. Coptic Christians should hold more than the current10 percent of parliament 
seats. 
11. The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in 
parliament. 
12. The government recently issued restrictions on private media because of the 
elections. 
13. The elections will not be fairly conducted. 
14. NDP candidates are not expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament. 
15. Judicial supervision is not important to prevent election fraud. 
16. The elections are expected to be violent. 
17. It‟s not important to have independent monitors. 
18. Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation. 
19. Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted from running in the elections 
by the government. 
20. Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president. 
21. Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 percent seats in parliament. 
22. The Wafd opposition party is not expected to hold most opposition seats in 
parliament. 
Attitudes towards civic engagement: is defined by 14 statements covering the 
different levels of civic engagement which is divided into awareness, interpersonal 
discussion, public opinion expression, community involvement, and political 
participation. All categories defining civic engagement are measured through several 
statements on a five-point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree in 
question (4) in the survey. The level of measurement is interval. The statements are 
listed in question 4 in the questionnaire as follows: 
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a) I consider voting a priority 
b) I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, letters, sms, fax)  
c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters) 
d) I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority 
e) Being informed about  Egyptian affairs is important 
f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority 
g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community 
problems 
h) I make a difference in my community 
i) Contributing to community is my responsibility  
j) I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt 
k) It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s presidential elections in 2011 
l) It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming parliamentary elections  
m) I intend to vote in the upcoming presidential elections 
n) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections 
The overall civic engagement attitude level is calculated through placing the five 
subcategories measuring civic engagement on a five-point scale. Awareness 
represents the first point on the civic engagement scale, followed by interpersonal 
discussion, public opinion expression, community involvement, and finally political 
participation which marks the end of the civic engagement spectrum, representing the 
strongest level of engagement. Although in other cultures political participation might 
not be the highest level of engagement, it‟s considered the highest in pre-revolution 
Egypt because that form of participation was frowned upon and discouraged by the 
government. Figure 4.1.4 on the following page illustrates the categories that define 
civic engagement. 
 Sociopolitical awareness is measured in question (4) by statements: (e) Being 
informed about Egyptian affairs is important and (f) I consider sociopolitical 
awareness a priority. 
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 Interpersonal discussion is measured in question 4 by the statement (d) I 
consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority. 
 Public opinion expression is measured in question 4 by statements (b) I 
express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, letters, sms, fax) 
and (c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters). 
 Community involvement is measured by the following statements in question 
4 (g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community 
problems, (h) I make a difference in my community, (i) Contributing to 
community is my responsibility, and (j)I volunteer to help solve community 
problems in Egypt. 
 Political participation: is measured by respondents‟ attitude towards voting 
in question 4 of the survey through the statements (k) It‟s my responsibility to 
vote in Egypt‟s presidential elections in 2011 (l) It‟s my responsibility to vote 
in Egypt‟s upcoming parliamentary elections (m) I intend to vote in the 2011 
presidential elections and (n) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary 
elections. 
Figure 4.1.4 Civic engagement categories and levels: 
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Experts‟ perception of civic engagement: experts are defined as academics and 
professionals in the fields of civic engagement, philanthropy, media, political science, 
and sociology. This dependent variable is defined in terms of how experts perceive 
the status of civic engagement in Egypt and the significance of civic engagement for 
Egypt. This variable is answered through the qualitative interview questions 1 and 2.  
Experts‟ perception of the role of talk shows in civic engagement: this is defined 
as how experts perceive the role and potential for talk shows to foster civic 
engagement in Egypt. This variable is answered through the qualitative interview 
questions 3 and 4. 
Experts‟ perception of media strategies: this is defined as experts‟ suggestions for 
the implementation of media strategies and recommendations that would foster civic 
engagement in Egypt. The variable is answered through question 6 in the qualitative 
interview.  
4.2. The Content Analysis Methodology 
The content analysis methodology is efficient in investigating media content in 
terms of quantity and quality of content (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). According to 
Kerlinger‟s (2000) classical definition, “content analysis is a method of studying and 
analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the 
purpose of measuring variables” (cited in Wimmer and Dominick, 2006, p.150). 
Agenda-setting studies rely heavily on content analysis to analyze media content and 
determine the significance of news subjects. Successive audience research is 
conducted to compare between the media and the public agendas (Wimmer and 
Dominick, 2006). To study research hypotheses one and two which cover the first and 
second levels of agenda-setting, a content analysis based on primary data recorded by 
the researcher was conducted in this study.  
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 The content analysis was conducted to analyze the agenda of Egyptian nightly 
television talk shows which specialize in covering and analyzing Egyptian affairs. 
Regardless of ownership, any television talk show that specializes in discussing 
Egyptian affairs is considered an Egyptian television talk show. This study covers 
Egyptian television talk shows broadcast in prime time during the first part of the fall 
broadcast season from October 6 to November 10 of the year 2010. The exact dates 
are included in (Appendix J).  
4.2.1. Content Analysis Sample 
Due to the absence of a credible program rating system in Egypt, 18 Egyptian 
television viewers were asked about the most popular talk shows in Egypt in order to 
select the most popular talk shows for this study. Respondents cited four talk shows as 
the most popular in Egypt: Al Qahera Al Youm (Cairo Today), Masr Ennaharda 
(Egypt Today), Al Ashera Masa‟an (10 PM) and 90 Deqeeqa (90 Minutes). Popular 
talk shows such as Al Qahera Al Youm (Cairo Today) aired on the Saudi-owned Orbit 
Showtime Network (OSN) lied within the population of this study because it 
discussed Egyptian affairs. Al Qahera Al Youm was initially included in the sample 
but the show was suspended by the Egyptian government during the course of this 
study and was therefore excluded from the sample.    
Accordingly, a purposive sample of three of the four most popular television 
talk shows was selected for study. The importance of purposive sampling in studies 
applying a content analysis research methodology is confirmed by Riffe and Fretag 
(1997) who found that 68 % of the Journalism Quarterly‟s content analysis studies 
used purposive sampling (cited in Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). Also, research 
studies applying agenda-setting theory were conducted over periods ranging from two 
weeks, to two months, to more than two months. Several research studies found that 
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the media succeeded in setting the public agenda after two weeks of media exposure 
(Severin and Tankard, 2001).  
4.2.2. The unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is the topic. All topics discussed during the entire duration 
of the talk show were examined.  The talk shows selected for analysis vary in airtime 
from two hours to three hours. A total of 78 episodes of talk shows were coded, 
representing an estimated total of 208 hours of television talk show airtime. The 
content was coded by the researcher with 15.6% percent of the sample coded by a 
second coder trained by the researcher for inter coder reliability (Appendix I). 
Two code books (Appendix E & F) and coding sheets (Appendix G & H) were 
formulated covering several variables. The first codebook covers the first level of 
agenda setting and second covers the second level of agenda setting. The codebook 
and code sheet were updated following a pretest on a sample of talk show content 
coded by the researcher and the second coder. Inter coder reliability was conducted 
using the Holsti formula R = 2M / N1 + N2. The inter coder reliability result is as 
follows: R = 0.99 or 99%, which is very high (see Appendix I for calculations).  
4.2.3 Categories of Content Analysis and Operational Definitions 
The content was coded according to categories and subcategories created for 
each topic discussed. These categories were formulated during the pretest period to fit 
the purposes of the current study. Accurate coding of the topics and the subcategories 
is determined by assessing the most important element about the topic discussed. 
Neuendorf (2002) noted that when an issue was seen as strongly dominant, any other 
issue was regarded as secondary and therefore not coded.  
Topics: to examine the first-level of agenda setting, topics were coded into 14 
categories: Political, Economic, Social, Environmental, Health, Education, Criminal, 
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Human Interest, Religion, Sports, Arts & Culture, Media, Science and Technology, 
and Miscellaneous. The subcategories under each topic list the focus of the 
discussion. The 14 topic categories are defined as follows: 
Topic 1 (Political): this category covers issues tackling Egyptian politics such as 
parliamentary elections, presidential candidates, and government. Attributes of 
covering the parliamentary elections were coded separately using the second 
codebook for the second-level of agenda setting. 
Topic 2 (Economic): this category covers topics such as minimum wages, Egypt‟s 
investments, development, economic growth, national debt, inflation, poverty, 
unemployment and other economic topics. 
Topic 3 (Social): this category includes topics such as labor rights, women rights, 
family, and divorce. 
Topic 4 (Environmental): this category covers pollution, water shortage, endangered 
species, energy resources, natural disasters, and other environmental topics listed in 
the codebook.  
Topic 5 (Health): this category covers health care, diseases, health insurance, and 
drugs. 
Topic 6 (Education): this category covers quality of education, higher education, 
school education, and curricula. 
Topic 7 (Criminal): this category covers thefts, murders, right to own a gun, 
terrorism, crime control, and trials. 
Topic 8 (Human interest): this category covers ordinary citizen success stories or 
personal ordeal stories. 
Topic 9 (Religion): this category covers religious preaching, sectarian tension, 
national unity, and religious discrimination. 
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Topic 10 (Sports): this category covers matches, accomplishments, and fan tension 
or violence. 
Topic 11 (Arts & Culture): this category covers arts and culture and celebrity 
interviews 
Topic 12 (Media): this category includes subcategories that deal with the status of the 
media in Egypt such as freedom of expression, censorship, media laws and 
regulations, mergers and acquisitions, jailing journalists, firing journalists, and 
suspension of programs or newspapers. 
Topic 13 (Science & Technology): this category includes subcategories that cover 
scientific news or discoveries and technological advances. 
Topic 14 (Miscellaneous): this category includes any topic that doesn‟t fit the list of 
topics above.  
Second-level agenda setting: the talk show attribute agenda is measured by 
examining the advance coverage of the Egyptian parliamentary elections. The 
following issue attributes are coded: elections fairness, NDP representation, judicial 
supervision, election violence, independent monitoring, Muslim Brotherhood, women 
representation, opposition representation, and Coptic Christian representation. The 22 
statements measuring the framing of the elections in the codebook are an exact copy 
of the statements formulated in the questionnaire in question 9. The frames were 
coded as mentioned, neutral and not mentioned depending on their dominance.  
4.3. Survey Methodology 
Due to the fact that a quantitative content analysis methodology couldn‟t be 
used to infer statements about the impact (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006) of television 
talk shows on viewers, this study proceeded with conducting a quantitative survey 
methodology.  To measure whether talk shows influence the public agenda with a 
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specific impact on civic engagement attitudes among Egyptian viewers, a 
questionnaire (Appendix A) was formulated and self-administered. The questionnaire 
was translated from English to Arabic (Appendix B) to accommodate non-English 
speakers.  
The questionnaire is composed of 15 questions including 13 closed ended 
questions on different scales of measurement and two open-ended questions. 
Responses for the open-ended questions which measure the first-level agenda of the 
public were coded using the codebook and coding sheet in (Appendix C & D). Many 
of the statements measuring civic engagement were adopted from national surveys 
conducted in the US and the civic measurement models created by Flanagan, C.A., 
Syvertsen, A.K. & Stout, M.D. (2007). The questions were rephrased to fit Egyptian 
culture. Fink‟s (2003) “How to Ask Survey Questions” was also used as a reference. 
The data was collected from November 5 to November 20, 2010 ahead of the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections to make sure that participants‟ responses were not 
affected by the election results. The questionnaire was reviewed by eight faculty 
members at the American University in Cairo. Several questions were reformulated 
and the questionnaire was updated based on the faculty and advisor‟s comments. A 
pretest has been conducted on an available sample of 20 students at AUC and the 
questionnaire was updated accordingly.  
Due to the restrictive environment prior to the Jan.25
th
 revolution and the 
government‟s constraints over conducting survey research in Egypt, this study was 
conducted on a non-random purposive sample of the well-educated Egyptian elite. 
The actual survey was administered among students, staff, and faculty at two private 
elite universities in Egypt: the American University in Cairo (AUC) and Modern 
Science and Arts University (MSA). An online survey was also created using 
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surveymonkey.com and was circulated on the social networking website 
Facebook.com. The survey was also self-administered among business people, 
lawyers, and other members of the elite. 
It‟s worth noting that many respondents were worried over answering the 
question regarding the 2010 parliamentary elections amidst a clear government 
crackdown on the media during the period that preceded the elections. Many 
respondents quit the survey starting from question 9 which lists 22 statements about 
the parliamentary elections and were therefore, eliminated from the sample.  
4.3.1. Survey Sample 
This study examines the agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television 
talk shows on the participants‟ agenda and the relationship between exposure to talk 
shows and civic engagement attitudes among a purposive sample of the Egyptian 
well-educated elite. The elite are defined as well educated members of the Egyptian 
public. Elite by definition is composed of “a group of persons who by virtue of 
position or education exercise much power or influence” (Merriam-Webster, 2010). 
This stratum of society is selected for study because it‟s important to determine 
whether well-educated Egyptians are civically engaged and actively involved in the 
country‟s transition to democracy. According to Postel (1992), the 40 percent illiterate 
Egyptian citizens are not concerned about democracy in Egypt or civic engagement. 
People at the low socio-economic level are more concerned about sustaining a living. 
Therefore, for democratic change to take place in Egypt, it must be nurtured by 
informed, involved and active members of society who have the collective power and 
education to influence policies and empower the rest of the population. 
Boyd (1977) studied mass media usage among Egyptian elites. His criteria for 
classifying elites were mainly based on occupation and economic status. Boyd divided 
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the sample into three sub-samples including top government officials, university 
administrators and professors, and well-off Egyptians.  Shlapentokh and Woods 
(2004) defined elites as “people whose position in society allows them to shape public 
perceptions through the media” (p.160) but also asserted that elites vary across 
countries. As leaders in educational, political, social, and economic institutions, elites 
have a great influence on domestic policies and media which in turn influence the 
public. Therefore, elites in this study are defined as well educated Egyptians who are 
socially more privileged than the rest of the population by virtue of their education 
and socioeconomic status. Responses were filtered to determine the elite sample 
according to education and area of residence. Well educated elites include university 
students, bachelor degree holders, graduate students, master's degree holders, and 
PhD holders. 
Therefore, this study classifies elite primarily as well educated individuals 
who are socially privileged.   Respondents below 18 years of age were excluded from 
the study because voting cards in Egypt are only issued at 18. Accordingly, the 
purposive sample of Egyptian elites in this study covers elite Egyptians who are well 
educated and older than 18.  
 
4.4 Qualitative in-depth interviews 
 
A number of 11 in-depth interviews were conducted with media, sociology, 
political science, and philanthropy experts. The following six questions were 
formulated for the qualitative interview methodology which covers all the research 
questions. The questions were also translated into Arabic for interviews with non-
English speakers.  
To answer RQ1 with regards to the experts‟ perception of civic engagement in 
Egypt, the following interview questions were formulated: 
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1. “Egyptian citizens are politically apathetic.” What is your opinion 
about this statement? 
2. “Civic engagement is an essential aspect in any democratic 
society.” How do you evaluate civic engagement in Egypt? 
To answer RQ2 with regards to the perception of the role of media in general 
and talk shows in particular in promoting civic engagement in Egypt, the following 
interview questions were formulated: 
3. In your opinion, do media have any role in fostering civic 
engagement in Egypt? 
4. Do talk shows play any role in promoting civic engagement in 
Egypt? How?  
 Do Egyptian television talk shows create socio-political 
awareness in Egypt? 
 Do Egyptian television talk shows promote socio-political 
dialogue in Egypt? 
 Do Egyptian television talk shows encourage citizens to 
express their opinions publicly? 
 Do Egyptian television talk shows foster community 
involvement in Egypt? 
 Do Egyptian television talk shows encourage political 
participation? 
 
5. How do you evaluate the performance of Egyptian television talk 
shows during their coverage of the Egyptian parliamentary 
coverage? 
To answer RQ3 with regards to the experts‟ perception of the future strategies that 
should be adopted by talk shows to promote civic engagement, the following 
interview question was formulated: 
6. What are the future strategies that should be adopted by Egyptian 
media in general and talk shows in specific to create a civically 
engaged society? 
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Chapter 5: Results 
The results of the current study were processed using PASW Statistics 18, a 
data analysis software previously known as SPSS. Microsoft Excel was also used for 
some graphs and tests. Hypothesis testing was conducted using the same software. 
The results are divided into two sections. The first section lists the survey results and 
the content analysis results and the second section lists qualitative interview results.  
The results are listed in the following tables, most illustrated by accompanying 
charts. A total number of 676 stories were coded in three television shows in the 
content analysis study. In addition, a number of 356 respondents completed the 
survey. Respondents had the following demographics: 
5.1: Level of education  
  
 Respondents were asked to specify their level of higher education on 5 
categories because the purposive sample studied is the well-educated elite.   
Table 5.1 Frequencies and percentages of the respondents‟ educational level 
Level of Education Frequency % 
 Undergraduate Student 186 52.2% 
Bachelor degree holder 79 22.2% 
Graduate Student 39 11.0% 
Master's degree holder 40 11.2% 
Doctoral degree holder 12 3.4% 
Total 356 100.0% 
 
As shown in (Table 5.1), more than half the sample is undergraduate 
university students, representing 52.2%. They are followed by bachelor degree 
holders who represent 22.2% of the sample. Whereas, 11.2% are master's degree 
holders and 11% are graduate students. Only 3.4% are doctoral degree holders. 
The following figure illustrates the levels of higher education in the sample studied. 
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Figure 5.1 Level of education, arranged in descending order of percentages 
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5.2 Area of Residence 
 
Respondents were asked to specify their area of residence among 9 closed-
ended categories and one open-ended category „other‟ which resulted in three new 
residence categories: Garden City, Alexandria and Shorouk.   
Table 5.2 Area of residence, frequencies and percentages ranked in descending 
order 
 
Area of Residence Frequency % 
 
1. Heliopolis 72 20.2 
2. New Cairo/Katameya 48 13.5 
3. Alexandria 48 13.5 
4. Maadi 35 9.8 
5. Mohandiseen 34 9.6 
6. Nasr City 33 9.3 
7. 6th of October 26 7.3 
8. Dokki 20 5.6 
9. Haram 14 3.9 
10. Garden City 14 3.9 
11. Zamalek 11 3.1 
12. Shorouk 1 .3 
Total 356 100.0 
 
As shown in (Table 5.2), the majority of the respondents reside in Heliopolis, 
representing 20.2 %. Respondents who reside in New Cairo/Katameya and the coastal 
city of Alexandria equally represented 13.5 % of the sample each. Maadi residents 
followed representing 9.8 % of the sample. Mohandiseen residents represented 9.6 % 
of the sample. Nasr city residents followed making 9.3 % of the sample followed by 
7.3 % respondents residing in the 6
th
 of October city. Dokki followed with 5.6 % 
respondents. Haram and Garden City had equal 3.9 % representation. Whereas, 
Zamalek had 3.1 respondents represented. Lastly, only 0.3 % reside in Shorouk. 
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Figure 5.2 Area of residence, percentages in descending order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
5.3 Age 
 
Respondents are classified according to five age categories listed in the 
following table. Respondents who were less than 18 years old were excluded. This is 
because Egyptian citizens who are less than 18 cannot vote and the survey includes 
questions about voting. 
Table 5.3: Age frequency and percentage 
Age Frequency % 
 18-29 261 73.3 
30-41 69 19.4 
42-53 14 3.9 
54-65 10 2.8 
Older than 65 2 .6 
Total 356 100.0 
 
As shown in (Table 5.3) the majority representing 73.3 % of the sample is 18-
29 years old which is justified by the 52.2 % undergraduate students who took the 
survey. Respondents belonging to the age group from 30-41 years old represented 
19.4 %. Whereas, 42-53 year olds and 54-65 years old had close representation in the 
sample, 3.9 % and 2.8 % respectively. Only 2 respondents representing 0.6 % of the 
sample are older than 65. 
 Figure 5.3 Age  
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5.4 Monthly Income 
 Respondents were asked to choose between seven income categories. 
Table 5.4 Monthly Income, arranged in descending order 
Monthly Income Frequency % 
 EGP 1,000 - less than EGP 3,000 83 23.3 
EGP 3,000 - less than EGP 5,000 67 18.8 
EGP 11,000 and above 63 17.7 
Less than EGP 1,000 42 11.8 
EGP 5,000 - less than EGP 7,000 42 11.8 
EGP 9,000 - less than EGP 11,000 30 8.4 
EGP 7,000 - less than EGP 9,000 29 8.1 
Total 356 100.0 
 
As shown in (Table 5.4), the majority 23.3 % of respondents earn EGP 1,000 
- less than EGP 3,000, followed by 18.8 % who earn EGP 3,000 - less than EGP 
5,000. This is also followed by 17.7 % earning EGP 11,000 and above. A number of 
42 respondents or 11.8 % earn less than EGP 1,000 which could be explained by the 
52.2 % under graduate students who took the survey. On the other hand, 11.8 % earn 
EGP 5,000 - less than EGP 7,000. In addition, 8.4 % earn EGP 9,000 - less than EGP 
11,000 and 8.1 % earn EGP 7,000 – less than EGP 9,000. 
Figure 5.4 Monthly Income, arranged in descending order of percentages  
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5.5 Gender 
 
 Both female and male respondents took the survey.  
 
Table 5.5  
Gender Frequency % 
 Female 241 67.7% 
Male 115 32.3% 
Total 356 100.0% 
 
As show in (Table 5.5), females represent the majority of this sample, as 241 
female respondents took the survey representing 67.7 %. Males represent 32.3 % as 
115 male respondents took the survey. 
 
Figure 5.5  Gender 
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5.6 Viewership 
 Viewership refers to whether respondents watch Egyptian nightly television 
talk shows such as Masr Ennaharda, Al Ashera Masa‟an, and 90 Deqeeqa. The first 
question in the questionnaire determines viewership with a „yes‟ or „no‟ answer. 
Those who answered „no‟ were excluded from the sample of viewers and only 
answered the demographics questions.  
Table 5.6: Viewership of Egyptian nightly television talk shows 
Do you watch any of the following Egyptian nightly 
television talk shows: Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa, and 
Al-Ashera Masa’an? 
Frequency % 
 
Yes 286 80.3 
No 70 19.7 
Total 356 100.0 
 
As shown in (Table 5.1), the majority of the 356 respondents who took the 
survey watch Egyptian nightly television talk shows, representing 286 respondents or 
80.3 %. A number of 70 respondents representing 19.7 % of the sample surveyed 
don't watch television talk shows. 
Figure 5.6: Viewership of Egyptian nightly television talk shows 
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5.7 Popularity of the three talk shows among viewers 
Popularity of the three Egyptian nightly television talk shows Masr 
Ennaharda, Al Ashera Masa‟an, and 90 Deqeeqa is defined by the degree to which 
respondents follow or view each talk show on a weekly basis. Accordingly, 
respondents were asked in the questionnaire how often they watch each show with six 
answer options from 5 times a week to never. 
Table 5.7a How often do you watch each television talk show per week? 
Viewership per 
week 
Frequency (%) of respondents 
Masr Ennaharda Al Ashera 
Masa'an 
90 Deqeeqa 
5 times 8 (2.8%) 25 (8.7%) 18 (6.3%) 
4 times 21 (7.3%) 28 (9.8%) 22 (7.7%) 
3 times 38 (13.3%) 58 (20.3%) 46 (16.1%) 
2 times 40 (14.0%) 49 (17.1%) 54 (18.9%) 
1 time 77 (26.9%) 83 (29.0%) 75 (26.2%) 
Never 102 (35.7%) 43 (15.0%) 71 (24.8%) 
Total 286 (100.0%) 286 (100.0%) 286 (100.0%) 
 
Masr Ennaharda: (Table 5.7) shows that only 2.8% of the respondents are regular 
viewers of Masr Ennaharda, 7.3% watch it 4 days per week, 13.3% and 14% of the 
respondents watch it 3 and 4 days respectively. Whereas 26.9% watch it once a week 
and the majority 35.7% never watch it. 
Al Ashera Masa'an: (Table 5.7) shows that only 8.7% of the respondents regularly 
view Al Ashera Masa'an, 9.8% view the show 4 days a week, 20.3% watch it 3 days 
per week and 17.1% of the respondents watch it twice a week. The majority of 
respondents 29% watch the show once a week and 15% never watch the show. 
90 Deqeeqa: (Table 5.7) shows that 6.3% regularly view 90 Deqeeqa, 7.7 % watch 
the talk show 4 days a week. Whereas 16.1% watch it 3 days per week and 18.9% of 
the respondents watch it twice a week. The majority of viewers, 26.2% watch 90 
Deqeeqa once a week and 24.8% never watch the show. 
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A Chi square test was conducted as shown in (Table 5.7a) below to examine if 
there was any significant difference between the mean average rating. The result χ2 = 
14.71 is non-significant, indicating a similar distribution of viewership times in the 
three talk shows. An analysis of variance was also conducted to test if there was any 
significant difference between the mean times per week for the three talk shows, and 
result was not significant. Therefore, because the popularity of the three programs is 
defined as the viewing times per week for each show and there is no significant 
difference in viewership, the three talk shows are more or less on the same popularity 
level. 
Table 5.7b Statistical test for table 5.7a 
Chi square                                                                   χ2 =14.71 NS 
Mean Average rating ( 
times per week) 
1.38 2.07 1.74 
Standard deviation 0.140 0.201 0.162 
ANOVA                                                                        F = 0.69 NS 
ANOVA df ss ms F 
Talk shows 2 0.0396 0.0198 0.69 ns 
Error 15 0.4301 0.0287  
Total 17 0.4697   
 
Fig 5.7 Popularity of the three talk shows among viewers, weekly viewership 
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5.8 Level of talk show exposure 
 The level of exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows was measured 
by comparing exposure to media sources on a three-point scale of always, sometimes, 
and never. Respondents were asked how often they depend on the media sources 
listed for news about Egyptian affairs. Since media and civic engagement previous 
research linked civic engagement to the news or information exposure rather than 
entertainment, it was necessary to specify the news dependency in the exposure 
question. Responses to always and sometimes were combined together in the 
following table to provide more robust results on the overall level of exposure.  
Table 5.8: Level of talk show exposure compared to other media  
Media Sources 
Arranged in order of 
Mean 
Frequency (%) in degree of agreement 
Always + 
Sometimes 
Never 
Mean av. 
Rating* 
+ SD 
Internet 
258 
(90.2%) 
28 
(9.8%) 
2.52 
+ 0.918 
TV Talk shows 
283 
(99%) 
3 
(1.0%) 
2.46 
+ 0.724 
Newspapers 
255 
(89.2%) 
31 
(10.8%) 
2.37 
+ 0.660 
TV news 
241 
(84.2%) 
45 
(15.7%) 
2.18 
+ 0.494 
Radio news 
158 
(55.3%) 
128 
(44.8%) 
1.64 
+ 0.353 
Magazines 
145 
(50.7%) 
141 
(49.3%) 
1.59 
+ 0.299 
Radio talk shows 
132 
(46.1%) 
154 
(53.8%) 
1.51 
+ 0.332 
Overall 
1472 
(73.6.4%) 
530 
(26.5%) 
2.04 
+ 0.360 
* based on a 3-point scale:  3 = Always, 2 = Sometimes, 1 = Never. 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Table 5.8a: Statistical test for table 5.8 
ANOVA 
Source of 
variation 
Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean square F 
Media sources 6.83 6 1.138 3.357 
Error 4.75 14 0.339  
Total 11.58 20   
 
ANOVA: F= 3.357 significant (p=0.029) indicating the existence of significant 
differences between the mean average ratings of media sources. (s
2 
= 0.339)  
 
Internet: (Table 5.8) shows that 90.2% depend on the Internet for news while 9.8% 
never depend on the Internet. A mean of 2.52 indicates that the majority falls between 
always and sometimes. 
Television Talk Shows: (Table 5.8) shows that almost all respondents 99% depend 
on television talk shows for news about Egyptian affairs. Only 3 respondents, 
representing 1% never do. A mean of 2.46 indicates that the majority fall between 
always and sometimes. 
Newspapers: (Table 5.8) shows that 89.2% depend on newspapers, compared to 
10.8% who never depend on newspapers. A mean of 2.37 indicates that the majority 
fall between always and sometimes. 
Television News: (Table 5.8) shows that 84.2% depend on television news and 15.7% 
never. A mean of 2.18 indicates that the majority sometimes depends on TV news. 
Radio news: (Table 5.8) shows that 55.3% of the respondents depend on radio news 
and 44.8% never. A mean of 1.64 indicates that the majority fall between sometimes 
and never. 
Magazines: (Table 5.8) shows that 50.7% depend on magazines and 49.3% never. A 
mean of 1.59 indicates that the majority falls between sometimes and never. 
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Radio talk shows: (Table 5.8) shows that only 46.1% depend on radio talk shows and 
53.8% never. A mean of 1.51 indicates that the majority falls between sometimes and 
never. 
As shown in (Table 5.8a), a statistical test was conducted to determine if there 
was any significant difference in exposure. An ANOVA: F= 3.357 significant 
(p=0.029) value indicates the existence of significant differences between the mean 
average ratings of media sources.  
Figure 5.8: Level of talk show exposure compared to other media, in descending 
order 
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5.9 Public & Media agendas of news priorities & H1: Public perception of issue 
salience is most likely influenced by Egyptian nightly television talk shows agenda 
 
The public agenda is defined as the news issues that are perceived as 
important by the public. To measure the public news agenda, respondents were asked 
in the open-ended question (5) of the questionnaire to list the five most important 
news issues happening in Egypt that came to their knowledge recently. Open-ended 
survey responses were coded using the codebook in (Appendix C) which lists the 
same topics in the content analysis codebook (Appendix E). 
As for the media agenda, it‟s defined as the news issues covered by the three 
popular television talk shows Masr Ennaharda, Al Ashera Masa‟an and 90 Deqeeqa. 
To measure their news agenda, a content analysis was conducted. (Table 5.9a) lists 
the public‟s news agenda and the talk show‟s news agenda. 
Table 5.9a: Public news agenda vs. Nightly Television Talk shows news agenda 
 
Respondents news agenda F (%) 
Talk Shows news 
agenda 
F (%) 
1. Parliamentary 
elections 
229(20.8%) 
1. Parliamentary 
elections 
63 (9.3%) 
2. Rising food prices 69 (6.3%) 2. Dostour crisis 25 (3.7%) 
3. Presidential elections 56 (5.1%) 3. Health care  24 (3.6%) 
4. Minimum wages 55 (5.0%) 4. Profiles 23 (3.4%) 
5. School violence 54 (4.9%) 5. Other politics 22 (3.3%) 
6. Terrorism 47 (4.3%) 6. People‟s ordeals 21 (3.1%) 
7. Courts 42 (3.8%) 7. Rising food prices 18 (2.7%) 
8. Dostour crisis 38 (3.5%) 8. Food shortages 16 (2.4%) 
9. Suspension of media 37 (3.4%) 9. Media regulations 16 (2.4%) 
10. University guards 35 (3.2%) 10. Pilgrimage 15 (2.2%) 
11. Diseases 34 (3.1%) 11. Traffic problems 15 (2.2%) 
12. Other topics in politics 32 (2.9%) 12. Higher education 14 (2.1%) 
13. Illegal land acquisition 28 (2.5%) 13. University security 14 (2.1%) 
14. Traffic problems 24 (2.2%) 14. Courts 14 (2.1%) 
15. Total Inflation 19 (1.7%) 15. Football matches 14 (2.1%) 
16. Sectarian tension 18 (1.6%) 16. School violence 13 (1.9%) 
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17. Media regulations 17 (1.5%) 17. Pollution 13 (1.9%) 
18. Football matches 16 (1.5%) 18. Other sports 13 (1.9%) 
19. Opposition 14 (1.3%) 19. Suspension of media 13 (1.9%) 
20. Investments 14 (1.3%) 20. Minimum wages 12 (1.8%) 
21. School education 13 (1.2%) 21. Private media 8 (1.2%) 
22. Other social issues 11 (1.0%) 22. Terrorism 7 (1.0%) 
23. Workers issues 10 (.9%) 23. Scientific research 7 (1.0%) 
24. World affairs 10 (.9%) 24. Charity 7 (1.0%) 
25. Demonstrations/strikes 8 (.7%) 25. Government 6 (.9%) 
26. Food shortages 8 (.7%) 26. Natural disasters 6 (.9%) 
27. Embezzlements 8 (.7%) 27. Diseases 6 (.9%) 
28. People‟s ordeals 8 (.7%) 28. Fan tension 6 (.9%) 
29. Water Shortage 7 (.6%) 29. Pol. achievements 5 (.7%) 
30. Natural Disasters 7 (.6%) 30. Family issues 5 (.7%) 
31. Nile Water Issues 7 (.6%) 31. Right to own guns 5 (.7%) 
32. Health insurance 7 (.6%) 32. Land take overs 5 (.7%) 
33. Police brutality 7 (.6%) 33. Religious preaching 5 (.7%) 
34. Right to own guns 7 (.6%) 34. Achievements 5 (.7%) 
35. Pilgrimage 7 (.6%) 35. Freedom of exp. 5 (.7%) 
36. Pollution 6 (.5%) 36. Future of media 5 (.7%) 
37. Electricity issues 6 (.5%) 37. Pol. representation 4 (.6%) 
38. Fires 6 (.5%) 38. Total inflation 4 (.6%) 
39. President 5 (.5%) 39. Nile water 4 (.6%) 
40. Unemployment 5 (.5%) 40. Health corruption 4 (.6%) 
41. Poverty 5 (.5%) 41. Sectarian tension 4 (.6%) 
42. Antiquities 5 (.5%) 42. Cinema reviews 4 (.6%) 
43. Wikileaks 5 (.5%) 43. Closing shops early 4 (.6%) 
44. Development 4 (.4%) 44. World affairs 4 (.6%) 
45. Education quality 4 (.4%) 45. Opposition 3 (.4%) 
46. Fan tension 4 (.4%) 46. Demonstrations 3 (.4%) 
47. Government 3 (.3%) 47. Taxes 3 (.4%) 
48. Women issues 3 (.3%) 48. Women issues 3 (.4%) 
49. Family issues 3 (.3%) 49. Drugs 3 (.4%) 
50. Other crimes 3 (.3%) 50. Quality of education 3 (.4%) 
51. Profiles 3 (.3%) 51. Edu-development 3 (.4%) 
52. Loss of the satellite 3 (.3%) 52. Arrests 3 (.4%) 
53. Health care 2 (.2%) 53. Police brutality 3 (.4%) 
54. Other sports 2 (.2%) 54. Censorship 3 (.4%) 
55. Media ethics 2 (.2%) 55. Scientific inventions 3 (.4%) 
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56. Scientific research 2 (.2%) 56. Unemployment 2 (.3%) 
57. Underground metro 2 (.2%) 57. Other human int. 2 (.3%) 
58. Closing shops early 2 (.2%) 58. Drama reviews 2 (.3%) 
59. Government spending 1 (.1%) 59. Galleries & concerts 2 (.3%) 
60. Energy resources 1 (.1%) 60. Jailing journalists 2 (.3%) 
61. Drugs 1 (.1%) 61. Scientific projects 2 (.3%) 
62. Health negligence 1 (.1%) 62. Electricity issues 2 (.3%) 
63. Arrests 1 (.1%) 63. Loss of satellite 2 (.3%) 
64. Crime control 1 (.1%) 64. Wikileaks 2 (.3%) 
65. Religious preaching 1 (.1%) 65. Islam & the west 2 (.3%) 
66. Achievements 1 (.1%) 66. Pol. participation 1 (.1%) 
67. Cinema reviews 1 (.1%) 67. Health insurance 1 (.1%) 
68. Jailing journalists 1 (.1%) 68. Crime control 1 (.1%) 
69. Scientific projects 1 (.1%) 69. Underground metro 1 (.1%) 
70. Gaza aid 1 (.1%) 70. Gaza aid 1 (.1%) 
Total 1100 
(100%) 
Total 676 
(100%) 
 
As shown in (Table 5.9a), the most important topic happening in Egypt 
according to the respondents is the Egyptian parliamentary elections, representing 
20.8% of the total topics listed by respondents. The parliamentary elections also 
topped the talk shows agenda, representing the mostly covered topic receiving 9.3 % 
of the total talk show coverage.  
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Figures 5.9aa: Respondents news agenda 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9ab: Talk shows news agenda 
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5.9b Public and Media Agendas Classified into Main Topics  
The public and media agendas of news priorities were also classified into main 
topics as shown in table 5.9b. 
Table 5.9b: Main Topics of Public & Media agendas  
 
Talk Shows Topics 
Frequency/% 
Respondents 
Frequency/% 
Main 
Topic 
 1. Political 114 
(16.9%) 
Political 346 
(31.5%) 
 2. Media 85 
(12.6%) 
Economic 181 
(16.5%) 
 3. Economic 74 
(10.9%) 
Criminal 143 
(13.0%) 
 4. Criminal 59 
(8.7%) 
Media 96 
(8.7%) 
 5. Miscellaneous 49 
(7.2%) 
Social 81 
(7.4%) 
 6. Arts & Culture 45 
(6.7%) 
Miscellaneous 59 
(5.4%) 
 7. Education 43 
(6.4%) 
Education 52 
(4.7%) 
 8. Social 38 
(5.6%) 
Health 45 
(4.1%) 
 9. Health 38 
(5.6%) 
Environmental 28 
(2.5%) 
 10. Human Interest 35 
(5.2%) 
Religion 26 
(2.4%) 
 11. Sports 35 
(5.2%) 
Sports 23 
(2.1%) 
 12. Religion 25 
(3.7%) 
Human Interest 9 
(.8%) 
 13. Environmental 24 
(3.6%) 
Arts & Culture 8 
(.7%) 
 14. Science & 
Technology 
12 
(1.8%) 
Science & Technology 3 
(.3%) 
 Total 676 
(100%) 
Total 1100 
(100%) 
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As shown in (Table 5.9b), the mostly covered topic by talk shows is the 
political topic (16.9%), which is also the first on the respondents‟ agenda (31.5%). 
Education, sports, and science and technology all fall on matching ranks on the two 
agendas. The media topic on the talk show agenda was much higher as the programs 
focused on media related developments heavily in their coverage before the Egyptian 
parliamentary elections. But for the respondents, economic issues (16.5%) were 
second on the agenda compared to third on the talk shows agenda (10.9%).  
Criminal issues ranked third on the respondents‟ agenda (13%) compared with 
fourth on the media agenda (8.7%). The media topic ranked fourth on the public 
agenda (8.7%), followed by social issues (7.4%). The least mentioned topic on both 
agendas is science and technology which ranked 14
th
 representing 0.3% of the public 
agenda and 1.8% on the media agenda. The following figures display the main topics 
on both agendas. 
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Figure 5.9ba: Public news agenda categorized into main topics 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9bb: Talk shows‟ news agenda categorized into main topics 
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5.9c Talk show‟s agenda setting impact 
 To determine whether nightly television talk shows agenda had an agenda 
setting influence, respondents were asked to name the primary source of information 
for each of the five issues they listed. The responses were coded into categories of 
media sources and were also coded into specific names of such sources when 
mentioned. If respondents listed more than one source for the same issue, they were 
coded as miscellaneous. However, if they cited nightly television talk shows among 
those sources, they were coded as television talk shows and other. This is to separate 
it from the category specified for television talk shows when they were solely cited. 
Furthermore, to determine whether the three television talk shows studied had any 
agenda setting influencing, the names of the shows and sources mentioned were also 
coded. Tables 5.9c and 5.9d display the sources cited by respondents and the specific 
names whenever mentioned, respectively.  
Table 5.9c: Main source of news for the issues listed by respondents  
 
How did these issues come to your knowledge? 
Specify the source 
Frequency % 
1. Television Talk Shows 465 42.3% 
2. Newspapers 229 20.8% 
3. Internet 172 15.6% 
4. TV News 83 7.5% 
5. Personal Communication 62 5.6% 
6. Miscellaneous 34 3.1% 
7. Radio News 22 2.0% 
8. TV Talk Shows & other 20 1.8% 
9. Magazines 6 .5% 
10. SMS service 4 .4% 
11. Radio Talk Shows 3 .3% 
Total 1100 100.0% 
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As shown in (Table 5.9c), television talk shows topped respondents sources 
mentioned 465 times comprising 42.3 % of the total news sources listed. Newspapers 
came second listed 229 times by respondents at 20.8 %. The Internet came third, cited 
by 172 respondents as their source of news comprising 15.6 %. Television news 
ranked fourth, mentioned 83 times at 7.5 %. The remaining sources include personal 
communication, miscellaneous, radio news, television talk shows and other, 
magazines, SMS, and radio talk shows were the least mentioned. The following figure 
describes the results. 
Figure 5.9c: Main source of news for the issues listed by respondents 
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Table 5.9d: Name of main source of news for the issues listed by respondents  
How did these issues first come to your knowledge? 
Specify the name 
Frequency % 
 1. Al Ashera Masa'an TV talk show 119 28.7% 
2. 90 Deqeeqa TV talk show 83 20.0% 
3. Masr Ennaharda TV talk show 52 12.5% 
4. Al Masry Al Youm newspaper 29 7.0% 
5. Al Youm Al Sabe online paper 25 6.0% 
6. Al Ahram newspaper 15 3.6% 
7. Al Shorouk newspaper 14 3.4% 
8. Facebook 14 3.4% 
9. Al Shorouk Online 7 1.7% 
10. Masrawy website 6 1.4% 
11. Al Jazeera TV channel 6 1.4% 
12. Men Qalb Masr TV talk show 6 1.4% 
13. Al Hayat Al Youm TV talk show 6 1.4% 
14. Twitter 4 1.0% 
15. Akhbar Baladna sms service 4 1.0% 
16. Al Qahera Al Youm TV talk show 3 .7% 
17. Nogoum FM 3 .7% 
18. Ahram Online 2 .5% 
19. Sabah Dream TV talk show 2 .5% 
20. Radio Masr 2 .5% 
21. Al Arabeya.net 2 .5% 
22. Baladna Belmasry talk show 2 .5% 
23. 48 Sa'a TV talk show 1 .2% 
24. Al Akhbar newspaper 1 .2% 
25. Al Jazeera.net 1 .2% 
26. Al Tab'a Al Akheera news program 1 .2% 
27. Teen Stuff magazine 1 .2% 
28. MSN News 1 .2% 
29. Business Today magazine 1 .2% 
30. Youtube 1 .2% 
31. Al Tab'a Al Oula news program 1 .2% 
Total 415 100.0% 
 
 
103 
 
As shown in (Table 5.9d), out of the 415 names listed by respondents as the 
main sources of news, television talk show Al Ashera Masa'an topped respondents 
sources, mentioned 119 times comprising 28.7 % of the news sources. 90 Deqeeqa  
talk show came second cited 83 times by respondents at 20 %. Masr Ennaharda came 
third cited by 52 respondents as their source of news comprising 12.5 %.  
 
Figure 5.9d: Name of main source of news for the issues listed by respondents 
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To further investigate the agenda-setting influence of television talk shows, 
two cross tabulation tables were conducted: (Table 5.9e) shows the cross tabulation 
of the five main sources of news which include television talk shows with the main 
topics. (Table 5.9f) shows the cross tabulation of the same five main sources with the 
top 10 news issues by respondents.  
Table 5.9e: Cross tabulation of the five main sources of news and the main 
topics 
Topic 
News 
p. 
TV 
News 
TV 
Talk 
Shows 
Inter-
net 
Pers-
onal 
com. 
 
Other 
 
 
Total 
Political 81 
23.4% 
26 
7.5% 
137 
39.6% 
55 
15.9% 
18 
5.2% 
29 
8.4% 
346 
100% 
Econ. 38 
21% 
12 
6.6% 
83 
45.9% 
21 
11.6% 
11 
6.1% 
16 
8.8% 
181 
100% 
Criminal 32 
22.4% 
10 
7% 
54 
37.8% 
25 
17.5% 
9 
6.3% 
13 
9% 
143 
100% 
Media 10 
10.4% 
8 
8.2% 
52 
54.2% 
14 
14.6% 
6 
6.3% 
6 
6.3% 
96 
100% 
Social 19 
23.5% 
1 
1.2% 
43 
53% 
11 
13.6% 
2 
2.5% 
5 
6.2% 
81 
100% 
Edu. 15 
28.8% 
4 
7.7% 
21 
40% 
6 
11.5% 
1 
1.9% 
5 
9.6% 
52 
100% 
Health 7 
1.5% 
5 
11.5% 
19 
42.2% 
6 
13% 
3 
6.6% 
5 
11.1% 
45 
100% 
Misc. 8 
13.5% 
8 
13.5% 
19 
32.3% 
11 
18.6% 
7 
11.8% 
6 
10.1% 
59 
100% 
Religion 5 
19.2% 
1 
3.8% 
10 
38.4% 
5 
19.2% 
3 
11.5% 
2 
7.7% 
26 
100% 
Sports 4 
17.3% 
3 
3% 
10 
43.4% 
6 
26% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
23 
100% 
Environ. 6 
21.4% 
5 
17.8% 
9 
32% 
6 
21.4% 
1 
3.6% 
1 
3.6% 
28 
100% 
Human 
Inst. 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
6 
66.6% 
2 
22.2% 
0 
0% 
1 
11.1% 
9 
100% 
Arts & 
Cult. 
4 
50% 
0 
0% 
2 
25% 
2 
25% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
8 
100% 
Sci & 
Tech. 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
66.6% 
1 
33.3% 
0 
0% 
3 
100% 
Total 
mean% 
229 
20.8% 
83 
7.5% 
465 
42.2% 
172 
15.6% 
62 
5.6% 
89 
8% 
1100 
100% 
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Table 5.9ea: Statistical test for table 5.9e 
ANOVA 
Source of 
variation 
Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean 
square 
F 
Sources of news 11731.77 5 2346.355 19.5140
9 
Error 9378.643 78 120.239  
Total 21110.42 83 254.3424  
 
As shown in (Table 5.9e), television talk shows topped the news sources in all 
topics, cited 42.2 % out of the total number of sources cited for the 1,100 issues 
provided by respondents. Talk shows were cited for political topic at 39.6 % as the 
primary source of news which supports the previous results in table 5.9c.  
As shown in (Table 5.9ea), ANOVA was conducted to compare the sources of 
news and to determine if there was any significant difference. The result F = 19.514 
(p=0.00001), is highly significant, indicating that the differences between the sources 
of news are significant with nightly television talk shows significantly much higher 
than any other source. 
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Table 5.9f: Cross tabulation of the five main sources of news and the 10 mostly 
mentioned news issues listed by respondents  
 News Issue Newspaper 
TV 
News 
TV 
Talk 
Shows 
Internet 
Personal 
Comm. 
Other Total 
 
 
Parliamentary 
Elections 
57 15 100 32 9 16 229 
24.9% 6.6% 43.7% 14.0% 3.9% 7% 100 % 
Minimum 
wages 
13 2 27 8 1 4 55 
23.6% 3.6% 49.1% 14.5% 1.8% 7.3% 100% 
Rising Food 
Prices 
14 5 31 7 5 7 69 
20.3% 7.2% 44.9% 10.1% 7.2% 10.1% 100% 
School 
violence  
9 1 31 7 1 5 54 
16.7% 1.9% 57.4% 13.0% 1.9% 9.3% 100% 
University 
Guards 
11 
31.4% 
1 
2.9% 
12 
34.3% 
5 
14.3% 
1 
2.9% 
5 
14.3% 
35 
100% 
 
Courts 
11 6 14 5 1 5 42 
26.2% 14.3% 33.3% 11.9% 2.4% 11.9% 100% 
Terrorism 
10 0 14 13 6 4 47 
21.3% .0% 29.8% 27.7% 12.8% 8.5% 100% 
Dostour Crisis 
3 1 23 5 3 3 38 
7.9% 2.6% 60.5% 13.2% 7.9% 7.9% 100% 
Suspension of 
Media 
0 
0% 
5 
13.5% 
23 
62.2% 
7 
18.9% 
1 
2.7% 
1 37 
100% 2.7% 
Presidential 
Elections 
12 2 17 11 4 10 56 
21.4% 3.6% 30.4% 19.6% 7.1% 17.9% 100% 
Mean %  19.3% 5.7% 44.5% 15.8% 5.1% 9.7% 100% 
 
Table 5.9fa: Statistical test for table 5.9f 
ANOVA 
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Source of news 10849.68 5 2169.937 40.38761 
Error 2901.3 54 53.72778  
Total 13750.98 59 233.0675  
 
As shown in (Table 5.9f), television talk shows also topped the news sources 
in all 10 issues listed, representing 43.7% of the sources mentioned for parliamentary 
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elections. Television talk shows were also cited by respondents for the issue of 
minimum wages representing 49.1 %.  
As shown in (Table 5.9fa), ANOVA was conducted to compare the sources of 
news. The result F = 40.388 (p=0.00001) is highly significant indicating that the 
differences between the sources of news are significant with TV talk shows much 
higher than any other source. 
 To further investigate whether respondents follow talk shows‟ coverage on the 
issues they listed and to insure internal validity, respondents were asked to specify 
how often they follow talk show‟s coverage for each issue they listed on a three-point 
scale with always representing the highest value of 3, sometimes representing a value 
of 2, and never representing the lowest value of 1.  
Table 5.9g Exposure to talk show's coverage of news priorities on the public 
agenda 
 
Percent Frequency 
How often do you follow talk shows' 
coverage of each issue you listed? 
34.2% 376 Always 
57.8% 636 Sometimes 
8.0% 88 Never 
100.0% 1100 Total 
2.26 Mean Av. Rating* 
0.587 SD 
 * based on a 3-point scale:  3 = Always, 2 = Sometimes, 1 = Never 
 
As shown in (Table 5.9g), the majority of respondents sometimes (57.8%) 
follow talk shows‟ coverage of the 1,100 news issues they listed, followed by always 
(34.2%) and "never" (8 %). The mean value of 2.26 shows that the majority fall 
between sometimes and always.  
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5.10 Talk Shows‟ Coverage & Agenda Setting 
 
The amount of coverage of talk shows is defined as the total number of news 
stories covered by the three Egyptian nightly television talk shows analyzed in the 
content-analysis study.  As shown in (Table 5.9d) earlier, television talk show Al 
Ashera Masa'an topped respondents‟ sources representing 28.7 % of the news 
sources, followed by 90 Deqeeqa  (20%) and Masr Ennaharda (12.5 %). If the 
amount of coverage is related to the agenda-setting impact, then the talk show with 
the highest number of stories would be most cited by respondents. A cross tabulation 
of the three talk shows with the top story on the agenda, the parliamentary elections, 
was also formulated. This is to examine if a particular show‟s amount of coverage had 
any relation to its dominant agenda-setting influence. The following table shows the 
amount of coverage in the three shows. 
 Table 5.10a: Total number of stories covered by Egyptian nightly television talk 
shows:  
Talk Show Frequency Percent 
 
Masr Ennaharda 258 38.2 
90 Deqeeqa 211 31.2 
Al Ashera Masa'an 207 30.6 
Total 676 100.0 
 
The total number of stories covered by the three talk shows is 676 stories. 
 Masr Ennaharda produced a slightly larger number with 258 stories, 
representing 38.2%. 
 90 Deqeeqa produced 31.2% of the stories. 
 Al Ashera Masa'an produced 30.6% of the total stories. 
As shown in (Table 5.10), There is no significant difference in the amount of 
coverage between the three talk shows.  
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Figure 5.10a: Total number of stories covered by Egyptian nightly television talk 
shows: 
 
Table 5.10b Cross tabulation of the amount of coverage of the parliamentary 
elections in the three talk shows 
 
News Issue 
Talk Show 
Total 
Al Ashera 
Masa'an 
Masr 
Ennaharda 
90 
Deqeeqa 
 
Parliamentary Elections 
 
25 
(39.7%) 
 
20 
(31.7%) 
 
18 
(28.6%) 
 
63 
(100%) 
 
 As shown in (Table 5.10b), Al Ashera Masa‟an had the highest parliamentary 
election stories (39.7%), followed by Masr Ennaharda (31.7%) and 90 Deqeeqa 
(28.6%). The difference between the three shows in terms of the amount of coverage 
is not significant. Therefore, there is no relation between the amount of coverage and 
a particular talk show‟s agenda-setting impact.  
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5.11 Second-level agenda-setting: Public framing vs. media framing of the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections & H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows’ 
portrayal of Egypt’s parliamentary elections is likely to influence viewers’ 
perception of the parliamentary elections. 
 
The second-level of agenda setting is applied in this study by examining the 
frames of the talk shows‟ advance coverage of the parliamentary elections and 
comparing it with respondents‟ frames of elections during the period that preceded 
the elections. Respondents were given 22 opposite statements in the questionnaire 
and were asked to specify their level of agreement on a five-point likert scale from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. The statements tackled a variety of election 
attributes.  The statements were categorized into separate tables according to topic for 
ease of analysis. To provide more robust results, strongly agree and agree results 
were combined into an overall agreement total. As well as strongly disagree and 
disagree as shown in the following table (also for the rest of the tables). 
5.11a Results of survey framing statements 
Table 5.11aa: Media Restrictions 
Opposite Statements Frequency (%) Mean Av. 
Rating* + SD Agree Neutral Disagree 
a) The government's recent 
restrictions on private media 
have nothing to do with the 
elections 
57 
(19.9%) 
43 
(15.0%) 
186 
(65.0%) 
2.20 
+ 0.121 
l) The government recently 
issued restrictions on private 
media because of the elections 
206 
(72.0%) 
58 
(20.3%) 
22 
(7.7%) 
3.97 
+ 0.791 
* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree) 
„t‟ = 4.956  (p= 0.0011) highly significant difference between the two opposites 
 
No election-related media restrictions: Table 5.11aa shows that 57% agree with 
statement (a), 5% are neutral, and 65% disagree. A mean of 2.20 indicates a 
disagreement level. 
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Election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11aa) shows that 72% agree with 
statement (l), 20.3% are neutral, and 7.7% disagree. A mean of 3.97 indicates that the 
majority agree with the statement.  
Table 5.11ab: Election Fairness  
Opposite Statement Frequency (%) Mean av. rating* 
+ SD Agree Neutral Disagree 
b) The elections will be 
fairly conducted 
41 
(14.3%) 
65 
(22.7%) 
180 
(62.9%) 
2.18 
+ 0.211 
m) The elections will 
not be fairly conducted 
191 
(66.8%) 
62 
(21.7%) 
33 
(11.5%) 
3.88 
+ 0.750 
 „t‟ = 4.875  (p= 0.0012) highly significant difference between the two opposites 
Fair Elections: (Table 5.11ab) shows that only 14.3% agree with statement (b), 
22.7% are neutral, and 62.9% disagree. A mean of 2.18 indicates that the majority 
disagree with the statement. 
Unfair Elections: (Table 5.11ab) shows that 66.8% agree with statement (m), 21.7% 
are neutral, and 11.5% disagree. A mean of 3.88 indicates that the majority are 
between agree and neutral. 
Table 5.11ac: NDP  
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) Mean av. 
Rating* 
+ SD 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
c) National Democratic Party 
(NDP) candidates are expected 
to hold the majority of seats in 
parliament 
213 
(74.5%) 
 60 
(21.0%) 
13  
(4.5%) 
4.10 
+ 0.880 
n) NDP candidates are not 
expected to hold the majority of 
seats in parliament 
 56 
(19.6%) 
74 
 (25.9%) 
156 
 (54.5%) 
2.40 
+ 0.196 
„t‟ = 4.224  (p= 0.0029) highly significant difference between the two opposites 
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NDP Majority: (Table 5.11ac) shows that 74.5% agree with statement (c), 21% are 
neutral, and only 4.5% disagree. A mean of 4.10 indicates that the majority is 
between strongly agree and agree. 
NDP Not Majority: (Table 5.11ac) shows that 19.6% agree with the statement (n), 
25.9% are neutral, and 54.5% disagree. 
Table 5.11ad: Judicial supervision 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) Mean av. Rating*  
+ SD  Agree Neutral Disagree 
d) Judicial supervision 
is important to prevent 
election fraud 
199 
(69.6%) 
 68 
(23.8%) 
19  
(6.6%) 
4.03 
+ 0.856 
o) Judicial supervision 
is not important to 
prevent election fraud 
 54 
(18.9%) 
 64 
(22.4%) 
168 
 (58.7%) 
2.33 
+ 0.151 
„t‟ = 4.388  (p= 0.0023) highly significant difference between the two opposites 
 
Important Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11ad) shows that 69.6% agree with 
statement (d), 23.8% are neutral, and 6.6% disagree. A mean of 4.03 indicates that the 
majority is between strongly agree and agree. 
Unimportant Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11ad) shows that 18.9% agree with 
statement (o), 22.4% are neutral, and 58.7% disagree. 
 
Table 5.11ae: Peaceful vs. violent elections 
Opposite Statements Frequency (%) Mean av. Rating*  
+ SD Agree Neutral Disagree 
e) The elections are 
expected to be peaceful 
56 
(19.6%) 
83  
(29.0%) 
147  
(51.4%) 
2.52 
+ 0.300 
p) The elections are 
expected to be violent 
 160 
(55.9%) 
87  
(30.4%) 
 39 
(13.6%) 
3.57 
+ 0.594 
„t‟ = 3.500  (p= 0.0081) highly significant difference between the two opposites 
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Peaceful Elections: (Table 5.11ae) shows that 19.6% agree with statement (e), 29% 
are neutral, and 51.4% disagree. A mean of 2.52 shows that the majority is between 
disagree and neutral. 
Violent Elections: (Table5.11ae) shows that 55.9% agree with statement (p), 30.4% 
are neutral, and 13.6% disagree. A mean of 3.57 shows that the majority is between 
agree and neutral. 
Table 5.11af: Independent Monitors 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) Mean av. Rating* 
+ SD Agree Neutral Disagree 
f) It's important to have 
independent monitors 
223 
78.0(%) 
52  
(18.2%) 
11  
(3.8%) 
4.11 
+ 0.879 
q) It's not important to 
have independent monitors 
36  
(12.6%) 
62  
(21.7%) 
188  
(65.7%) 
2.22 
+ 0.269 
„t‟ = 4.592  (p= 0.0018) highly significant difference between the two opposites 
Important Independent Monitors:  (Table 5.11af) shows that 78% agree with 
statement (f), 18.2% are neutral, and 3.8% disagree. A mean of 4.11 shows that the 
majority is between strongly agree and agree. 
Unimportant Independent Monitors:  (Table 5.11af) shows that 12.6 % agree with 
statement (q), 21.7 % are neutral, and 65.7 % disagree. A mean of 2.22 shows that the 
majority is between disagree and neutral. 
Table 5.11ag: Opposition Representation 
Opposite Statements Frequency (%) Mean av. Rating* 
+ SD Agree Neutral Disagree 
g) Opposition party 
candidates will have a 
powerful representation 
77 
(26.9%) 
108  
(37.8%) 
101  
(35.3%) 
2.82 
+ 0.431 
r) Opposition party 
candidates will have a 
weak representation 
 140 
(49.0%) 
 101 
(35.3%) 
45  
(15.7%) 
3.47 
+ 0.531 
„t‟ = 2.136  (p= 0.0652) no significant difference between the two opposites 
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Powerful Opposition: (Table 5.11ag) shows that 26.9 % agree with statement (g), 
37.8% are neutral, and 35.3 disagree. A mean of 2.82 shows that the majority is 
between disagree and neutral. 
Weak Opposition: (Table 5.11ag) shows that 49 % agree with statement (r), 35.3 % 
are neutral, and 15.7% disagree. A mean of 3.47 shows that the majority is between 
agree and neutral.  
Table 5.11ah: Muslim Brotherhood 
Opposite Statements Frequency (%) Mean av. 
Rating* 
+ SD 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates will be welcomed 
to run in the elections by the 
government 
49 
(17.1%) 
63  
(22.0%) 
174  
(60.8%) 
2.31 
+ 0.213 
Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates will be restricted 
to run in the elections by 
the government 
 153 
(53.5%) 
84  
(29.4%) 
49  
(17.1%) 
3.56 
+ 0.533 
„t‟ = 4.840  (p= 0.0013) highly significant difference between the two opposites 
 
Muslim Brotherhood Welcomed: (Table 5.11ah) shows that 17.1 % agree with 
statement (h), 22% are neutral, and 60.8% disagree. A mean of 2.31 shows a majority 
between disagree and neutral.  
Muslim Brotherhood Restricted: (Table 5.11ah) shows that 53.5% agree with 
statement (s), 29.4% are neutral, and 17.1% disagree. A mean of 3.56 indicates that 
the majority falls between agree and neutral. 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
Table 5.11ai: Women Representation 
Statement Frequency (%) Mean av. 
Rating* 
+ SD 
 Agree Neutral Disagree 
i) Women must have equal 
representation in 
parliament 
154 
(53.8%) 
90  
(31.5%) 
42  
(14.7%) 
3.66 
+ 0.598 
t) Women representation 
should be restricted to the 
quota set by the president 
72  
(25.2%) 
92  
(32.2%) 
122  
(42.7%) 
2.73 
+ 0.294 
„t‟ = 3.095  (p= 0.0148) significant difference between the two opposites 
 
Equal Women Representation: (Table 5.11ai) shows that 53.8% agree with 
statement (i), 31.5% are neutral, and 14.7% disagree. A mean of 3.66 shows that the 
majority is between agree and neutral. 
Unequal Women Representation: (Table 5.11ai) shows that 25.2% agree with 
statement (t), 32.2% are neutral, and 42.7% disagree. A mean of 2.73 indicates that 
the majority is between disagree and neutral.  
Table 5.11aj: Coptic Representation 
Statement Frequency (%) Mean av. Rating* 
+ SD 
 Agree Neutral Disagree 
j) Coptic Christians should 
hold more than the current 10 
percent of parliament seats 
114 
(39.9%) 
110  
(38.5%) 
62  
(21.7%) 
3.26 
+ 0.468 
u) Coptic Christians should 
hold  the current 10 percent of 
parliament seats 
83  
(29.0%) 
132  
(46.2%) 
71  
(24.8%) 
3.06 
+ 0.504 
„t‟ = 0.637  (p= 0.5419) no significant difference between the two opposites 
 
More Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11aj) shows that 39.9% agree with statement 
(j), 38.5% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.26 indicates the majority is 
between agree and neutral.  
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Same Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11aj) shows that 29 % agree with statement 
(u), 46.2% are neutral, and 24.8% disagree. A mean of 3.06 also indicates a majority 
that is also between agree and neutral.  
Table 5.11ak: Wafd Opposition Party 
Statement Frequency (%) Mean av. Rating* 
+ SD 
 Agree Neutral Disagree 
k)The Wafd opposition party 
is expected to hold most 
opposition seats in 
parliament 
83 
(29.0%) 
 139 
(48.6%) 
64  
(22.4%) 
3.08 
+ 0.557 
v)The Wafd opposition party 
is not  expected to hold most 
opposition seats in 
parliament 
92  
(32.2%) 
132  
(46.2%) 
62  
(21.7%) 
3.14 
+ 0.538 
„t‟ = 0.161  (p= 0.9999) no significant difference between the two opposites 
 
Wafd Majority: (Table 5.11ak) shows that 29 % agree with statement (k), 48.6% are 
neutral, and 22.4% disagree. A mean of 3.08 indicates that the majority is between 
neutral and agree. 
Wafd Not Majority: (Table 5.11ak) shows that 32.2 % agree with statement (v), 
46.2% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.14 also shows that the majority is 
between agree and neutral. 
 As shown in the above tables most respondents expect the elections to be 
violent. However, the majority had positive attitudes towards election monitoring by 
judges and independent monitors agreeing that they are important to prevent election 
fraud. To determine whether the respondents overall frames corresponded with the 
talk shows‟ frames of the elections, the results of the content analysis which basically 
indicate which frame was mentioned more, thereby more dominant, are compared 
with the survey agreement results listed in the table below.   
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5.11b Results of Content Analysis Election Frames 
 
Table 5.11ba: Election Frames: Media Restrictions 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
The government's recent restrictions on 
private media have nothing to do with the 
elections 
3  
(8.3%) 
2  
(5.6%) 
31  
(86.1%) 
The government recently issued 
restrictions on private media because of 
the elections 
5  
(13.9%) 
2  
(5.6%) 
29  
(80.6%) 
 
No election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11ba) displays how the media 
restrictions frame was presented out of the total 36 election stories coded. Framing the 
government's recent restrictions as having nothing to do with elections was mentioned 
8.3%, not mentioned 86.1%, and neutral 5.6%. 
Election-related media restrictions:  (Table 5.11ba) shows that framing the media 
restrictions as being issued because of the elections was mentioned 13.9%, not 
mentioned 80.6%, and neutral 5.6%.  
Table 5.11bb: Elections Fairness 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
The elections will be fairly conducted 13 
(36.1%) 
4 
(11.1%) 
19  
(52.8%) 
The elections will be unfairly conducted 
13  
(36.1%) 
4  
(11.1%) 
19  
(52.8%) 
 
Fair Elections vs. Unfair Elections: (Table 5.11bb) shows that framing the elections 
as fair and unfair was equally mentioned in 36.1% of the stories, not mentioned 
52.8%, and neutral 11.1%.  
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Table 5.11bc: The National Democratic Party 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
The NDP is expected to hold the majority 
of seats in parliament 
9  
(25.0%) 
4 
(11.1%) 
23  
(63.9%) 
The NDP is not expected to hold the 
majority of seats in parliament 
0  
(0%) 
4  
(11.1%) 
32  
(88.9%) 
 
NDP Majority: (Table 5.11bc) shows that framing the NDP as the majority was 
mentioned in 25% of the stories, not mentioned 63.9% and neutral 4%.  
 NDP Not Majority: (Table 5.11bc) shows that framing the NDP as not expected to 
hold the majority was mentioned in 0% of the stories, not mentioned in 88.9%, and 
neutral in 11.1%.  
Table 5.11bd: Judicial Supervision 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
Judicial supervision is important to 
prevent fraud 
10  
(27.8%) 
9  
(25.0%) 
17  
(47.2%) 
Judicial supervision is not important to 
prevent fraud 
10  
(27.8%) 
4  
(11.1%) 
22  
(61.1%) 
 
Important vs. Unimportant Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11bd) shows that 
framing judicial supervision as important and as unimportant was equally mentioned 
in 27.8% of the stories.  The importance of judicial supervision was not mentioned in 
47.2% and was neutral in 25%. The unimportance of judicial supervision was neutral 
in 11.1% and not mentioned in 61.1%.  
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Table 5.11be: Peaceful vs. Violent Elections 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
The elections are expected to be peaceful 7  
(19.4%) 
5  
(13.9%) 
24  
(66.7%) 
The elections are expected to be violent 
10  
(27.8%) 
5  
(13.9%) 
21  
(58.3%) 
 
Peaceful Elections: (Table 5.11be) shows that framing the elections as peaceful was 
mentioned 19.4%, not mentioned 66.7% and neutral 13.9%.  
Violent Elections: (Table 5.11be) shows that framing the elections as violent was 
mentioned 27.8%, not mentioned 58.3% and neutral 13.9%. 
 
Table 5.11bf: Independent Monitors 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
It’s important to have independent 
monitors 
11  
(30.6%) 
1  
(2.8%) 
24  
(66.7%) 
It‟s not important to have independent 
monitors 
5  
(13.9%) 
1  
(2.8%) 
30  
(83.3%) 
 
Important Independent Monitors:  (Table 5.11bf) shows that framing independent 
monitors as important was mentioned 30.6%, not mentioned 66.7% and neutral 2.8%.   
Unimportant Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11bf) shows that framing 
independent monitors as unimportant was only mentioned 13.9%, neutral 2.8%, and 
not mentioned 83.3%.  
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Table 5.11bg: Opposition Representation 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
Opposition party candidates will have a 
powerful representation 
6  
(16.7%) 
5  
(13.9%) 
25  
(69.4%) 
Opposition party candidates will have a 
weak representation 
15  
(41.7%) 
6  
(16.7%) 
41.7  
(83.3%) 
 
Powerful Opposition: (Table 5.11bg) shows that framing the opposition 
representation as powerful was only mentioned 16.7%, 13.9% neutral, and 69.4% not 
mentioned.   
Weak Opposition: (Table 5.11bg) shows that framing the opposition representation 
as weak was mentioned 41.7%, neutral 16.7% and not mentioned 83.3%.  
 
Table 5.11bh: Muslim Brotherhood 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
Muslim brotherhood candidates will be 
welcomed to run in the elections by the 
government 
5  
(13.9%) 
5  
(13.9%) 
26  
(72.2%) 
Muslim brotherhood candidates will be 
restricted from running in the elections 
by the government 
8  
(22.2%) 
5  
(13.9%) 
23  
(63.9%) 
 
Muslim Brotherhood Welcomed: (Table 5.11bh) shows that framing the Muslim 
Brotherhood as being welcomed to run in the elections was only mentioned 13.9%, 
neutral 13.9% and not mentioned 72.2%.   
Muslim Brotherhood Restricted: (Table 5.11bh) shows that framing the Muslim 
Brotherhood as being restricted from running in the elections was mentioned 22.2%, 
13.9% neutral, and 63.9% not mentioned.  
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Table 5.11bi: Women Representation 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
Women must have equal representation in 
parliament 
3  
(8.3%) 
3  
(8.3%) 
30  
(83.3%) 
Women representation should be restricted 
to the quota set by the president 
0  
(0%) 
3  
(8.3%) 
33  
(91.7%) 
 
Equal Women Representation: (Table 5.11bi) shows that framing equal women 
representation was 8.3% mentioned, neutral 8.3%, and not mentioned 83.3%.  
Unequal Women Representation: (Table 5.11bi) shows that framing unequal 
women representation was mentioned 0%, neutral 8.3% and not mentioned 91.7%.  
 
Table 5.11bj: Coptic Representation 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
Coptic Christians should hold more than 
the current10 percent of parliament seats 
6  
(16.7%) 
1  
(2.8%) 
29  
(80.6%) 
Coptic Christians should hold the usual 
current 10 percent seats in parliament 
0  
(0%) 
0  
(0%) 
36  
(100.0%) 
 
More Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11bj) shows that framing more Coptic 
representation was mentioned 16.7%, neutral 2.8% and not mentioned 80.6%.  
Same Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11bj) shows that framing the same Coptic 
representation was mentioned 0%, neutral 0% and not mentioned 100%.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
Table 5.11bk: Wafd Opposition Party 
Opposite Statements 
Frequency (%) 
Mentioned Neutral 
Not 
Mentioned 
The Wafd opposition party is expected to 
hold most opposition seats in parliament 
9  
(25.0%) 
6  
(16.7%) 
21  
(58.3%) 
The Wafd opposition party is not expected 
to hold most opposition seats in 
parliament 
0  
(0%) 
6  
(16.7%) 
30  
(83.3%) 
 
Wafd Majority: (Table 5.11bk) shows that framing the Wafd opposition party as 
expected to hold most opposition seats was mentioned 25%, neutral 16.7%, and not 
mentioned 58.3%. 
Wafd Not Majority: (Table 5.11bk) shows that framing the Wafd opposition party as 
not expected to hold most opposition seats was mentioned 0%, neutral 16.7%, and not 
mentioned 83.3%. 
 
5.11c Comparing Content Analysis & Survey Election Frames 
Table 5.11c Comparing content analysis and survey frames of the elections 
 
Opposite Frames 
Content 
Analysis 
% 
Mentioned 
Survey 
% 
Agree 
 
Match 
1 The government's recent restrictions on private media 
have nothing to do with the elections 
8.3-L 19.9-L 
Yes 
2 The government recently issued restrictions on 
private media because of the elections 
13.9-H 72.0-H 
3 The elections will be fairly conducted 36.1 14.3 
No 
4 The elections will be unfairly conducted 36.1 66.8 
5 Judicial supervision is important to prevent fraud 27.8 69.6-H 
No 
6 Judicial supervision is not important to prevent fraud 27.8 18.9-L 
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7 The elections are expected to be peaceful 19.4-L 19.6-L 
Yes 
8 The elections are expected to be violent 27.8-H 55.9-H 
9 It’s important to have independent monitors 30.6-H 78.0-H 
Yes 
10 It‟s not important to have independent monitors 13.9-L 12.6-L 
11 Opposition party candidates will have a powerful 
representation 
16.7-L 26.9-L 
Yes 
12 Opposition party candidates will have a weak 
representation 
41.7-H 49.0-H 
13 Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to 
run in the elections by the government 
13.9-L 17.1-L 
Yes 
14 Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted 
from running in the elections by the government 
22.2-H 53.5-H 
15 Women must have equal representation in 
parliament 
8.3-H 53.8-H 
Yes 
16 Women representation should be restricted to the 
quota set by the president 
0-L 25.2-L 
17 Coptic Christians should hold more than the 
current10 percent of parliament seats 
16.7-H 39.9-H 
Yes 
18 Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 
percent seats in parliament 
0-L 29.0-L 
19 The NDP is expected to hold the majority of seats in 
parliament 
25.0-H 74.5-H 
Yes 
20 The NDP is not expected to hold the majority of seats 
in parliament 
0-L 19.6-L 
21 The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most 
opposition seats in parliament 
25.0-H 29.0-L 
No 
22 The Wafd opposition party is not expected to hold 
most opposition seats in parliament 
0-L 32.2-H 
 
As shown in (Table 5.11c), 8 framing statements out of 11 matched between 
being mentioned by talk shows and agreed upon by respondents, representing a 73% 
match. 
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5.12 Perception of the role of nightly TV talk shows and civic engagement 
attitudes & H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic 
engagement, the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic 
engagement. 
 
Perception of the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows in civic 
engagement was measured through seven statements on a five-point likert scale. 
Civic engagement is operationally defined as sociopolitical awareness, sociopolitical 
discussions, public opinion expression, community involvement and political 
participation.  
Table 5.12a: Perception of nightly television talk shows‟ role in civic engagement 
Survey Statements of Question 3 
Arranged in order of Mean* 
Frequency (%) in degree of agreement 
Agree 
(5+4) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2+1) 
Mean Av. 
Rating* 
+ SD 
a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a 
source of news about Egypt's affairs 
264 
(92.3%) 
17 
(5.9%) 
5 
(1.7%) 
4.28 
+ 1.084 
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create 
sociopolitical awareness 
209 
(73.1%) 
57 
(19.9%) 
20 
(7.0%) 
3.90 
+ 0.808 
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows 
encourage ordinary citizens  to express 
their opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, 
fax, letters, sms to the show) 
208 
(72.7%) 
51 
(17.8%) 
27 
(9.4%) 
3.87 
+ 0.791 
c) Egyptian nightly TV Talk shows 
encourage people to make charitable 
contributions 
192 
(67.1%) 
76 
(26.6%) 
18 
(6.3%) 
3.82 
+ 0.741 
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows 
encourage people to participate in solving 
community problems in Egypt 
144 
(50.3%) 
91 
(31.8%) 
 
51 
(17.8%) 
 
3.43 
+ 0.542 
g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows 
encourage citizens to vote 
114 
(39.9%) 
103 
(36.0%) 
69 
(24.1%) 
3.22 
+ 0.477 
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my 
primary source of information about the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections held in 
Nov. 2010 
121 
(42.3%) 
82 
(28.7%) 
83 
(29.0%) 
3.21 
+ 0.394 
Total 
1252 
(%62.5) 
477 
(23.8%) 
273 
(13.6%) 
3.68 
+ 0.653 
* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree) 
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Table 5.12aa: Statistical test for table 5.12a 
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Media sources 2.74 6 0.457 1.053 
Error 12.16 28 0.434  
Total 14.9 34   
ANOVA: F= 1.053 not significant (p=0.4134) indicating no significant differences between 
the mean average ratings of talk shows role in civic engagement.  
 
a) Perception of talk shows as a source of news: (Table 5.12a) shows that almost 
the entire sample, 92.3%, agree that talk shows are a source of news, 5.9% are neutral, 
and only 1.7% disagree. A mean of 4.28 indicates that the majority falls between 
agree and strongly agree. 
e) Perception of talk shows as creating sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12a) 
shows that the majority representing 73.1%, agree that talk shows promote 
sociopolitical awareness, 19.9% are neutral, and only 7% disagree. A mean of 3.90 
indicates that the majority falls almost on the agree level. 
d) Perception of talk shows as encouraging public opinion expression: (Table 
5.12a) shows that the 72.7% representing the majority agree that talk shows 
encourage public opinion expression, 17.8% neutral, and only 9.4% disagree. A mean 
of 3.87 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral. 
c) Perception of talk shows as encouraging charity: (Table 5.12a) shows that 
67.1%, representing the majority, agree that talk shows encourage charity work, 
26.6% neutral, and only 6.3% disagree. A mean of 3.22 indicates that the majority 
falls between agree and neutral. 
b) Perception of talk shows as encouraging community participation:  (Table 
5.12a) shows that half the sample, 50.3%, agrees that talk shows encourage 
community participation, 31.8% neutral, and 17.8% disagree. A mean of 3.43 
indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral. 
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g) Perception of talk shows as encouraging voting: (Table 5.12a) shows that 
39.9% agree that talk shows encourage voting, followed by 36% neutral, and 24.1% 
disagree. A mean of 3.22 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral. 
f) Perception of talk shows as a main source for information on the Egyptian 
parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12a) shows that 42.3%, agree that talk shows are 
a main source of news regarding the elections, 19.9% are neutral, and 29% disagree. 
A mean of 3.21 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral. 
 There is a high agreement on the total 2,002 responses. As shown in (Table 
5.12a), the total number of agreement on all talk show perception statements is 
62.5% or 1,252 agreement responses, compared to 23.8% neutral and a low 
disagreement total of 13.6%. The overall mean is 3.68, which is between agree and 
neutral indicating a positive perception of the role of television talks shows. 
 An ANOVA was conducted, as shown in (Table 5.12aa), to test if there was 
any significant difference between the statements. The result F= 1.053 is not 
significant (p=0.4134), indicating that there is no significant difference between the 
mean average ratings of the perceptions of talk shows role in civic engagement.  
Figure 5.12a: Perception of nightly TV talk shows‟ role in civic engagement 
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5.12b Attitudes towards civic engagement 
 
Civic engagement attitudes were measured through 14 statements on a five-
point likert scale. Civic engagement is defined into sociopolitical awareness, public 
opinion expression, sociopolitical discussions, community participation and political 
participation through voting.  
Table 5.12b: Attitudes towards civic engagement, listed in descending order of 
mean 
Statements of Question 4 
Arranged in order of Mean 
Frequency (%) in degree of agreement 
Agree 
(5+4) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Disagree 
(2+1) 
Mean av. 
Rating* 
+ SD 
e) Being informed about Egyptian affairs 
is important 
254 
(88.8%) 
21 
(7.3%) 
11 
(3.8%) 
4.30 
+ 1.068 
f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a 
priority 
224 
(78.3%) 
43 
(15.0%) 
19 
(6.6%) 
4.09 
+ 0.889 
i) Contributing to community is my 
responsibility 
206 
(72.0%) 
59 
(20.6%) 
21 
(7.3%) 
3.88 
+ 0.787 
g) Citizens should not wait for the 
government to solve their community 
problems 
189 
(66.1%) 
35 
(12.2%) 
62 
(21.7%) 
3.70 
+ 0.720 
d) I consider discussing sociopolitical 
affairs a priority 
176 
(61.5%) 
70 
(24.5%) 
40 
(14.0%) 
3.69 
+ 0.626 
j) I volunteer to help solve community 
problems in Egypt 
157 
(54.9%) 
91 
(31.8%) 
38 
(13.3%) 
3.60 
+ 0.570 
h) I make a difference in my community 
160 
(55.9%) 
79 
(27.6%) 
47 
(16.4%) 
3.54 
+ 0.570 
k) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's 
presidential elections in 2011 
159 
(55.6%) 
72 
(25.2%) 
55 
(19.2%) 
3.55 
+ 0.552 
 a) I consider voting a priority  
146 
(51.0%) 
77 
(26.9%) 
63 
(22.0%) 
3.45 
+0.487 
l) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's 
upcoming parliamentary elections 
140 
(49.0%) 
79 
(27.6%) 
67 
(23.4%) 
3.38 
+ 0.461 
m) I intend to vote in Egypt's upcoming 
presidential elections 
138 
(48.3%) 
61 
(21.3%) 
87 
(30.4%) 
3.31 
+ 0.438 
n) I intend to vote in the upcoming 
parliamentary elections 
104 
(36.4%) 
81 
(28.3%) 
101 
(35.3%) 
3.03 
+ 0.319 
 b) I express my opinion through the 
media (e.g. call-ins, emails, etc.) 
86 
(30.1%) 
76 
(26.6%) 
124 
(43.4%) 
2.81 
+ 0.316 
 c) I express my opinion to public officials 
(e.g. petitions, letters) 
68 
(23.8%) 
74 
(25.9%) 
144 
(50.3%) 
2.65 
+ 0.308 
Overall 
2207 
(55.1%) 
918 
(22.9%) 
879 
(22.0%) 
3.50 
+ 0.525 
* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree) 
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Table 5.12ba: Statistical test for table 5.12b 
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Media sources 0.557 13 0.043 0.112 
Error 21.394 56 0.382  
Total 21.951 69   
ANOVA: F= 0.112 not significant (p=0.9999) indicating no significant differences between 
the mean average ratings of attitudes towards civic engagement. (s
2 
= 0.382)  
 
e) Informed about Egyptian affairs: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority 88.8% 
agree that being informed about Egyptian affairs is a priority, 7.3% are neutral, and 
only 3.8% disagree. A mean of 4.30 indicates that the majority is between strongly 
agree and agree. 
f) Sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority 78.3% agree that 
sociopolitical awareness is a priority, 15% neutral, and only 6.6% disagree. A mean 
of 4.09 indicates that the majority is between agree and strongly agree. 
i) Community responsibility: (Table 5.12b) shows that 72% agree that contributing 
to community is their responsibility, 20.6% are neutral, and 7.3% disagree. A mean 
of 3.88 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral. 
g) Community action: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority comprising 66.1% 
agree that citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community 
problems, 12.2% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.70 indicates that the 
majority is between agree and neutral. 
d) Discussing sociopolitical affairs: (Table 5.12b) shows that 61.5% agree that 
discussing sociopolitical affairs is a priority, 24.5% are neutral, and 14% disagree. A 
mean of 3.69 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral. 
j) Volunteer to solve community problems: (Table 5.12b) shows that 54.9% agree 
with the statement that they volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt, 
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31.8% are neutral, and 13.3% disagree. A mean of 3.60 indicates that the majority is 
between agree and neutral. 
h) Community value: (Table 5.12b) shows that 55.9% agree that they make a 
difference in their communities, 27.6% are neutral, and 16.4% disagree. A mean of 
3.54 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral. 
k) Voting responsibility, presidential elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 55.6% 
agree that it's their responsibility to vote in Egypt's presidential elections in 2011, 
25.2% are neutral, 19.2% disagree. A mean of 3.55 indicates that the majority agree. 
a) I consider voting a priority: (Table 5.12b) shows that 51% agree that they 
consider voting a priority, 26.9% are neutral, and 22% disagree. A mean of 3.45 
indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral. 
l) Voting responsibility, parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 49% 
agree that it's their responsibility to vote in Egypt's 2010 parliamentary elections, 
27.6% are neutral, and 23.4% disagree. A mean of 3.38 indicates that the majority is 
between agree and neutral. 
m) Voting intention, presidential elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 48.3% agree 
that they intend to vote in the presidential elections, 21.3% are neutral, and 30.4% 
disagree. A mean of 3.31 indicates that the majority is between neutral and agree. 
n) Voting intention, parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 36.4% 
agree that they intend to vote in the Nov.2010 parliamentary elections, 28.4% are 
neutral, and 35.3% disagree. A mean of 3.03 indicates that the majority is neutral. 
b) Public opinion expression through media: (Table 5.12b) shows that 30.1% 
agree that they express their opinions through mass media, 26.6% are neutral, and 
43.4% disagree. A mean of 2.81 indicates that the majority is between neutral and 
disagree. 
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c) I express my opinion to public officials: (Table 5.12b) shows that 23.8% agree 
that they express their opinions to public officials, 25.9% are neutral, and 50.3% 
disagree. A mean of 2.65 indicates that the majority is between neutral and disagree. 
Overall, as shown in (Table 5.12b) the agreement percentage on the total 14 
statements measuring civic engagement attitudes is more than half (55.1 %). The 
overall neutrality and disagreement percentage with the civic engagement attitudes 
are almost the same, 22.9% and 22% respectively. The total mean average for all the 
statements is 3.50 which indicates that the majority of respondents are between agree 
and neutral. The majority fall midpoint between agree and neutral with regards to 
civic engagement attitudes, which indicate positive attitudes. 
As shown in (Table 5.12ba), an ANOVA was conducted to determine whether 
there was a significant between the mean average ratings of attitudes towards civic 
engagement and the result was ANOVA: F= 0.112 not significant (p=0.9999) 
indicating no significant differences. (s
2 
= 0.382)  
Figure 5.12b: Attitudes towards civic engagement 
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5.12c Perception of the role of television talk shows & attitudes towards civic 
engagement  
 
 Perception of talk shows as promoting civic engagement was measured 
through seven statements on a five-point liker scale in question 4 in the questionnaire. 
The results were listed earlier in section 5.12a, showing an average mean of 
agreement on perceiving talk shows as having a positive role regarding civic 
engagement. A correlation coefficient was carried out to test H3 to determine if there 
is a significant correlation between perception of talk shows as civically engaging and 
positive attitudes towards civic engagement. Statements from survey question (3) 
which measure the perception were correlated with corresponding statements in 
question (4) measuring attitudes towards civic engagement. Statement (c) regarding 
the perception of talk shows as encouraging charity was not included in the 
correlations table because it didn‟t have corresponding attitude statement. The 
following table shows lists the results.  
Table 5.12c: Correlations between perception of the role of talk shows and civic 
engagement attitudes 
Correlated variables R P 
a)TV talk shows are a source of news &  
-Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important 
- I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority 
 
   
0.173**   
0.166** 
 
 
0.003 
0.005 
b)TV talk shows encourage community participation & 
- Citizens should not wait for government to solve problems 
- I make a difference in my community 
- Community contribution a responsibility 
- I volunteer to solve community problems 
 
-0.032 
 0.047 
 0.029 
 0.178** 
 
0.585 
0.433 
0.631 
0.003 
d)TV talk shows encourage opinion expression & 
- Opinion expression through Media 
- Opinion expression to public officials 
- Discussing sociopolitical affairs 
 
  0.190** 
  0.073 
  0.209** 
 
0.001 
0.216 
0.000 
e)TV talk shows promote sociopolitical awareness & 
- Informed about Egyptian affairs 
- Sociopolitical awareness priority 
 
  0.244** 
  0.295** 
 
 
0.000 
0.000 
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f)TV talk shows are a main source of election information & 
- Responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections 
- Intention to vote in parliamentary elections 
 
  0.083 
  0.128* 
 
0.160 
0.030 
g)TV talk shows encourage voting & 
- Voting priority 
- Responsibility to vote in presidential elections 
- Responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections 
- Intention to vote in presidential elections 
- Intention to vote in parliamentary elections 
 
  0.256** 
  0.204** 
  0.215** 
  0.192** 
  0.264** 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
*   Correlation coefficient „r‟ significant (at 0.05 level of probability) 
** Correlation coefficient „r‟ highly significant (at 0.01 level of probability) 
 
a) Correlations between perception of talk shows as source of news and 
attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12c) shows that the 
correlation was highly significant at 0.173** and 0.166** with the two 
statements measuring attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness. 
b) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging 
community participation and respondents‟ attitudes towards community 
participation were highly significant, 0.178**, with one statement: „I volunteer 
to help solve community problems in Egypt‟. There was no significance with 
the remaining three statements shown in (Table 5.12c). 
d) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging opinion 
expression and respondent‟s attitudes towards opinion expression were 
highly significant with expression opinion through media, 0.190**, and 
discussing sociopolitical affairs, 0.209**. The correlation was insignificant 
with expressing opinions directly to public officials. 
e) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as promoting 
sociopolitical awareness and attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness 
were highly significant with 0.244** for being informed about Egyptian 
affairs, and 0.295** for considering sociopolitical awareness a priority. 
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f) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as a primary source 
for election information and attitudes towards the elections were 
significant, 0.128*, with the intention to vote in the elections. However, they 
were insignificant, 0.083, with the responsibility to vote in the elections. 
g) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging voting 
and the five attitudes towards voting were all highly significant: Voting 
priority,  0.256**, Responsibility to vote in presidential elections, 0.204**, 
responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections, 0.215**, intention to vote in 
presidential elections, 0.192**, and the intention to vote in the parliamentary 
elections,  0.264** 
 
As shown in table 5.12c and the corresponding results, there is a significant to 
highly significant correlation between most of the talk show perception statements 
and corresponding attitudes towards civic engagement. 
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5.13 Exposure & attitudes towards civic engagement & H4: There is a relation 
between exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement 
attitudes. 
 Exposure to nightly television talk shows was defined earlier in section 5.8 of 
the results as the degree of dependency on talk shows for news. This was measured on 
the three-point scale: always, sometimes, never. A mean average result of 2.46 
indicates that the majority fall between always and sometimes. Civic engagement 
attitudes are measured in question (4) in the survey on a five-point liker scale. The 
following table is based on cross tabulations between each statement in question (4) 
with exposure (see Appendix K). The ratio results and percentages are listed below. 
Table 5.13a: Relationship between Exposure to Talk Shows and Civic 
Engagement Attitudes 
Civic Engagement Attitudes 
(Strongly agree & Agree) 
Television Talk Shows 
Exposure 
(Always & Sometimes) 
Ratio % 
a) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important 251 / 286 87.8% 
b) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority 222 / 286 77.8% 
c) Community contribution is my responsibility 203 / 286 71.0% 
d) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve community 187 / 286 65.4% 
e) Discussing sociopolitical affairs 175 / 286 61.2% 
f) Responsibility to vote at presidential elections 159 / 286 55.6% 
g) Making a difference in community   158 / 286 55.2% 
h) Volunteer to solve community problems   156 / 286 54.5% 
i) Voting priority 145 / 286 50.7% 
j) Responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections 140 / 286 48.9% 
k) Intention to vote at presidential elections   138 / 286 48.3% 
l) Intend to vote at parliamentary elections  104 / 286 36.4% 
m) Opinion expression through media                85 / 286 29.7% 
n) Opinion expression to public officials   68 / 286 23.8% 
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a) Relationship between exposure to talk shows and attitudes towards being 
informed about Egyptian affairs was the highest relationship, representing 87.8% 
b) Relationship between exposure and considering sociopolitical awareness a 
priority was the second highest, representing 77.8% 
c) Relationship between exposure and considering community contribution a 
responsibility was also high, representing 71.0% 
d) Relationship between exposure and considering that citizens should not wait for 
the government to solve community problems was relatively high, representing 
65.4% 
e) Relationship between exposure and discussing sociopolitical affairs was 
relatively high, representing 61.2% 
f) Relationship between exposure and responsibility to vote at presidential 
elections was moderate, representing 55.6% 
g) Relationship between exposure and making a difference in community was 
moderate, representing 55.2% 
h) Relationship between exposure and volunteering to solve community problems 
in Egypt was moderate, representing 54.5% 
i) Relationship between exposure and considering voting a priority was moderate, 
representing 50.7% 
j) Relationship between exposure and responsibility to vote at parliamentary 
elections was low, representing 48.9% 
k) Relationship between exposure and the intention to vote at presidential 
elections was low, representing 48.3% 
l) Relationship between exposure and the intention to vote at parliamentary 
elections was low, representing 36.4% 
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m) Relationship between exposure and opinion expression through media  was very 
low, representing 29.7% 
n) Relationship between exposure and opinion expression to public officials was 
very low, representing 23.8% 
The following figure shows the relationships between exposure and civic 
engagement attitudes as displayed in (Table 5.13a). 
Figure 5.13a Relationship between Television Talk Shows Exposure and Civic 
Engagement Attitudes 
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5.13b Overall level of civic engagement 
 Civic engagement attitudes were categorized and rated on a five-point scale 
according to the operational definition of civic engagement: sociopolitical awareness, 
sociopolitical discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, and political 
participation. Each of the five aspects is given a value from 1 to 5, representing a 
specific weight on the civic engagement scale created by the researcher. Political 
participation was considered the highest level of engagement and hence given a value 
of 5. Community engagement is the second highest level (4), opinion expression (3), 
sociopolitical discussions (2), and sociopolitical awareness was given a value of (1). 
Accordingly, the total percentage of agreement with attitude statements measuring a 
specific category was calculated and translated into a corresponding value for each 
category of civic engagement with 1 (representing the basic level of engagement) to 5 
(representing the top level of engagement).  
Table 5.13b Overall Level and Value of Civic Engagement 
Civic Engagement Categories  
[Agree + Strongly Agree/exposure] 
N % Value 
Sociopolitical Awareness (Value=1) 
Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important 
I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority 
473 82.6% 0.8/1 
251 87.8%  
222 77.8%  
Community Involvement (Value=4) 704 82.05% 3.8/4 
Contributing to community is my responsibility 
Citizens shouldn‟t wait for the government to solve their community 
problems 
I make a difference in my community  
I volunteer to solve community problems in Egypt 
203 71.0%  
187 65.4%  
158 55.2%  
156 
54.5% 
 
Sociopolitical Discussions (Value=2) 
I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority 
157 61.2% 1.1/2 
Political Participation (Value=5) 686 47.9% 2.4/5 
It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming presidential 
elections 
I consider voting a priority 
It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming parliamentary 
elections 
I intend to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming presidential elections 
I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections 
159 55.6%  
145 50.7%  
140 48.9%  
138 48.3%  
104 
36.4% 
 
Opinion Expression (Value=3) 153 26.7% 0.8/3 
I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails) 
I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters) 
85 29.7%  
68 23.8%  
Total Value 2.96/5 
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Sociopolitical Awareness: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the total percentage of 
agreement with the two statements measuring sociopolitical awareness, represents the 
highest category of civic engagement (82.6%). The calculated rating value of this 
category is 0.82/1. 
Community Involvement: as shown in (Table 5.13b) the total percentage of 
agreement with the four statements measuring community involvement represents is 
(82.05%), making community involvement the second highest category. The 
calculated value is 3.8/4. 
Sociopolitical Discussions: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the percentage of the 
statement measuring sociopolitical affairs discussions is (61.2%), representing the 
third highest category. The calculated rating value is 1.08/2. 
Political participation: as shown in (Table 5.13b) the total percentage of agreement 
with the five statements measuring political participation is (47.9%) making political 
participation the fourth category of engagement. The calculated value is 2.4/5. 
Opinion Expression: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the total percentage of agreement 
with the two statements measuring opinion expression is the lowest (26.7%). The 
calculated value of this category is 0.78/3. 
 
The overall value as shown in (Table 5.13b) is 2.96/5, as illustrated in (Figure 
5.13bb). The value was derived through calculating the total values (in the values 
column) which produced 8.88/15. The total was then multiplied by 5, for placement 
on the 5-point civic engagement scale created by the researcher. The following 
figures illustrate the results. 
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Figure 5.13ba Percentages of civic engagement categories 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13bb Overall value of civic engagement 
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5.14 Mean average ratings of education level and perception of the role of talk 
shows  
Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to 
conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference 
between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with the perception of 
the role of talk shows.  
Table 5.14 Mean average ratings of education level and perception of the role of talk 
shows  
 
Statements on the role of talk shows 
Av. Rating* of Education levels 
 
Undergrad BA 
Grad. 
Student 
MA PHD 
a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a 
source of news about Egypt's affairs 
4.19 4.39 4.3 4.41 4.25 
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows 
encourage people to participate in solving 
community problems in Egypt 
3.53 3.45 3.07 3.5 2.63 
c) Egyptian nightly TV Talk shows 
encourage people to make charitable 
contributions 
3.71 4.01 3.93 3.97 3 
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows 
encourage ordinary citizens  to express their 
opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, 
letters, sms to the show) 
3.88 3.84 4 3.79 3.63 
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create 
sociopolitical awareness 
3.86 4.01 3.87 3.91 3.75 
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my 
primary source of information about the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections held in 
Nov. 2010 
3.31 3.43 2.63 3.06 2.5 
g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows 
encourage citizens to vote 
3.39 3.27 2.73 3.03 2.5 
Mean 3.70 3.77 3.50 3.67 3.18 
* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree. 
Table 5.14a Statistical test for table 5.14 
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Education levels 1.55 4 0.3875 1.33 
Error 8.75 30 0.2917  
Total 10.3 34   
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As shown in (Table 5.14a), ANOVA F between education levels = 1.33 not 
significant (p=0.2816), indicating no significant differences between the mean 
average ratings of education levels. Error mean square s
2 
=0.292. 
5.15 Mean average ratings of education level and civic engagement attitudes  
Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to 
conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference 
between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with attitudes towards 
civic engagement.  
Table 5.15 Mean average ratings of education levels and civic engagement 
attitudes  
Civic engagement attitudes Average rating* of Education levels 
 Undergrad BA Grad. 
stude
nt 
MA PH
D 
 a) voting a priority  3.59 3.34 3.5 3.06 3.5 
 b) opinion through the media 2.88 2.96 2.6 2.35 2.88 
 c) opinion to public officials 2.65 2.88 2.43 2.35 3 
d) discussing sociopolitical affairs 2.58 3.88 3.8 3.59 4.13 
e) informed about Egyptian affairs 4.29 4.27 4.27 4.38 4.5 
f) sociopolitical awareness a priority 3.99 4.12 4.27 4.21 4.5 
g) Citizens should solve their problems 3.63 3.63 3.6 4.03 4.5 
h) I make a difference in my community 3.56 3.45 3.6 3.53 3.63 
i) Contributing to community  3.9 3.78 4.07 3.85 3.88 
j)  volunteer to help solve community 
problems 
3.63 3.61 3.63 3.47 3.63 
k) responsibility to vote presidential 
elections 
3.62 3.52 3.83 3 3.75 
l) responsibility to vote parliamentary 
elections 
3.44 3.33 3.53 3.06 3.75 
m)  vote intent presidential elections 3.36 3.34 3.63 2.71 3.38 
n)  vote intent parliamentary elections 3.13 3.13 2.9 2.5 3.13 
Mean av. rating 3.45 3.52 3.55 3.29 3.73 
* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree. 
Table 5.15a Statistical test for table 5.15 
ANOVA 
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Education levels 1.39 4 0.35 1.21 
Error 19.09 65 0.29  
Total 20.48 69   
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As shown in (Table 5.15a), ANOVA F between education levels = 1.21 not 
significant (p=0.3151), indicating no significant differences between the mean 
average ratings of education levels. Error mean square s
2 
=0.294. 
5.16 Mean average ratings of education level and media exposure 
Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to 
conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference 
between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with media exposure.  
Table 5.16 Mean average ratings of education level and media exposure 
Media Exposure Average rating *of Education levels 
 Undergrad. BA 
Grad. 
Student 
MA PHD 
Newspapers 2.27 2.49 2.53 2.29 2.75 
Television news 2.29 2.21 1.83 2.03 2 
Television talk shows 2.51 2.43 2.33 2.35 2.63 
Radio news 1.64 1.61 1.6 1.68 1.75 
Radio talk shows 1.54 1.61 1.37 1.41 1.13 
Magazines 1.7 1.57 1.27 1.5 1.38 
Internet 2.67 2.22 2.7 2.41 2.25 
Mean av. rating 2.09 2.02 1.95 1.95 1.98 
* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree. 
Table 5.16a Statistical test for table 5.16 
ANOVA 
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Education levels 0.09 4 0.0225 0.09 
Error 7.51 30 0.25 ns 
Total 7.6 34   
 
As shown in (Table 5.16a), ANOVA F between education levels = 0.09 not 
significant (p=0.9849) indicating no significant differences between the mean average 
ratings of education levels. Error mean square s
2 
=0.250. 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
5.17 Qualitative Interview Results 
5.17.1 Experts perception of civic engagement in Egypt    
RQ1: How do experts perceive civic engagement in Egypt? 
Experts were divided over the status of civic engagement in pre-revolution 
Egypt. Some experts agreed with the statement that Egyptian citizens are politically 
apathetic and some didn‟t. 
Dr. Barbara Ibrahim, director of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy 
and Civic Engagement at the American University in Cairo, disagrees with the 
statement that Egyptians are politically apathetic. Ibrahim asserted that “Egyptians are 
politically well informed.” She asserted that when Egyptians see a window of 
opportunity for free and fair elections, they will feel that their voices really count and 
they will be politically engaged citizens. The lack of political participation is a result 
of three decades of what Ibrahim describes as a “fossilized political system [with] no 
circulation of power”. Egyptians have figured out that their voices do not count, that 
elections are forged, and that the national democratic ruling party enforces its will, 
regardless of people‟s engagement. 
Dr. Ibrahim noted that youth are engaged in Egypt and cited examples such as 
the 6
th
 of April movement and bloggers. She also cited youth involvement in the 
social service group called Resala which has 90 thousand members operating 34 
branches across Egypt. “I can‟t even think about any US organization that is founded 
and led by young people that reached that level,” she said. 
Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Naila Hamdy believes that 
Egyptians used to be politically apathetic but they have started to change over the past 
few years. According to Dr. Hamdy, Egyptians engagement may not go as far as 
voting but “they still discuss, watch, analyze, comment, [and] circulate media about 
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events.” Dr. Hamdy noted that even the Egyptian elite who gave up and stopped being 
interested in politics for many years, are much more active now. 
Dr. Amani Al Shimi of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic 
Engagement, also agrees with Dr. Ibrahim and Dr. Hamdy. She explains that 
Egyptians don‟t take steps toward voicing their opinions on the assumption that their 
opinion will not change the status quo but asserts that a large portion of the Egyptian 
population has opinions and insights about the political ruling in Egypt. “They are 
very critical and analytic about their future situation. They do have a voice. They, 
sometimes, choose not to use it,” Al Shimi explained. However, when it comes to 
voting, they are discouraged by the tedious process for issuing a voting card.   
Director of the Adham Center for Journalism Training and Research, Hafez 
Mirazi, emphasized that there needs to be a clear definition for political apathy. “If 
political apathy means the low numbers for voting or political participation in the way 
that it could be measured by American standards or western standards,” then 
Egyptians would be apathetic. However, Mirazi believes that Egyptians are involved 
and interested in politics. Empirically speaking by American standards, no voting 
would make someone apathetic, but when it comes to involvement or interest, 
Egyptians are very active.  Their “sense of perceived powerlessness” is the reason for 
their political inactivity, he explained. They could be discouraged and feel it‟s not 
worth the trouble because they don‟t have the power to make real change but they 
frequently discuss politics. “It is not fair to call someone who is talking politics and 
eating and drinking politics apathetic,” Professor Mirazi asserted. 
Professor Mirazi added that in order to accurately measure civic engagement 
in Egypt, charity and activities at religious institutions including mosques and 
churches should considered. Disregarding this form of activity in Egypt and dealing 
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with civic engagement as strictly secular is not fair and would make everyone 
apathetic, he explained. Civic engagement could be an alternative for people because 
they gave up on the political democratic process. By being engaged, Egyptians feel 
they can do something about their society. This in turn should lead to more political 
participation because it trains people to be more involved. “You can‟t have a 
democratic society without civic engagement. But, you can have civic engagement 
without a democratic society,” Professor Mirazi explained. “A prerequisite of 
democratic society is civic engagement.”  
Dr. El Shimi noted that there is an awakening among the youth population in 
Egypt. Large numbers of young people create or participate in groups with a mission 
to serve the community in a variety of ways. For example some groups address 
poverty related issues, gender equity, or support child rights. The themes are various 
and the fact that large numbers of students from schools and universities engage in 
such activities shows that people are not apathetic.  
On the other hand, Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Amani 
Ismail agrees with the statement saying that a significant portion of Egyptian citizens 
are politically apathetic. Dr. Ismail attributed the low voter turnout in the November 
2010 parliamentary elections to political apathy in Egypt. According to Dr. Ismail, the 
voter turnout was about quarter of the total aggregate of the eligible population. She 
also argued that political apathy is also manifested in the fact that there aren‟t 
demonstrations and protests against issues that people complain about all the time. 
Although professor Ismail perceives Egyptians as politically apathetic, she 
noted that one can‟t accuse Egyptian citizens of political apathy without taking into 
consideration the root causes behind their apathy. Citing Maslow‟s hierarchy of 
needs, which places the most essential needs for survival such as food, shelter, and 
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water at the very base of the needs pyramid, Professor Ismail argues that one can‟t 
expect Egyptians to be politically active when a big portion of the population is 
deprived of such basic needs. “More than third of the population are under the poverty 
line. You can‟t really expect them to be politically active,” said Dr. Ismail, explaining 
one of the reasons behind political apathy.  
Professor Ismail added that about half of the Egyptian population can‟t read or 
write and by excluding this 50 percent in addition to the population under 18 who 
can‟t vote, a small portion of the population is left which includes the vocal 
intellectual elite. Dr. Ismail said the intellectual elite are very vocal but in terms of 
mobilizing for political activism and for political reform in society, it‟s more about 
the quantity and not the quality. Numbers do matter, she asserted citing the example 
of US women who were able to achieve suffrage by 1920 because many open-minded 
men believed in their cause and supported them.  
Dr. Laila Abdul Meguid, journalism and mass communication professor and 
former dean at Cairo University, also agrees with Dr. Ismail that the majority of 
Egyptians have been politically apathetic for many years. She attributes this apathy to 
the historical, social and economic structure of Egypt. Professor Abdul Meguid 
explains that in Egyptian culture, there is usually no space for people to express their 
opinions. The Egyptian society is built on a tribal system. She added that under this 
system, any institution whether educational, media or even family is hierarchical in 
nature. Furthermore, democracy is not even instilled in the educational system. 
Therefore, the ideas of establishing dialogue, accepting opposition, and the 
differences in opinion are not well established in Egyptian culture. She also noted that 
Egyptian society is a centralized one. Decisions come from top to bottom. Therefore, 
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citizens don‟t feel that they are real partners so they don‟t take the initiative to change 
their communities. 
The concept of democracy must be nurtured for the coming generations, 
beginning with the family and the educational system. In many instances, one can find 
an amount of censorship and direct supervision from the parental authority or the 
educators who impose their supervision on their children or students rather than 
encourage discussion or dialogue. This is one of the reasons why most Egyptian 
citizens are politically apathetic, asserted Dr. Abdel Meguid. When students voice 
their opinions at the university, their voices should be heard and others should respect 
their opinions. In Egyptian culture, the voices of young people are often ignored just 
because they are young and their opinions are not perceived as important. Therefore, 
when citizens reach the eligible age of voting at 18, they do not transform into active 
citizens just because they reached the legal age. They were raised up in a passive 
culture that doesn‟t encourage them to be active or even make decisions on their own 
including crucial life changing decisions such as which university to join or which 
partner to marry, said Dr. Abdel Meguid.  
AUC Political Science Professor Manar El-Shorbagy, who also agrees that 
Egyptians are politically apathetic, noted that people have learned throughout the last 
50 years that engagement in politics is risky. Egyptians fear being subjected to trouble 
so they avoid participating in politics but they are not “genetically apathetic”. Dr. El-
Shorbagy agrees with Dr. Ismail that Egyptians learned that their votes don‟t count, 
which was recently exemplified by the most fraudulent parliamentary elections of 
November 2010. Although it‟s a “smart position” for people to choose not to waste 
their time when they already know in advance that their votes won‟t count, the 
problem is total withdrawal. Dr. Hassan Hamed, journalism and mass communication 
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professor, also believes that Egyptians suffer from political apathy. They are very 
negative and their participation is very limited, consequently, most of the population 
is not engaged, Professor Hamed explained. 
AUC Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Mervat Abou Ouf, 
agrees that apathy is becoming a norm in Egypt. People are taking a passive approach 
because they perceive it as an equivalent to being safe and secure. Egypt is not a 
democratic nation and people fear retaliation if they take action. People have to have 
some sort of an incentive or sense of belonging to become active. Professor Abou Ouf 
said the young generation who has the educational means are the country‟s hope and 
all what they need to do to is get engaged. All the engaging social networking on the 
Internet is a platform for these young people to express their ideas and beliefs freely. 
This is a sign that youth care. But they need a push to get more involved. They need 
to trust that they can make a difference, asserted Professor Abou Ouf. 
Sociology Professor Madiha Safty, who conducted a research in 2005 for 
UNDP on social capital which involves public and political community participation, 
found that Egyptians were very apathetic. She noted that, they are “indifferent to the 
point of apathy.” Dr. Safty explained that Egyptians are not willing to participate 
because they don‟t affiliate with their communities for several reasons. Like Abdel 
Meguid, Dr.Safty attributed this passiveness to the absence of political education in 
the Egypt.  
Cairo University Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Sami El-
Sherif, believes that not all Egyptians are apathetic. He emphasized that the 
intellectuals and elites are the most involved politically and socially. As for the rest 
the population who struggle with finding a living, they are less active. According to 
Dr. El-Sherif, civic engagement is still a newly born idea in Egypt.  
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5.17.2 Experts perception of the role of media in general and Egyptian nightly 
television talk shows in particular in fostering civic engagement in Egypt    
RQ2: How do experts perceive the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows in 
fostering civic engagement in Egypt? 
As for the role of media, most experts believed that the media‟s role starts 
with creating awareness and that change will have to come from the well-informed 
citizens. 
Regarding the role of media in fostering civic engagement in Egypt, Dr. 
Ibrahim agrees that the media play a vital role because unless citizens are well 
informed, they can‟t act responsibly. According to Ibrahim, 10 years ago all of the 
Egyptian media was controlled by the state, and there were only two or three 
television channels. Now, there is an “explosive growth of satellite channels and 
independent newspapers in Egypt.” Regardless of the fact that the independent media 
is occasionally attacked and their editors fined or jailed, Ibrahim thinks it is almost 
impossible to go backward. The media give people a voice, encouraging them to 
express their opinions publicly about social and political issues in Egypt. She cited the 
examples of television talk shows and call-in radio programs, adding that the Internet 
is partly contributing to that as well. Ibrahim attributes the increase in political 
activism over the past 20 years to the corresponding increase in sources of 
information. “The multiplicity of sources of information aspire more activism,” she 
said.     
In getting audience‟s to voice their opinions and to voice their agendas, the 
media itself can act as a form of civic engagement, explained Dr. El Shimi. By 
providing a space for citizens‟ voices and raising awareness, discussions, and debates 
the media becomes a mean of civic engagement. The media has a lot of potential 
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because it can help people be more critical viewers and provide space for people to 
talk about their problems. “The media can act as a teacher and at the same time a 
bridge or a facilitator of civic engagement,” Professor El Shimi explained.  
According to Dr. Hamdy, Egyptian media has changed dramatically over the past 
few years. “The media is much more vibrant and they handle all kinds of issues and 
that allows for changing the way people think. It makes people want to be part of their 
society and be civically engaged.” Whether talk shows promote civic engagement 
depends on the nature of the show and the selection of topics, explained Dr. Hamdy. 
But many of them play a role in promoting civic engagement. They create awareness 
among audiences who learn about new issues through these talk shows. The effect of 
talk shows on awareness is seen across different strata in Egyptian society but most 
impressively the unprivileged population. Professor Hamdy noted that before the 
introduction of talk shows, it was seldom to witness uneducated citizens at public 
transportation means engaging in debates about politics in reference to what they saw 
the night before on a television talk show.  
Although Dr. Hamdy emphasized that it is difficult to measure the direct impact 
of talk shows and other media, she believes that talk shows “have helped people think 
about engaging in community issues and community awareness.” Citing the Agrium 
petrochemical case as an example, Dr. Hamdy said ordinary citizens protested against 
the establishment of the factory because they learned about environmental hazards 
through media. According to Professor Hamdy, a lot of the influence in the Agrium 
case came from television as well. 
Sociopolitical discussions on talk shows help make people more aware of what is 
going especially when politics is of interest to the Egyptian audience.  Talk shows 
discuss issues that are of interest to the audience. Professor Mirazi described how 
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ironic it is to find people tuned to television talk shows discussing politics late at night 
instead of watching something entertaining such as a movie or drama. “It gives you a 
statement about how people are really glued to political issues and that they are not 
apathetic…These talk shows keep them more interested and sometimes guide the 
discussions,” Professor Mirazi said.  
Dr. El Sherif described the media‟s role as essential in creating a democratic 
environment that fosters effective community and political participation. To fulfill 
this role, it‟s crucial to have a free media which is an integral part in any political 
reform experience. By informing people of their social and political rights and 
responsibilities and by giving them space to express their opinions freely, the media 
encourage people to be civically engaged. However, Professor El Sherif emphasized 
that it‟s difficult to evaluate the role of media in Egypt because the free and 
independent media is newly born and the state-owned media strongly portrays the 
views of the government.  
Professor El Sherif explained that television talk shows encourage people to 
express their opinions by criticizing certain negative aspects in their community 
including high profile individuals such as ministers in the government, which never 
existed in the Egyptian media before. When people get exposed to such shows and see 
others expressing a diversity of opinions, they get affected and it creates some sort of 
a movement in society. On the other hand, Dr. El Sherif asserted that media alone 
cannot push people to go and vote. Media can only call on people to participate 
because there are other factors involved, such as how citizens value the importance of 
their voices.  
As for encouraging political participation, Dr. El Sherif noted that despite the 
fact that the media covered the parliamentary elections extensively, official 
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participation was 14 million. However, he considered this 35 % participation 
“reasonable”. Professor El Sherif who was also a member of the committee assigned 
by former information minister Anas El Fiki to monitor the performance of the 
Egyptian media during the Nov.2010 parliamentary Elections, argued that the best 
aspect about the elections was the media coverage. According to Dr. El Sherif, state 
television provided opposition parties with the opportunity to express their points of 
view and gave every candidate five minutes to present their views.   
Professor El Sherif asserted that television talk shows on state-owned channels 
encouraged participation in the elections through covering candidates from all walk of 
politics. The media‟s role in covering the elections was rated by El Sherif as 80 
percent successful. He further elaborated that programs did abide by the committee‟s 
rules. Chief among these rules is separating editorial content from the elections‟ 
advertising content. For example, if a minister is running in the elections, there should 
be a clear separation between covering his day-to-day activities as a minister and 
covering his race in the elections.  
 On the other hand, Professor Abou Ouf disagrees with El Sherif emphasizing 
that “media have loads of defects in fulfilling” their role because they are heavily 
affected by agendas from different parties including the government and businessmen. 
This affects media content as each party tries to serve its interests. Professor Abou 
Ouf noted that Egypt is “far lagging” compared to the rest of the world when it comes 
to the role of media in promoting active citizenship. Media is also restricted by the 
government when it comes to fulfilling its functions freely. Freedom of expression is 
not absolute. For example, the talk show which enjoyed almost absolute freedom was 
Al Qahera Al Youm and it was shut down for political reasons ahead of the Nov.2010 
parliamentary elections. 
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In order for the media to play an effective role in civic engagement, the media 
should be free, said Dr. Safty supporting Professor Abu Ouf‟s point of view. If people 
can say what they feel and express themselves freely on the media, they can pave the 
road to democracy. Dr. Safty explained that the last few years before the revolution 
witnessed more rallies, strikes, and protests because the media enjoyed more freedom. 
People had more space to express their frustration on the media which stirred up ideas 
and opposition which didn‟t exist in the past.  
Dr. Shorbagy noted that it‟s difficult to analyze the role of the media without 
putting the whole political context into consideration. If there is relative openness in 
the media but political parties remain restrained and demonstrations remain risky, the 
media openness becomes just a way for people to express their frustration. She argued 
that people talk about issues, listen and feel angry but at the end of the day they 
switch off their “TV and they go to sleep.” On the other hand, the government 
realized that this openness in the media is making people angry at the government and 
dissatisfied so they started to limit that freedom again by closing down several 
satellite channels and talk shows before the November 2010 elections.  
Dr. Hassan Hamed believes the media has a limited role. Civil society groups 
must unite their efforts in order to do something beneficial for the welfare of society. 
If all elements of society are not involved, media will not be able to fulfill a civically 
engaging role in society on its own. Thus, all the roles need to be integrated together, 
explained Dr. Hamed. Television talk shows and the media create political awareness 
and motivate citizens to participate but this is not enough, Dr. Hamed asserted.  
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5.17.3 Experts perception of the future strategies that should be adopted by talk 
shows to foster civic engagement in Egypt    
RQ3: How do experts perceive the strategies that Egyptian nightly television talk 
shows should implement to foster civic engagement in Egypt? 
Experts provided a multiplicity of ideas that would serve as recommendations 
for media outlets in general and talk shows in particular to play a more effective and 
responsible role in society. Many experts called for the need to establish credibility, 
professionalism, and balance in the media coverage. 
Ibrahim noted that for Egypt to change, new mechanisms, institutions, and 
networks that allow youth voices to be heard must be established. New ideas need to 
circulate in society which always originate from young people, explained Dr. Ibrahim 
adding that more outlets are needed to provide young people with a platform to share 
their opinions. Ibrahim noted that democracy can only work if citizens are engaged 
and if they invest in taking the time to inform themselves through a variety of sources 
as well as expose themselves to different perspectives. She asserted that media play a 
pivotal role in informing the Egyptian public, yet they still need to be more 
professional and more disciplined in the way they cover the news. Lack of 
professionalism is seen in how factual reporting gets mixed with opinions by the 
Egyptian media. As for talk shows to play a more constructive role in promoting civic 
engagement, Ibrahim suggested hosting government officials, parliamentarians and 
governors and asking a panel of citizens to interview them on the talk show.  
Dr. El Shimi said that although talk shows like Masr Ennaharda have diverse 
themes or topics to cover, there is still no diversity among the guests they interview. 
She also said that interviewers or talk show hosts should only be facilitators who 
guide the audience to critically observe and form opinions rather than enforce their 
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opinions on their audiences. This is crucial because anything interviewers 
communicate can be taken by the average viewer as the right opinion to adopt. The 
interviewer‟s input should be minimized to facilitating or moderating the discussion. 
In addition, the media‟s role in fostering civic engagement should be accomplished by 
giving the people media space to voice their opinions.  Ordinary citizens can appear 
on talk shows, talk to people like themselves, and discuss problems together to come 
up with solutions for their community problems, Professor El Shimi suggested.  
Professor El Sherif noted that some talk shows focus only on the negative side 
ignoring what‟s positive which gradually affects their credibility because they only 
show their audiences one side of the story. If they continue to paint a gloomy image 
of Egypt, they will lose future viewership. Focusing on the problems without 
suggesting any solutions drives people away. Successful television talk shows engage 
people without depressing them, he said. People need to see both the dark side and 
bright side. Talk shows also need to maintain balance by showing the argument and 
the counter argument without being biased towards the government or a specific 
political party. They must also present issues that cater to the needs of ordinary 
citizens and not issues that serve the interests of the channel or the ruling party. Dr. El 
Sherif emphasized that there is no ready recipe for any talk show to succeed in 
encouraging Egyptians to participate. But he asserted that successful talk shows are 
the ones that engage citizens by allowing them to personally participle on these 
shows. 
Dr. Safty said there is no particular strategy to follow explaining that all what 
the media need is more freedom to be able to create public awareness and 
development.  It is important to encourage civic involvement at the very early stages 
through education and the media can also play a role of an educator. The media 
156 
 
should encourage people to be active, express themselves freely, and cultivate their 
sense of belongingness, Dr. Safty said.  
According to Dr. Hamdy, it is not a “mandate” for the talk show itself to 
establish a strategy to foster civic engagement unless people decide to take action. 
Talk shows can perform their role by giving people space to express their opinions. 
Also, civil society organizations should influence media to take issues of civic 
engagement seriously. Talk shows exercise social responsibility through performing 
their journalistic function and they should focus on establishing more credibility and 
professionalism. Many shows will die out, but those who have established credibility 
will survive. There is an abundance of talk shows on Egyptian satellite channels and 
the only ones who are going to survive are the credible shows. As professor Hamdy 
puts it “all the taboos have been broken, now is the time for credibility.” 
Dr. Ismail said talk shows should shed more light on offering concrete 
solutions to problems. The media need to educate people about good practices to fill 
the gap between what‟s taught and what is practiced. Dr. Abdel Meguid agrees, 
criticizing talk shows for magnifying issues and focusing on problems all the time 
without offering solutions. The media make people hate and refuse everything without 
offering an alternative, she said. By shedding light on the negative aspects of society, 
they tend to portray a gloomy picture of reality. Eventually, people suffer from 
depression because they see everything as negative. Talk shows need to give people 
more hope by showing more positive images of society. Media tend to frighten people 
to a great extent until they become apathetic. To overcome this problem, talk shows 
should introduce both positive and negative aspects but in a balanced way to provide 
people with hope to change, Dr. Abdel Meguid said.  
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In order for talk shows to be professional and balanced, Dr. Abu Ouf agrees with 
Dr. Abdel Meguid that they need to convey negative and positive aspects of society. 
Talk shows have to realize how popular they are and the “powerful effect” they have 
on people. They create an “output for viewers to convey what [they] believe in at the 
spur of the moment and [they] get [their] responses immediately.” This makes the 
responsibility for talk shows “humongous”. They must cover issues in an ethical and 
balanced approach which gives hope. They also have to find a way to promote 
nationalism as well as activism. “The mistrust is overwhelming Egyptians. That is the 
core of our problems. We need to establish a sense of trust and belongingness among 
people in Egypt,” Abu Ouf said.  
Professor Abu Ouf noted that although talk shows create sociopolitical awareness, 
sometimes they end up sensationalizing news. She gave the example of talk show host 
Amr Adeeb and how he tackles controversial issues in a sarcastic and in some cases 
gossipy way. She noted that this makes viewers not take important issues very 
seriously. Although the standard varies among talk shows as some are presentable to 
an extent, but they tend to move in a direction of sensationalism in their coverage. 
Professor Abu Ouf asserted that making profits should not be at the expense of the 
quality of the message and ethics because talk shows at the end of the day would 
rather have scoops of news to attract the audience.  
Professor Mirazi criticized talk shows for trying to attract the sympathy of 
viewers by calling for charity. He said they need to separate the editorial content from 
charity. If talk shows wish to collect money for special cases, then they can organize 
an event and raise funds for that purpose. There should be a clear separation from the 
professional work of these talk shows and charity. Mirazi referred to the now defunct 
Masr Ennaharda where the former host Mahmoud Saad calls on businessmen to 
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donate money to special cases. He also airs special requests or petitions written by 
viewers. Mirazi said this gives an indication that it is a service provided by the show. 
“People are really abusing it and it is a way to attract an audience,” he said. Professor 
Mirazi argued that such individual cases of charity should be carried out at the 
mosque or church level. They take a big portion of airtime when audiences are 
expecting to hear news from the show. However, Professor Mirazi argued that if it‟s a 
national cause like the rain floods crisis, then it would be valid to give it enough 
exposure. However, giving individual cases national attention is not professional. It 
wears donors out, said Mirazi adding that it would be better to create an annual 
telethon instead of soliciting for individual cases most of the time.  
According to professor Mirazi, part of the intention behind these calls for charity 
is finding a good story and appealing to the audience through using the cases of these 
poor people. However, this embarrasses the people who are not aware of their right to 
remain anonymous, he said. There should be clear guidelines regarding this matter. 
The intention maybe good but talk shows need to develop ethical rules that would 
protect individuals who resorted to the show for help as well as maintain a level of 
professionalism, he emphasized. 
Mirazi noted that talk shows succeeded in giving the Egyptian audience a national 
media outlet compared to pan Arab outlets. National talk shows allowed people to 
focus on Egyptian issues instead of the pan Arab ones, which allowed people to be 
more engaged because they can actually do something about issues in proximity.  This 
was evident in the case of the rain floods in Aswan and Sinai. “At least you are not 
telling them about Iraq or Palestine because they cannot do anything about it,” said 
Mirazi.  
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However, Mirazi added that talk shows and other media outlets need to move 
further from the national level to a more local level by establishing talk shows that 
cater to different Egyptian communities at the village level and not just at the national 
level. Getting local involves real liberalization of the Egyptian media which hasn‟t 
been achieved until now.  
Making it possible to issue a license for FM and AM stations on a local level 
provides citizens with their rights to air waves. According to Mirazi, if local media 
outlets are established, the level of engagement would be very high. This is because it 
will no longer be about an anchor in Cairo talking about problems in a remote village. 
Instead, it will be an anchor within the village discussing its community problems. 
Abu Ouf agreed with Mirazi and noted that more specialized talk shows in terms of 
content also need to be developed.  
Dr. Abdel Meguid believes the media has an essential role but “it is not a 
magical stick”. The media has a role just like any other educational and social 
institution. Professor Abdel Meguid emphasized that the more the media engage as a 
real partner in the decision making process, the more influence it will have on society. 
Without media, people will not be able to convey their plans or programs or urge 
people to participate. Thus, media should take part in the early stages by creating 
debates and not just covering the end result.  
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Chapter 6: Analysis and Discussion 
6.1 Talk shows information function and civic engagement 
As the number and popularity of Egyptian nightly television talk shows 
increase, as well as people‟s dependency on them for news on Egyptian affairs, it was 
important to examine how viewers perceive these shows and their possible impact on 
their attitudes. Talk shows substituted traditional news by providing social, political 
and public affairs information in a simplified entertaining way that is easy to grasp by 
the ordinary citizen, forming an information-entertainment mix often referred to by 
communication scholars as infotainment. This also bridged the gap between the 
mainstream media and the Egyptian audience by establishing virtual channels of 
communication between the public and policy makers who appear on talk shows 
responding to citizens‟ queries, often about controversial economic, political or social 
issues.  
Since many scholars associate the information and awareness function of the 
mass media with civic engagement, it was essential to study the impact of such a 
developing and important genre in Egypt on civic engagement attitudes among 
viewers. Civic engagement is fundamental for any democracy and especially for 
countries in transition such as Egypt. In both developed and emerging democracies, 
there is always a dire need to foster civic engagement which represents sociopolitical 
awareness, discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, and political 
participation. In a democracy, citizens rule. In order to achieve this status, citizens 
should engage in politics and their communities effectively and responsibly. 
However, to reach this level of engagement, citizens must get well-informed first. 
Information comes from many sources with the mass media in the lead.  
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6.2 Agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows 
To study whether television talk shows play such an important role in 
informing the public and influencing civic engagement attitudes, the current research 
examined three research questions and four research hypotheses that test the 
relationship between exposure to television talks, agenda-setting and attitudes towards 
civic engagement. Since seeking sociopolitical awareness is the first level of being 
civically engaged, this research applied agenda-setting theory to determine whether 
Egyptian nightly television talk shows set the news agenda among their viewers. By 
setting the news priorities, talk shows satisfy the first-level of agenda setting which 
translates into the first level of civic engagement, which represents awareness. The 
second-level of agenda setting or framing shapes the audience‟s opinions. If the 
agenda-setting effect is achieved at the first and second levels, then it will most likely 
extend to shaping attitudes and possibly influence behavior. This research studied the 
first three levels beginning with awareness, opinions, and ending with attitudes 
towards civic engagement. At the core of these civic engagement attitudes lies the 
intention to take action. 
Beginning with the viewership of talk shows, the results of the study found 
that 286 respondents representing an 80.3% majority of the total 356 sample surveyed 
watch Egyptian nightly television talk shows. A number of 70 respondents 
representing 19.7 % of the sample surveyed don't watch television talk shows (Table 
5.6). As for the popularity of the three television talk shows Masr Ennaharda, Al 
Ashera Masa‟an, and 90 Deqeeqa, an analysis of variance testing if there was any 
significant difference between the mean times of viewership per week was not 
significant (Table 5.7a). Since popularity of the three programs is defined as the 
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viewing times per week which were not significantly different, the three talk shows 
are more or less on the same popularity level.  
The content analysis conducted also showed that there was no significant 
difference between the quantities of news coverage provided by the three talk shows. 
As shown in (Table 5.10a), the total number of stories covered by the three talk shows 
is 676 stories. Masr Ennaharda produced a slightly larger number with 258 stories 
(38.2%), followed by 90 Deqeeqa (31.2%) which was very close to Al Ashera 
Masa'an representing 30.6% of the total stories. However, there is no significant 
difference in the amount of coverage between the three talk shows.  
Moving on to the information function of talk shows, the results of the study 
confirm that Egyptian viewers do depend on talk shows as a primary source of news. 
Almost all respondents (99 %) depend on Egyptian nightly television talk shows for 
news, significantly higher than any other source of news with the exception of the 
Internet which ranked second with 90.2 % news dependency as shown in (Table 5.8). 
Although more respondents depend on television talk shows for news as compared to 
the Internet, the mean average rating for the Internet was slightly higher (2.52), 
compared to television talk shows (2.46). This is explained by the larger number of 
respondents who always depend on the Internet (62.2%) compared to (46.9%) who 
always depend on television talk shows. Since „always‟ carries more weight 
representing a value of 3 on the three point exposure scale, the mean for the Internet 
was slightly higher with 0.06 than television talk shows. However, a larger number of 
respondents „never‟ depend on the Internet for news representing 9.8% compared to 
only 1% who „never‟ depend on talk shows for news. The differences in the „never‟ 
value which equals (1) re-established the balance between the mean scores for the 
Internet and television talk shows.   
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The exposure results support the widespread opinion that talk shows have 
become an important source of news for the Egyptian audience. The quantitative 
survey results also support the qualitative interview results as most experts perceived 
talk shows as a source of news, emphasizing the role of talk shows in creating 
sociopolitical awareness and thereby fostering the first level of civic engagement. 
This finding is in agreement with Mahmoud‟s (2007) study about Egyptian youth‟s 
dependency on television talk shows for news and information.  
In order to determine whether an agenda-setting effect is a likely outcome of 
this exposure, results of the primary content analysis and primary survey conducted in 
this research were compared. The 676 stories coded from the three talk shows were 
compared with the 1,100 news issues listed by the 286 respondents who watch the 
three television talk shows. After examining whether the public‟s agenda of news 
priorities corresponds with the talk shows‟ agenda, the results in (Table 5.9a), show 
corresponding agendas with the Egyptian 2010 parliamentary elections leading both 
agendas. Out of the 70 news categories coded, 51 matched representing 72.85% 
similarity. The parliamentary elections represented 20.8% of the total topics listed by 
respondents and received the highest quantity (9.3 %) with regards to the talk show 
overall coverage. Moreover, among the top 20 news issues on the public and media 
agendas, 12 news issues were common which include rising food prices, minimum 
wages, school violence, courts, Dostour crisis, suspension of media programs and 
channels, university security, other political topics, traffic problems, media 
regulations, and football matches.  
A brief description of the top five news issues on the public versus the media 
agendas in (Table 5.9a), shows that the rising food prices ranked second (6.3%) on the 
viewers‟ news agenda, followed by presidential elections (5.1%). It is worth noting 
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that the issue of the presidential elections ranked as the third most important issue for 
the public but was never covered by talk shows. The fourth issue is the minimum 
wages representing 5% of the respondents‟ news agenda and the fifth news issue is 
school violence, representing 4.9 % of the total issues. On the other hand, the 
remaining top five news issues on the talk shows agenda, as shown in (Table 5.9a), 
include the Dostour newspaper crisis (3.7%) which followed the parliamentary 
elections, health care and awareness (3.6%), profiles (3.4%) and other simultaneous 
topics in politics which ranked fifth (3.3%).    
After examining whether the viewers‟ agenda was set by nightly television 
talk shows as opposed to other sources of news, the results showed that respondents 
listed talk shows as their source of news for the majority of issues. The results support 
an agenda-setting impact as talk shows were cited by respondents 465 times, 
representing a significant 42.3 % of the total news sources listed as shown in (Table 
5.9c). 
Furthermore, the agenda-setting impact did come from the three nightly 
television talk shows under study, as the names of talk shows listed by respondents 
were coded separately and the results in (Table 5.9d) were as follows: Al Ashera 
Masa'an topped respondents news sources (28.7 %), followed by 90 Deqeeqa (20 %), 
and the third talk show on the list of news sources is Masr Ennaharda (12.5 %). The 
results support H1: Public perception of news priorities is most likely influenced by 
Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ news agenda. Therefore, H1 is accepted and 
this study found that Egyptian nightly television talk shows have an agenda-setting 
impact on viewers. This finding is in agreement with previous research studies such as 
Youssef‟s (2008) study which also found that Egyptian nightly television talk shows 
have an agenda-setting impact on viewers.  
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After supporting an agenda-setting impact on the first-level which corresponds 
with the exposure results supporting further that viewers depend on talk shows for 
news, it is necessary to move on to the second-level of agenda setting to determine 
whether talk show have an impact on viewers‟ perceptions of the Egyptian 2010 
parliamentary elections. After analyzing 11 election frames in the content analysis 
study and comparing them with corresponding frames rated by respondents in the 
survey, the result was a high match between the talk shows‟ frames and the viewers‟ 
frames. Eight frames out of 11 frames examined matched, representing a 73% 
similarity which is considerably high as shown in (Table 5.11c). The results indicate a 
relatively strong relationship between the media and public second-level agendas, 
thereby supporting H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ portrayal of Egypt‟s 
parliamentary elections is likely to influence viewers‟ perception of the parliamentary 
elections. 
It‟s worth noting that the three frames which didn‟t match between the viewers 
and the talk shows were election fairness, judicial supervision, and the Wafd 
opposition party. Such a disagreement in frames could be attributed to the fact that 
talk shows provided equal mention to the opposite statements “the elections will be 
fairly conducted” versus “the elections will be unfairly conducted”. This discrepancy 
which could be regarded as neutral or balanced coverage supports what experts noted 
in the qualitative results with reference to the government‟s pressure on talk shows 
before the elections. With many media outlets shutdown by the government ahead of 
the elections, it seemed that self-censorship was a safe way to keep the shows and 
their hosts on air.  
Self-censorship was evident in the Oct.10 episode of Al Ashera Masa‟an 
which featured two women candidates who discussed their representation in 
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parliament. Although one was an NDP candidate and the other an opposition 
candidate, the discussion was far from being free. When opposition member Gamila 
Ismail described how the former ruling party forged previous elections and how it 
failed in running the country, the presenter Mona El Shazly interrupted Ismail several 
times trying to explain to her that she‟s not asking her to evaluate NDP‟s 
performance. El-Shazly stressed more than once that she‟s only asking about women 
representation in parliament. The same show received a warning on Nov.11 for 
allowing two guests to make negative remarks about how the NDP is running the 
election. Ironically enough, the guests were state-owned newspaper editors Nasr El 
Qaffas and Mahmoud Nafadi. 
The second frame which didn‟t match is the importance of judicial supervision 
to prevent election fraud. The same reasons could be attributed to this frame as well 
because talk shows also gave that frame equal coverage which could be explained as 
an attempt to be balanced or to avoid a possible government crackdown. The third 
frame was about the Wafd party‟s representation in parliament which is not a 
controversial frame and is therefore insignificant to the analysis. Despite these three 
mismatching frames, the survey results confirmed the content analysis results as 
shown in (Table 5.11c), supporting a second-level agenda setting impact on the 
viewers‟ perception of the 2010 parliamentary elections. It‟s worth noting that the 
survey was collected before the elections to make certain that the viewers‟ perceptions 
were not affected by the actual election results. 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
 6.3 Perception of talk shows, exposure, and civic engagement 
With regards to how viewers perceive talk show‟s role in civic engagement, 
participants highly agreed (62.5%) with the seven statements rating talk shows‟ role. 
The five-point likert statements rate talk shows‟ role starting from the first level of 
civic engagement which is creating awareness and ending with encouraging voting. 
The results in (Table 5.12a), show that perception of talk shows as a source of news 
received the highest percentage of agreement (92.3%). This finding further explains 
why talk shows have an agenda-setting impact. Likewise, respondents also perceived 
talk shows as creating sociopolitical awareness (73.1%). This finding is in further 
agreement with the qualitative results regarding experts‟ perception of talk shows, 
which also supports why talk shows have a strong agenda-setting impact on their 
viewers. The perception of talk shows as encouraging voting received the least 
degree of agreement (39.9%), which had a mean average rating of 3.22 indicating 
that the majority falls between agree and neutral. Overall, respondents perceive talk 
shows as civically engaging as the total percentage of agreement with the statements 
represents (62.5%).  
To determine which civic engagement attitudes had a positive correlation with 
viewers‟ perception of talk shows role, 14 statements on a five-point likert scale were 
rated by respondents according to their degree of agreement with the different aspects 
of civic engagement, also covered in the perception statements. The results in (Table 
5.12b) indicate that the highest percentage of agreement went to sociopolitical 
awareness (88.8%), followed by community participation (66.1%), and discussing 
sociopolitical affairs (61.5). The total agreement percentage on civic engagement 
attitudes is (55.1 %). The results show a positive correlation between the perception 
statements and their corresponding civic engagement attitudes as shown in (Table 
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5.12c) which illustrates a significant to highly significant correlation results. These 
results support H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic 
engagement, the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic 
engagement.  
Accepting H3 which supports a positive correlation between perception of talk 
shows and civic engagement attitudes is in itself an indicator of the extension of the 
agenda-setting impact beyond the first and second levels to shaping perceptions and 
influencing attitudes. Therefore, to examine whether the news exposure to talk shows 
is related to civic engagement attitudes, each attitude was cross-tabulated with 
exposure (Appendix K). The findings in (Table 5.13a) confirm that exposure to talk 
shows has the highest relationship (87.7 %) with attitudes towards sociopolitical 
awareness. This further confirms the agenda-setting link to civic engagement 
attitudes. The second highest relationship with exposure also measures sociopolitical 
awareness (77.8%). The least relationships with exposure were opinion expression 
through media (29.7%) and opinion expression to public officials (23.8 %).  Most 
relations in (Table 5.13a) are high with 9 out of the 14 attitudes having over 50% 
agreement. Therefore, the results support H4: There is a positive relation between 
exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes. 
Thus, H4 is accepted. 
Due to the fact that the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, statistical 
tests were conducted to examine if there was any significant difference between the 
different levels of education listed in (Table 5.1) and respondents‟ perception of the 
role of talk shows, civic engagement attitudes and talk show exposure. The results in 
section 5.14 show no significant difference between education and the other variables.   
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In order to rate the overall level of civic engagement, attitudes were organized 
into the categories which operationally define civic engagement (sociopolitical 
awareness, sociopolitical discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, 
and political participation). The results show that sociopolitical awareness which 
represents the basic level of engagement was leading with (82.6%). It‟s interesting to 
find that community involvement represented the second highest category of 
engagement with (82.05%), followed by sociopolitical affairs discussions (61.2%), 
representing the third highest category. The categories which fell below (50%) were 
political participation (47.9%) and opinion expression, representing the lowest 
(26.7%).  
These findings emphasize further that there‟s a strong relation between 
exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement. However, 
the strongest relations are with the first three categories: sociopolitical awareness, 
community involvement and sociopolitical discussions. The strongest positive attitude 
towards civic engagement is sociopolitical awareness as shown in (Table 5.13b). This 
finding is in agreement with the qualitative interview results as most experts noted 
that Egyptians seek sociopolitical awareness emphasizing how much the public is 
interested in politics regardless of any tangible political participation. The finding 
regarding community involvement illustrates that despite the common misperception 
about Egyptians being involved in their communities, they had strong positive 
attitudes towards involvement with (71%) agreeing to the statement “contributing to 
community is my responsibility”. Also, more than half the sample agreed with the 
statements “I make a difference in my community”, “I volunteer to help solve 
community problems in Egypt” and “citizens should not wait for the government to 
solve their community problems”. This finding is in line with some of the experts 
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perceptions about community involvement in Egypt. Almost half the experts noted 
how Egyptians collaborate at the community level by forming informal fundraising 
networks for the poor, volunteering with NGOs or other forms of community 
activities. This finding illustrates that the well-educated elite sample surveyed in this 
research has very positive attitudes towards community engagement.  
As for political participation, the findings are in agreement with the experts‟ 
perception that Egyptians are not active politically. This is mostly because the 
environment in pre-revolution Egypt discouraged such participation. As many experts 
noted, Egyptians had a general feeling that their voices are not going to count, so they 
were not likely to invest their energies in political activities such as voting especially 
when they can tell the results beforehand. This is evident in the (36.4%) agreement 
with the statement “I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections” 
(36.4%), which represents the lowest percentage of agreement among the five 
statements measuring political participation. Despite that, (55.6%) still agreed that it‟s 
their responsibility to vote in the presidential elections and (50.7%) considered voting 
a priority. 
The very low agreement level with public opinion expression through the 
mass media or through petitions or letters to government officials (26.7%) could also 
be explained by the atmosphere of mistrust that the experts referred to in the 
qualitative interview results. As many Egyptians felt voiceless or didn‟t care to voice 
their concerns before the revolution believing that their opinion won‟t be taken 
seriously and won‟t change anything. Despite that, the overall rating of the categories 
mentioned above on the civic engagement scale produced a value almost at midpoint 
(2.96/5) illustrating that the elite sample surveyed are civically engaged mostly when 
it comes to awareness, community involvement, and discussing sociopolitical affairs.  
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Due to the fact that sociopolitical awareness ranked the highest in terms of 
agreement among viewers, it‟s crucial that Egyptian nightly television talk talks adopt 
more professional and ethical standards in their coverage of Egyptian affairs. Most 
experts noted that talk show hosts and reporters are often opinionated when they 
should be reporting facts and moderating discussions. They must also refrain from 
dramatizing the news. Experts interviewed in this research also emphasized the need 
to diversify sources appearing on talk shows. This is because talk shows often 
interview the same sources over and over again which creates redundancy. In 
addition, providing excessive exposure creates a misperceived status for such sources 
in the eyes of viewers.  Abiding by an ethical standard of coverage is extremely 
important for a genre perceived by 92.3% of the sample as a primary source of news.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion 
The findings of this study are in agreement with the findings of previous 
studies conducted on the agenda-setting effect of the media. The findings support that 
Egyptian nightly television talk shows have an agenda-setting impact on elite viewers 
both on the first-level, which sets the news priorities, and on the second-level, which 
sets the framing of issues. The findings also support that the agenda-setting at the 
second-level shaped how viewers perceived the Egyptian parliamentary elections 
examined in this research. 
 The primary finding of this research is that the agenda-setting function of 
television talk shows has an impact on attitudes towards civic engagement. The 
findings support that the more viewers are exposed to talk shows, the more they 
perceive issues covered by talk shows as important (first-level agenda-setting). 
Furthermore, viewers‟ perceptions of particular issues were most likely shaped by talk 
shows‟ frames of coverage (second-level agenda-setting). The first outcome of the 
agenda-setting impact on both levels is sociopolitical awareness, which represents the 
first and most basic level of civic engagement. One of the primary findings of this 
research is the positive correlation between the perception of talk shows as civically 
engaging and attitudes towards civic engagement. Another significant finding is the 
positive relationship between exposure to Egyptian nightly television shows and civic 
engagement attitudes.    
 The findings of this study also show that the Egyptian elite scored a 2.96 on 
the civic engagement rating scale. This illustrates that they are engaged when it comes 
to sociopolitical awareness, community involvement and sociopolitical discussions. 
Although more is needed from talk shows to foster higher levels of civic engagement 
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as Egypt transcends this transitional period and transforms into a democracy, it‟s 
important to note that political participation was discouraged in pre-revolution Egypt. 
Talk shows themselves didn‟t really promote voting per se but worked more on 
fostering awareness and community level engagement. The significance of the 
agenda-setting impact of television talk shows calls for an urgent need to establish a 
high level of professionalism with regards to talk shows‟ news coverage and 
discussions.      
 Since they are perceived as a source of news and were found to have an 
agenda-setting impact as well as an impact on perceptions and civic engagement 
attitudes, Egyptian nightly television talk shows have a greater responsibility towards 
their viewers. They must maintain balance and accuracy in their coverage. They must 
moderate discussions and not impose opinions. The fact that Egypt is hopefully on the 
right way to democracy entails that these talk shows also need to establish the 
fundamentals of democracy within their coverage. They need to give ordinary citizens 
airtime and not just officials or experts. Provide minorities with a voice and not just 
the vocal mainstream Egyptian majority. Maintain balance and give interviewees full 
freedom to express their opinions even if they are not in line with the channel‟s 
ideology. Question officials and hold them accountable. Allow citizens to question 
them as well. Egyptian nightly television talk shows must implement a greater degree 
of social responsibility as they are held accountable to millions of viewers who resort 
to this genre for news and information. Therefore, they must perform their 
information function professionally and responsibly to help establish well-informed 
and engaged citizenry in Egypt.   
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7.2 Recommendations for talk shows 
Experts provided recommendations for talk shows to play a more effective and 
responsible role with regards to news coverage and civic engagement. Following is a 
summary of their recommendations: 
 Establish credibility, professionalism, and balance in coverage.  
 Separate factual reporting from opinions. 
 Provide more voices to youth to circulate fresh and new ideas in society. 
 Establish more diversity in guests. 
 Hosts should facilitate discussion and not enforce their opinions.  
 Give ordinary citizens more representation and interaction with the show. 
 Provide both sides of the picture. The positive as well as the negative side to 
avoid painting a gloomy image of society and driving audiences away.  
 Offer concrete solutions to problems.  
 Separate editorial content from charity soliciting by organizing fundraising 
events for that purpose instead of using airtime for it.  
 Establish local talk shows that cater to different Egyptian communities at 
the village level and not just on the national level to focus on smaller 
communities and foster civic engagement.  
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7.3 Recommendations for future research  
 The current study was conducted before the Egyptian revolution, a similar 
study examining exposure to nightly television talk shows and civic 
engagement after the revolution is necessary to examine how far political 
participation attitudes have changed after the revolution. 
 Apply the uses and gratifications theory in future research. 
 Conduct focus groups with television talk show viewers to provide a more 
in depth analysis of their perceptions and attitudes. 
 Conduct research on different television talk shows which have become 
popular after the revolution such as Baladna Belmasry and Akher Kalam 
 Conduct research on the popularity and credibility of talk shows during and 
after the revolution. 
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8. Limitations of the study 
 The study surveyed a non-random purposive sample. Therefore, the results 
can‟t be generalized.  
 Lack of studies conducted on media and civic engagement in Egypt. 
 Lack of published scholarly research on Egyptian television talk shows. 
 Lack of freedom of expression before the revolution. Several respondents 
were worried about answering the questions about their perception of the 
upcoming parliamentary elections. Many online surveys were disregarded for 
that specific reason because many participants skipped that section all 
together. 
 Al Qahera Al Youm, one of the very popular talk shows before the revolution, 
intended for this study, was suspended after a few episodes were recorded. 
Therefore, it was excluded from the sample. 
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10. APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE 
This is an academic questionnaire conducted for graduate studies in Journalism 
and Mass Communication at the American University in Cairo. This study 
focuses on media and civic engagement in Egypt with a particular emphasis on 
Egyptian nightly television talk shows Masr Ennaharda (Egypt Today), 90 
Deqeeqa (90 Minutes), and Al-Ashera Masa’an (10 PM).  Your participation is of 
extreme importance. By filling out this questionnaire you will contribute to social 
science research in Egypt and help make our society better. Your participation is 
voluntary and your data will remain anonymous. Thank you for your time. 
  
1)  Do you watch any of the following Egyptian nightly television talk shows: 
Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa, and Al-Ashera Masa’an? Please select one answer. 
a. Yes 
b. No (if you answered “No”, please jump to question 10 and answer questions 10 to 15) 
 
2) Please indicate with (√) how often you watch each talk show per week?  
 Five 
times 
Four 
times 
Three 
times 
Two 
times 
Once 
a 
week 
Never 
1. Masr Ennaharda       
2. Al Ashera Masa’an       
3. 90 Deqeeqa       
 
3) Please indicate with (√) your degree of agreement or disagreement with the 
following statements about Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic 
engagement:  
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source 
of  news about Egypt‟s affairs 
     
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage 
people to participate in solving community 
problems in Egypt 
     
c) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage 
people to make charitable contributions  
     
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage 
ordinary citizens to express their opinions 
publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms). 
     
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create 
sociopolitical awareness 
     
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my 
primary source of information about the 
Egyptian parliamentary elections held in 
November, 2010. 
     
g) Egyptian nightly TV talks shows encourage 
citizens to vote 
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4) Please indicate with (√ ) your degree of agreement or disagreement with 
each of the following statements about civic engagement: 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
a) I consider voting a priority      
b) I express my opinion 
through the media (e.g. call-
ins, emails, letters, sms, fax)  
     
c) I express my opinion to 
public officials (e.g. 
petitions, letters) 
     
d) I consider discussing 
sociopolitical affairs a 
priority 
     
e) Being informed about  
Egyptian affairs is important 
     
f) I consider sociopolitical 
awareness a priority 
     
g) Citizens should not wait for 
the government to solve 
their community problems 
     
h) I make a difference in my 
community 
     
i) Contributing to community 
is my responsibility  
     
j) I volunteer to help solve 
community problems in 
Egypt 
     
k) It‟s my responsibility to 
vote in Egypt‟s presidential 
elections in 2011 
     
l) It‟s my responsibility to 
vote in Egypt‟s upcoming 
parliamentary elections  
     
m) I intend to vote in the 
upcoming presidential 
elections 
     
o) I intend to vote in the 
upcoming parliamentary 
elections 
     
 
 
 
189 
 
5) What is the most important news happening in Egypt that came to your 
knowledge recently? Please list five issues. 
 
1. _____________________________________ 
2. _____________________________________ 
3. _____________________________________ 
4. _____________________________________ 
5. _____________________________________ 
 
6) How did these issues first come to your knowledge? Please specify your 
source of information for each issue and name the source (e.g.  90 Deqeeqa 
TV talk show).  
You may choose from the following sources: 
[Newspapers, Magazines, Radio News, Radio talk shows, Television News, 
Internet, Egyptian TV Talk Shows including Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa, 
or Al Ashera Masa’an , Personal communication]. 
 
1. Source for issue one: ________________________ 
2. Source for issue two: ________________________ 
3. Source for issue three: _______________________ 
4. Source for issue four: ________________________   
5. Source for issue five:_________________________ 
 
7) How often do you follow Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ coverage 
for each issue you listed? Please indicate with (√) for each issue. 
 
 Always Sometimes Never 
Issue 1 you listed    
Issue 2 you listed    
Issue 3 you listed    
Issue 4 you listed    
Issue 5 you listed    
 
8) How often do you depend on the following media sources for news about 
Egyptian affairs? Please indicate with (√) for each source. 
 
 Always Sometimes Never 
Newspapers    
Television news    
Television talk shows    
Radio news    
Radio talk shows    
Magazines    
Internet    
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9) Please indicate with (√ ) your degree of agreement with the following 
statements about the upcoming Egyptian parliamentary elections. 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
a) The government‟s recent restrictions on 
private media have nothing to do with the 
elections   
     
b) The elections will be fairly conducted      
c) National Democratic Party (NDP) 
candidates are expected to hold the 
majority of seats in parliament 
     
d) Judicial supervision is important to 
prevent election fraud 
     
e) The elections are expected to be peaceful      
f) It‟s important to have independent 
monitors 
     
g) Opposition party candidates will have a 
powerful representation 
     
h) Muslim brotherhood candidates will be 
welcomed to run in the elections by the 
government 
     
i) Women must have equal representation in 
parliament 
     
j) Coptic Christians should hold more than 
the current10 percent of parliament seats 
     
k) The Wafd opposition party is expected to 
hold most opposition seats in parliament 
     
l) The government recently issued 
restrictions on private media because of 
the elections 
     
m) The elections will not be fairly conducted      
n) NDP candidates are not expected to hold 
the majority of seats in parliament 
     
o) Judicial supervision is not important to 
prevent election fraud 
     
p) The elections are expected to be violent      
q) It‟s not important to have independent 
monitors 
     
r) Opposition party candidates will have a 
weak representation 
     
s) Muslim brotherhood candidates will be 
restricted from running in the elections by 
the government 
     
t) Women representation should be 
restricted to the quota set by the president 
     
u) Coptic Christians should hold the usual 
current 10 percent seats in parliament 
     
v) The Wafd opposition party is not expected 
to hold most opposition seats inparliament 
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10) Gender 
a. Female 
b. Male 
 
11) What is your area of residence? Check one answer only.  
a. Heliopolis 
b. Nasr City 
c. New Cairo/Katameya 
d. Maadi 
e. Dokki 
f. Mohandiseen 
g. Zamalek 
h. Haram 
i. 6th of October 
j. Other, Please specify____________________ 
 
12) How old are you? Check one answer only. 
a. Less than 18 
b. 18 – 29 
c. 30 – 41 
d. 42 – 53 
e. 54 – 65 
f. Older than 65 
 
13) What is your nationality? Check one answer only. 
a. Egyptian 
b. Other, Please specify_____________________ 
 
14) What is your level of education? Check one answer only. 
a. Undergraduate student 
b. Bachelor degree holder 
c. Graduate student 
d. Master‟s degree holder 
e. Doctoral degree holder 
f. Other, Please specify_________________________ 
 
15) Which best describes your monthly income? Check one answer only. 
a. Less than 1,000  
b. EGP 1,000 – less than EGP 3,000 
c. EGP 3,000 – less than EGP 5,000 
d. EGP 5,000 – less than EGP 7,000 
e. EGP 7,000 – less than EGP 9,000 
f. EGP 9,000 – less than EGP 11,000 
g. EGP 11,000 and above 
 
 
 
Thank you for your most valuable participation  
 
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 B XIDNEPPA:eriannoitseuQ cibarA
 سخبٞبُ أمبدَٜٝإ
بىقبٕشة. حشمز ٕزٓ بنٞت  ٝىيذساسبث اىعيٞب بقسٌ اىصحبفت ٗ الإعلاً  ببىجبٍعت الأٍش عذٍسخبٞبُ أمبدَٜٝ إ ٕزا
ٍزو: ٍصش  اىذساست عيٚ اىَشبسمت اىَذّٞت فٜ ٍصش ٗ دٗس بشاٍج اىخيٞفزُٝ٘ اىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئٞٔ اىَصشٝت
ٗلا ٝخطيب ٍعشفت إسٌ إ ُّ ٕزا الإسخبٞبُ ٍخصص فقظ ىيبحذ اىعيَٜ   .دقٞقت، ٗاىعبششة  ٍسبءا    09اىْٖبسدٓ، 
ٕ٘ٝخل. ٍشبسمخل ٍَٖت ىيَسبعذة  ٚأٗ ٕ٘ٝت اىَشبسك، ٗ اىَعيٍ٘بث اىخٜ سخضبف إىٚ اىْخبئج ىِ حْسب إى
 عيٚ حفٌٖ ٍب ٝحذد فٜ اىَجخَع اىَصشٛ. شنشا  ٍسبقب  عيٚ ٗقخل.
 
قت، اىعبششة  دقٞ  09اىْٖبسدٓ،  ٍصش) ٕو حشبٕذ أٛ ٍِ بشاٍج اىخيٞفزُٝ٘ اىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئٞٔ اىَصشٝت: 1
 ٍسبءا ؟ اىشجبء إخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة. 
 ّؼٌ  -أ
  )51إىٚ  01ٗالاجببت عيٚ الأسئيت  01(إرا مبّج الإجببت "لا"، اىشجبء الاّخقبه إىٚ اىسؤاه سقٌ لا  -ة
 
 (√) الأسب٘ع ؟ ضع علاٍت خلاه فٜ  اىخيٞفزُٝ٘ اىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئٞٔ اىَصشٝت ٍب ٍذٙ ٍشبٕذحل ىبشاٍج) 2 
 
 أبذا ٍشة ٍشحِٞ  رلاد ٍشاث  أسبع ٍشاث  ٍشاث خَس  
       ٍصر اىْٖبردٓ
       اىؼبشرح  ٍطبءا
       دقٍقخ  09
  
ىخحذد دسجت ٍ٘افقخل أٗ اخخلافل ٍع اىعببساث اىخبىٞت ح٘ه بشاٍج اىخيٞفزُٝ٘ اىح٘اسٝت (√) ) ضع علاٍت 3 
 اىَسبئٞٔ اىَصشٝت ٗاىَشبسمت اىَذّٞت:
 غٞش ٍ٘افق جذا غٞش ٍ٘افق ٍحبٝذ ٍ٘افق ٍ٘افق جذا 
 فسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخٍثراٍج اىزي )1
ٍصبدر الأخجبر ح٘ه اىشؤُٗ  ٍصذر ٍِ رؼذ
 اىَصرٌخ 
     
 ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ )2
رشجغ اىْبش ػيى اىَشبرمخ فً حو ٍشبمو 
 اىَجزَغ اىَصري
     
 بئٍٔ اىَصرٌخثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَط )3
 رقذٌٌ ٍطبَٕبد خٍرٌخ  رشجغ اىْبش ػيى
     
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ  )4
اىؼبدي ػيى اىزؼجٍر ػِ رأٌٔ  رشجغ اىَ٘اطِ
رضبئو اىجرٌذ  (ٍِ خلاه اىَنبىَبد،
 الإىنزرًّٗ، اىفبمص، اىرضبئو اىقصٍرح، اىخ) 
     
ىَصرٌخ ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ ا )5
 ضٍبضٍخ  -إجزَبػٍخ رْشًء ر٘ػٍخ
     
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ  )6
رئٍطٍب ىيَؼيٍ٘بد ح٘ه الإّزخبثبد  رؼذ ٍصذرا  
ضزؼقذ فً ّ٘فَجر  اىجرىَبٍّخ اىَصرٌخ اىزً
 0102
     
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ  )7
ّزخبثبد رشجغ اىَ٘اطٍِْ ػيى اىزصٌ٘ذ فً الإ
 ثشنو ػبً
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) ٍِ فضيل قٌ بخ٘ضٞح ٍذٙ ٍ٘افقخل أٗ عذً ٍ٘افقخل ٍع مو ٗاحذة ٍِ اىعببساث اىخبىٞت ٗاىخٜ حذٗس عِ 4
 ْبسبلٝبَب √( عِ طشٝق ٗضع علاٍت ( اىَذّٞتاىَشبسمت  اىَشبسمت
ٍ٘افق  
 جذا
 ٍحبٝذ ٍ٘افق
غٞش 
 ٍ٘افق
غٞش ٍ٘افق 
 جذا
      ذ الإّزخبثً أٗىٌ٘خأػزجر اىزصٌ٘ )1
خلاه ٗضبئو  ٍِ أػجرػِ رأًٌ )2
(ٍثو:اىَنبىَبد اىٖبرفٍخ، ػلاً الإ
اىجرٌذ الإىنزرًّٗ، اىرضبئو، 
 اىرضبئو اىقصٍرح، ٗاىفبمص)
     
أػجر ػِ رأًٌ ىيَطؤٗىٍِ (ٍثو:  )3
 رظيَبد، ٗرضبئو)
     
 -أػزجر ٍْبقشخ اىقضبٌب الإجزَبػٍخ )4
 اىطٍبضٍخ أٗىٌ٘خ
     
      ف ػِ اىشئُ٘ اىَصرٌخ أٗىٌ٘خأُ أػر )5
      أػزجر اى٘ػً اىطٍبضً الإجزَبػً أٗىٌ٘خ )6
لا ٌْجغً ػيى اىَ٘اطٍِْ أُ ٌْزظرٗا ٍِ  )7
 اىحنٍ٘خ حو ٍشبمو ٍجزَؼبرٌٖ
     
      أّب أصْغ فبرق ٗإخزلاف فً ٍجزَؼً )8
      اىَطبَٕخ فً ٍجزَؼً ًٕ أٗىٌ٘زً )9
أقً٘ ثبىزط٘ع ىيَطبػذح فً حو  )01
 اىَجزَؼٍخ فً ٍصر اىَشنلاد
     
إّٖب ٍطؤٗىٍزً أُ أقً٘ ثبىزصٌ٘ذ فً  )11
 1102إّزخبثبد اىرئبضخ اىَصرٌخ فً 
     
إّٖب ٍطؤٗىٍزً أُ أقً٘ ثبىزصٌ٘ذ فً  )21
 الإّزخبثبد اىجرىَبٍّخ اىقبدٍخ
     
أّب أّ٘ي الإدلاء ثص٘رً فً الإّزخبثبد  )31
 اىرئبضٍخ اىقبدٍخ
     
ّزخبثبد أّب أّ٘ي الإدلاء ثص٘رً فً الإ )41
 اىجرىَبٍّخ اىقبدٍخ
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ٍب ٕٜ إٌٔ الأّببء/ الأخببس اىخٜ ححذد فٜ ٍصش ٗاىخٜ عشفج عْٖب فٜ اّٟٗت الاخٞشة. قٌ بزمش خَست  )5
 قضبٝب/ أخببس
 )...................................................................................................1
 ...........................................................................................)........2
 )...................................................................................................3
 .......................................)............................................................4
 )...................................................................................................5
 
) مٞف عشفج عِ ٕزٓ اىقضبٝب ؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بخحذٝذ ٍصذس ٍعيٍ٘بحل ىنو قضٞت ٍِ اىقضبٝب اىخَست ٗارمش 6
 دقٞقت).  09اسٌ اىَصذس (ٍزو: اىبشّبٍج اىخيٞفزّٜٝ٘ اىح٘اسٛ 
بشاٍج  ،َٝنْل الإخخٞبس ٍِ بِٞ حيل اىَصبدس ( ٍجلاث، صحف، أخببس إراعٞت، أخببس حيٞفزّٝ٘ٞت، إّخشّج
 الإحصبه اىشخصٜ) ،دقٞقت أٗ اىعبششة ٍسبءا   09ٍصش اىْٖبسة،  ٍزو ىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئٞٔ اىَصشٝتاىخيفزُٝ٘ ا
 ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر الأٗه..................................................... )1
 ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىثبًّ..................................................... )2
 ٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىثبىث.....................................................ٍصذر اىقض )3
 ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىراثغ..................................................... )4
 ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىخبٍص................................................... )5
 
 فزُٝ٘ اىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئٞٔ اىَصشٝتٞبشاٍج اىخيٍِ خلاه  ٚاىخٜ رمشحٖب ببلأعي بٝبحقً٘ بَخببعت اىقض ) ٕو7
 ىنو قضٞت أٗ خبش قَج بزمشٓ) √دقٞقت أٗ اىعبششة ٍسبءا  ؟ ٍِ فضيل ضع علاٍت ( 09ٍصش اىْٖبسة، ٍزو 
 أبذا   أحٞبّب   دائَب   
     ىاىقضٍخ الأٗى )1
    اىقضٍخ اىثبٍّخ )2
    اىقضٍخ اىثبىثخ )3
    ىراثؼخ اىقضٍخ ا )4
    اىقضٍخ اىخبٍطخ )5
 
 
 
ٕزٓ اىَصبدس الإعلاٍٞت ىَعشفت أخببس عِ اىشئُ٘ اىَصشٝت؟ ٍِ فضيل   ٍٚشة حقً٘ ببلإعخَبد عي مٌ )8
 ىنو ٍصذس) √قٌ ببىخ٘ضٞح عِ طشٝق ٗضع علاٍت (
 أبذا   أحٞبّب   دائَب   
    صحف إخجبرٌخ )1
    أخجبر ريٍفسٌٍّ٘خ )2
    بئٍٔ اىَصرٌخثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَط )3
    أخجبر إراػٍخ )4
    ثراٍج ح٘ارٌخ إراػٍخ )5
    ٍجلاد )6
    إّزرّذ )7
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ٍ٘افقخل اٗ عذً ٍ٘افقخل ٍع مو ٍِ اىعببساث  ٙىخ٘ضح ٍذ ) √(ٍِ فضيل قٌ ببلإشبسة ٍسخخذٍب   )9
 اىخبىٞت عِ الإّخخبببث اىبشىَبّٞت اىَصشٝت اىقبدٍت
ٍ٘افق  
 جذا
غٞش  ٍحبٝذ ٍ٘افق
 ٍ٘افق
غٞش ٍ٘افق 
 جذا
اىقٍ٘د اىحنٍٍ٘خ اىحبىٍخ ػيى الإػلاً اىخبص ىٍص  )1
 ىٖب ػلاقخ ثبلإّزخبثبد
     
      الإّزخبثبد اىجرىَبٍّخ اىقبدٍخ ضزْؼقذ ثْسإخ )2
ٍرشح٘ اىحسة اى٘طًْ اىذٌَقراطً ٍِ اىَز٘قغ  )3
 أُ ٌْبى٘ا ٍؼظٌ اىَقبػذ فً اىجرىَبُ
     
اىرقبثخ ٗالإشراف اىقضبئً أٍر ٕبً ىَْغ رسٌٗر  )4
 لإّزخبثبدا
     
      ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ رنُ٘ الإّزخبثبد ضيٍَخ )5
      ٍِ اىٌَٖ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك ٍراقجٍِ ٍطزقيٍٍِ )6
ٍرشحً الأحساة اىَؼبرضخ ضٍنُ٘ ىٌٖ رَثٍو  )7
 ق٘ي
     
ٍرشح٘ الإخ٘اُ اىَطيٍَِ ضٍرحت ثٌٖ ىخ٘ض  )8
 الإّزخبثبد ٍِ قِجَو اىحنٍ٘خ
     
يْطبء فً لاثذ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك رَثٍو ٍزطبٗي ى )9
 اىجرىَبُ
     
اىَطٍحٍُ٘ الأقجبط لاثذ أُ ٌنُ٘ ىٌٖ رَثٍو فً  )01
 ثبىَئخ ٍِ اىَقبػذ 01اىجرىَبُ ثْطجخ رسٌذ ػِ 
     
حسة اى٘فذ اىَؼبرض ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ ٌف٘ز ثَؼظٌ  )11
 ٍقبػذ اىَؼبرضخ فً اىجرىَبُ
     
أصذرد اىحنٍ٘خ ٍؤخرا  قٍ٘د ػيً الإػلاً  )21
 اىخبص ثطجت الإّزخبثبد
     
      ٌزٌ إّؼقبدٕب ثْسإخ ٗػذه ىِالإّزخبثبد  )31
ٍرشح٘ اىحسة اى٘طًْ اىذٌَقراطً ٍِ اىَز٘قغ  )41
 ٌْبى٘ا ٍؼظٌ اىَقبػذ فً اىجرىَبُ لا  أُ
     
رقبثخ ٗإشراف  ٍِ اىٌَٖ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك ىٍص )51
 اىقضبئً ىَْغ رسٌٗر الإّزخبثبد
     
      ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ رنُ٘ الإّزخبثبد ػٍْفخ  )61
      ٍِ اىٌَٖ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك ٍراقجٍِ ٍطزقيٍٍِ ىٍص )71
ٌنُ٘ ىٌٖ رَثٍو  ىٍِرشحً الأحساة اىَؼبرضخ  )81
 ق٘ي فً اىجرىَبُ
     
 قٍ٘دٍرشح٘ الإخ٘اُ اىَطيٍَِ ضٍفرض ػيٌٍٖ  )91
 ىخ٘ض الإّزخبثبد ٍِ قجو اىحنٍ٘خ
     
اىزَثٍو اىْطبئً لاثذ أُ ٌحذد ثبىْطجخ اىزً ٌفرضٖب  )02
 رئٍص اىجَٖ٘رٌخ
     
أُ رجقى ّطجزٌٖ فً  لاثذاىَطٍحٍُ٘ الأقجبط  )12
 ثبىَئخ ٍِ اىَقبػذ مبىَؼزبد 01اىجرىَبُ 
     
ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ ٌف٘ز  ىٍصحسة اى٘فذ اىَؼبرض  )22
 ثَؼظٌ ٍقبػذ اىَؼبرضخ فً اىجرىَبُ
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 رمر -ة  ىأّث -أ :) اىْ٘ع01
 
 
 ٗاحذة فقظ) ٍب ٕٜ اىَْطقت اىخٜ حعٞش بٖب؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت 11
 ) ٍصر اىجذٌذح1
 ) ٍذٌْخ ّصر2
 ) اىقبٕرح اىجذٌذح/ اىقطبٍٍخ3
 ) ٍؼبدي4
 ) دقً5
 ) ٍْٖذضٍِ6
 ) زٍبىل7
 ) ٕرً8
 أمز٘ثر 6) 9
 ......................................، ٍِ فضيل قٌ ثبىز٘ضٍحآخر) 01
 
 ) مٌ عَشك؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ21
 81) أقو ٍِ 1
 92-81)  2
 14-03)  3
 35 -24) 4
 56 -45) 5
 56) أمجر ٍِ 6
 
 ) ٍب ٕٜ جْسٞخل؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ31
 ) ٍصري1
 ،...................................، ٍِ فضيل قٌ ثبىز٘ضٍحرخآ) 2
 
 حعيَٞل؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ ٙ) ٍب ٕ٘ ٍسخ٘41
 ) طبىت جبٍؼً1
 شٖبدح جبٍؼٍخ ىػي سحبئ)  2
 ) طبىت دراضبد ػيٍب3
 درجخ اىَبجطزٍر ى) حبئس ػي4
 درجخ اىذمز٘رآ ى) حبئس ػي5
 ،..................................، ٍِ فضيل قٌ ثبىز٘ضٍحآخر) 6
 
 ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ ٍب الإخخٞبس اىَلائٌ اىزٛ ٝصف دخيل اىشٖشٛ؟) 51
 ٍٖب  ٍصرٌب  جْ 00001) أقو ٍِ 1
 جٍْٖب  ٍصرٌب   00003أقو ٍِ  - 00001)  ٍِ 2
 جٍْٖب  ٍصرٌب       00005أقو ٍِ  - 00003) ٍِ 3
 جٍْٖب  ٍصرٌب   00007أقو ٍِ  -00005) ٍِ 4
 جٍْٖب  ٍصرٌب   00009أقو ٍِ  -00007) ٍِ 5
 جٍْٖب  ٍصرٌب   000011أقو ٍِ  -00009) ٍِ 6
 جٍْٖب  ٍصرٌب  فَب أمثر 000011) ٍِ 7
 
 شنشا  جزٝلا  عيٚ ٕزٓ اىَشبسمت اىقّٞ ََ ت 
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APPENDIX C: Codebook for the Open-Ended Survey Questions 
 
A. Topic Number: ________________  
B. Topic:________________________ 
C. Sub-topic:______________ 
 
1. Topic (1):  Political  
1. Parliamentary elections 
2. Presidential elections 
3. President Mubarak‟s meetings/visits/communications 
4. Political participation 
5. Political representation 
6. Opposition (e.g. arrests of MB..etc) 
7. Government (problems, corruption, emergency law) 
8. Demonstrations/strikes 
9. Achievements/Celebrations (6th of October) 
10. Foreign affairs 
 
2. Topic (2): Economic 
11. Minimum wages 
12. Government spending 
13. National debts 
14. Investments 
15. General Inflation 
16. Rising food prices 
17. Taxes 
18. Unemployment 
19. Poverty 
20. Development 
21. Shortages in food and supplies 
 
3. Topic (3): Social 
22. Workers issues 
23. Women issues 
24. Religious rights 
25. Family issues (marriages, divorce) 
26. School violence (sexual abuse, beating up children…etc) 
27. Other,_______________ 
 
4. Topic (4): Environmental 
28. Pollution (air, water, garbage) 
29. Water shortage 
30. Endangered species 
31. Energy resources 
32. Natural disasters 
33. Other, (Nile water protection and agreements) 
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5. Topic (5): Health 
34. Health care/awareness 
35. Diseases 
36. Health insurance 
37. Drugs 
38. Negligence and corruption 
 
6. Topic (6): Education 
39. Problems in quality of education 
40. Higher education 
41. School education 
42. Illiteracy 
43. Education development 
44. University violence and security 
 
7. Topic (7): Criminal 
45. Court sentences and trials 
46. Arrests 
47. Police brutality 
48. Thefts 
49. Embezzlements 
50. Murders 
51. Right to own a gun 
52. Terrorism 
53. Crime control 
54. Illegal acquisition of public properties (e.g. lands) 
55. Other,(hit and run accidents/ building collapse, shooting) 
 
8. Topic (8): Human interest 
56. Ordinary peoples success stories 
57. Ordinary peoples ordeal stories 
58. Other,_______________ 
 
9. Topic (9): Religion 
59. Religious preaching 
60. Sectarian tension (and instigating tension) 
61. Religious discrimination 
62. Pilgrimage 
 
10. Topic (10): Sports 
63. Matches 
64. Fan tension 
65. Achievements 
66. Other,__________ 
 
 
11. Topic (11): Arts & Culture 
67. Profiles (actors, singers, writers, directors…etc) 
68. Drama reviews 
69. Cinema reviews 
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70. Galleries, concerts  
71. Antiquities 
 
12. Topic (12): Media 
72. Freedom of expression 
73. Censorship 
74. Mergers and acquisitions 
75. Jailing journalists/trials 
76. Firing journalists/Dostour crisis 
77. Suspension of programs or newspapers or channels 
78. Future of media (online media…etc.) 
79. Media ethics and law 
80. Media regulations vs restrictions ahead of the parliamentary 
elections 
81. Privately owned media 
 
13. Topic (13): Science & Technology 
82. Inventions 
83. Scientific research 
84. Science projects 
 
14. Topic (13): Miscelaneous 
85. Electricity issues (problems, regulations, new rules) 
86. Traffic issues (traffic jams, accidents) 
87. Underground metro issues 
88. Closing shops early 
90. Fires (metro fire, explosions…etc) 
91. Charity 
92. Loss of the Egyptian satellite 
93. Wikileaks (Iraqi warlogs) 
94. Gaza aid 
95. Islam and the West 
96. World News  
 
D. MAIN SOURCE OF TOPIC 
1. Newspapers 
2. TV news 
3. Tv talk shows 
4. Radio News 
5. Radio Talk shows 
6. Magazines 
7. Internet 
8. TV talk shows among other sources 
9. Personal Communication 
10. Miscelaneous 
11. SMS service 
 
E. Name of Sources Cited by Respondents 
1. Al Ashera Masa‟an tv talk show 
2. Masr Ennaharda tv talk show 
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3. 90 Dekeeka tv talk show 
4. 48 Sa‟a tv talk show 
5. Not Applicable 
6. Al Masry Al Youm newspaper 
7. Al Ahram newspaper 
8. Al Akhbar newspaper 
9. Al Wafd newspaper 
10. Al Youm Al Sabe‟a online newspaper 
11. Masrawy website 
12. Twitter 
13. Al Shorouk newspaper 
14. Al Jazeera TV channel 
15. Al Qahera Al Youm tv talk show 
17.Akhbar Baladna 
18. Men Qalb Masr tv talk show 
19. AlJazeera.net 
20. Al Shorouk online 
21.Al Tab‟a Al Akheera news program 
22. Facebook 
23. Ahram online 
24. Sabah Dream tv talk show 
25. Nogoum FM 
26. Radio Masr 
27. Teen Stuff magazine 
28. MSN news 
29. Al Hayat Al Youm tv talk show 
30 Business Today magazine 
31. Al Arabeya.net 
32. Baladna Belmasri tv talk show 
33. Youtube. 
34. Al Tab‟a Al Oula news program 
35. BBC. 
  
 
F. Exposure to talk shows with regards to each topic 
1. Always 
2. Sometimes 
3. Neutral 
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APPENDIX D: Coding Sheet for Open-Ended Survey Questions 
TOPIC 
NO 
TOPIC 
SUB-
TOPIC 
 
Source 
 
Name of 
source 
 
Talk Show 
Exposure to 
Topic 
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APPENDIX E: Codebook 1: First-level Agenda Setting 
 
G. Coder 
1. Sara 
2. Sahar 
 
H. Talk show 
1. Al Ashera Masa‟an 
2. Masr Ennaharda 
3. 90 Deqeeqa 
 
I. Broadcast Day  
1. Saturday 
2. Sunday 
3. Monday 
4. Tuesday 
5. Wednesday 
 
J. Broadcast Date:_________________ 
K. Topic Number: ________________  
L. Topic:________________________ 
M. Sub-topic:______________ 
 
15. Topic (1):  Political  
82. Parliamentary elections 
83. Presidential elections 
84. President Mubarak‟s meetings/visits/communications 
85. Political participation 
86. Political representation 
87. Opposition (e.g. arrests of MB..etc) 
88. Government (problems, corruption, emergency law) 
89. Demonstrations/strikes 
90. Achievements/Celebrations (6th of October) 
91. Other, (foreign affairs, deaths of political figures)______________ 
 
16. Topic (2): Economic 
92. Minimum wages 
93. Government spending 
94. National debts 
95. Investments 
96. General Inflation 
97. Rising food prices 
98. Taxes 
99. Unemployment 
100. Poverty 
101. Development 
102. Other,(food shortage, gas canisters, 
consumers)_______________ 
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17. Topic (3): Social 
103. Workers issues 
104. Women issues 
105. Religious rights 
106. Family issues (marriages, divorce) 
107. School violence (sexual abuse, beating up children…etc.) 
108. Other,_______________ 
 
18. Topic (4): Environmental 
109. Pollution (air, water, garbage) 
110. Water shortage 
111. Endangered species 
112. Energy resources 
113. Natural disasters 
114. Other, (Nile water protection and agreements) 
 
19. Topic (5): Health 
115. Health care/awareness 
116. Diseases 
117. Health insurance 
118. Drugs 
119. Other,(Negligence, corruption) 
 
20. Topic (6): Education 
120. Problems in quality of education 
121. Higher education 
122. School education 
123. Illiteracy 
124. Education development 
125. Other,(university violence and security, e.g. Ain Shams 
University) 
 
21. Topic (7): Criminal 
126. Courts (sentences, trials) 
127. Arrests 
128. Police brutality 
129. Thefts 
130. Embezzlements 
131. Murders 
132. Right to own a gun 
133. Terrorism 
134. Crime control 
135. Illegal acquisition of public properties (e.g. lands) 
136. Other,(hit and run accidents/ building collapse, shooting) 
 
22. Topic (8): Human interest 
137. Ordinary citizen success stories 
138. Ordinary citizen personal ordeal stories 
139. Other,_______________ 
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23. Topic (9): Religion 
140. Religious preaching 
141. Sectarian tension (and instigating tension) 
142. Religious discrimination 
143. Other, (Pilgrimage)_____________ 
 
24. Topic (10): Sports 
144. Matches 
145. Fan tension 
146. Achievements 
147. Other,__________ 
 
25. Topic (11): Arts & Culture 
148. Profiles (actors, singers, writers, directors…etc.) 
149. Drama reviews 
150. Cinema reviews 
151. Galleries, concerts  
152. Other,_(Antiquities, books …)_________ 
 
26. Topic (12): Media 
153. Freedom of expression 
154. Censorship 
155. Mergers and acquisitions 
156. Jailing journalists/trials 
157. Firing journalists/Dostour crisis 
158. Suspension of programs or newspapers or channels 
159. Future of media (online media…etc.) 
160. Media ethics and law 
161. Media regulations vs. restrictions ahead of the parliamentary 
elections 
162. Other,(evaluation of privately owned media)____________ 
 
27. Topic (13): Science & Technology 
82. Inventions 
83. Scientific research 
84. Science projects 
 
28. Topic (13): Miscellaneous 
85. Electricity (problems, regulations, new rules) 
86. Traffic problems (traffic jams, accidents) 
87. Underground metro drilling problems 
88. Closing shops early 
90. Fires (metro fire, explosions…etc.) 
91. Charity calls 
92. Loss of the Egyptian satellite 
93. Wikileaks (Iraqi war logs) 
94. Gaza aid convoys 
95. Islam and the West 
96. World Affairs 
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APPENDIX F: Codebook 2: Second-level Agenda Setting 
 
Overall frames of advance parliamentary elections‟ coverage 
 
Coding Instructions: The statements below are meant to measure how talk shows 
portray the Egyptian parliamentary elections. Pick the number in each column that 
best represents how they portray the elections in their coverage/discussions. 3= 
Mentioned, 2 = Neutral, and 1=Not Mentioned. (A topic is neutral if the opposite 
frames are covered within the same story and if the story was balanced). 
 
     1 2 3 
 1 2 3     
1)The government‟s restrictions on 
private media have nothing to do 
with the elections 
   2) The government issued restrictions 
on private media because of the 
elections 
   
3)The elections will be fairly 
conducted 
   4) The elections will be unfairly 
conducted 
   
5)Judicial supervision is important 
to prevent fraud 
   6)Judicial supervision is not important 
to prevent fraud 
   
7)The elections are expected to be 
peaceful 
   8)The elections are expected to be 
violent 
   
9)It‟s important to have independent 
monitors 
   10)It‟s not important to have 
independent monitors 
   
11)Opposition party candidates will 
have a powerful representation 
   12)Opposition party candidates will 
have a week representation 
   
13)Muslim brotherhood candidates 
will be welcomed to run in the 
elections by the government 
   14)Muslim brotherhood candidates will 
be restricted from running in the 
elections by the government 
   
15)Women must have equal 
representation in parliament 
   16)Women representation should be 
restricted to the quota set by the 
president 
   
17)Coptic Christians should hold 
more than the current10 percent of 
parliament seats 
   18)Coptic Christians should hold the 
usual current 10 percent seats in 
parliament 
   
19)The NDP is expected to hold the 
majority of seats in parliament 
   20)The NDP is not expected to hold the 
majority of seats in parliament 
   
21)The Wafd opposition party is 
expected to hold most opposition 
seats in parliament 
   22)The Wafd opposition party is not 
expected to hold most opposition seats 
in parliament 
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APPENDIX G: Coding Sheet: First-Level Agenda Setting  
Talk show news coverage 
 
C
O
D
E 
R 
S
H
O
W 
D
A
Y 
DAT
E 
T
O
P 
I 
C 
N
O 
T
O
P
I
C 
S
U
B
T
O
P 
I 
C 
TOPIC 
KEY WORDS 
 
COMMENTS 
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APPENDIX H: Coding Sheet: Second-Level Agenda Setting 
Frames of advance election coverage 
2
2 
2
1 
2
0 
1
9 
1
8 
1
7 
1
6 
1
5 
1
4 
1
3 
1
2 
1
1 
1
0 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 D
A
T
E 
D
A
Y 
SH
O
W 
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DE
R 
T
o
p
i 
c 
n
o
. 
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APPENDIX I: Inter-Coder Reliability 
 
The Holsti Formula was used to calculate inter-coder reliability as follows: 
 
R =     2M 
    __________ 
         
        N1 + N2 
 
M = total number of coding decisions agreed upon by the two coders 
N = total number of coding decisions in the subsample tested for reliability by each 
coder (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). 
 
 
The total sample of 676 stories included 4,596 coding decisions. A subsample 
including 719 coding decisions, representing 15.6 % of the total sample was re-coded 
by a second coder to test inter-coder reliability. 
 
The results are as follows: 
 
R =     2(714) 
    __________    
         
        719 + 719 
 
 
R =     1428 
    __________ = 0.99  
         
            1438 
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APPENDIX J: Coding Dates: 
 
The following table shows the dates included the content analysis sample which 
ranged from Oct. 6 to Nov. 10. 
 
 
Dates /2010 
 
Nov.10 
Nov.9 
Nov.8 
No.v.7 
Nov.6 
Nov.3 
Nov.2 
Nov.1 
Oct.31 
Oct.30 
Oct.27 
Oct.26 
Oct.25 
Oct.24 
Oct.23 
Oct.20 
Oct.19 
Oct.18 
Oct.17 
Oct.16 
Oct.13 
Oct.12 
Oct.11 
Oct.10 
Oct.9 
Oct.6 
Total 
 
 
 
 
210 
 
APPENDIX K: Cross Tabulations for Table 5.13: between each statement 
measuring civic engagement attitudes in question (4) with exposure: 
Voting Priority 
Television Talk Shows Exposure 
Total Always Sometimes Never 
 Strongly Agree 27 38 1 66 
Agree 32 48 0 80 
Neutral 45 32 0 77 
Disagree 21 21 2 44 
Strongly Disagree 9 10 0 19 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Discussing Sociopolitical Affairs 
Television Talk Shows Exposure 
Total Always Sometimes Never 
 Strongly Agree 38 30 0 68 
Agree 45 62 1 108 
Neutral 31 38 1 70 
Disagree 18 14 1 33 
Strongly Disagree 2 5 0 7 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Informed About Egyptian Affairs Television Talk Shows Exposure 
Total Always Sometimes Never 
 Strongly Agree 71 59 1 131 
Agree 46 75 2 123 
Neutral 13 8 0 21 
Disagree 3 5 0 8 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 0 3 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Sociopolitical Awareness Priority 
Television Talk Shows Exposure 
Total Always Sometimes Never 
 Strongly Agree 58 52 2 112 
Agree 44 68 0 112 
Neutral 22 20 1 43 
Disagree 8 5 0 13 
Strongly Disagree 2 4 0 6 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Community Contribution A 
Responsibility 
Television Talk Shows Exposure 
Total Always Sometimes Never 
 Strongly Agree 40 31 1 72 
Agree 61 71 2 134 
Neutral 27 32 0 59 
Disagree 5 11 0 16 
Strongly Disagree 1 4 0 5 
My Responsibility To Vote Presidential Television Talk Shows Exposure Total 
211 
 
Elections Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 29 47 0 76 
Agree 40 43 0 83 
Neutral 42 30 0 72 
Disagree 13 18 1 32 
Strongly Disagree 10 11 2 23 
Total 134 149 3 286 
My Responsibility To Vote 
Parliamentary Elections 
Television Talk Shows Exposure 
Total 
Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 26 35 0 61 
Agree 38 41 0 79 
Neutral 40 39 0 79 
Disagree 18 24 1 43 
Strongly Disagree 12 10 2 24 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Citizens Should Not Wait For 
Government 
 To Solve Problems 
TV Talk Shows Exposure 
Total 
Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 43 56 1 100 
Agree 40 48 1 89 
Neutral 17 18 0 35 
Disagree 19 16 0 35 
Strongly Disagree 15 11 1 27 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Opinion Expression Through Media 
TV Talk Shows Exposure 
Total 
Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 10 11 0 21 
Agree 32 32 1 65 
Neutral 46 30 0 76 
Disagree 33 52 1 86 
Strongly Disagree 13 24 1 38 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Opinion Expression To Public 
Officials 
TV Talk Shows Exposure 
Total 
Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 6 9 0 15 
Agree 25 28 0 53 
Neutral 36 37 1 74 
Disagree 53 52 1 106 
Strongly Disagree 14 23 1 38 
Total 134 149 3 286 
 Make A Difference In My 
Community 
TV Talk Shows Exposure 
Total 
Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 25 31 1 57 
Agree 55 47 1 103 
Neutral 38 41 0 79 
Disagree 13 18 0 31 
Strongly Disagree 3 12 1 16 
Total 134 149 3 286 
I Volunteer To Solve Community TV Talk Shows Exposure Total 
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Problems Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 27 33 1 61 
Agree 47 49 0 96 
Neutral 47 42 2 91 
Disagree 11 20 0 31 
Strongly Disagree 2 5 0 7 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Intend To Vote In Presidential 
Elections 
TV Talk Shows Exposure 
Total 
Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 31 38 0 69 
Agree 34 35 0 69 
Neutral 30 31 0 61 
Disagree 25 28 2 55 
Strongly Disagree 14 17 1 32 
Total 134 149 3 286 
Intend To Vote In Parliamentary 
Elections 
TV Talk Shows Exposure 
Total 
Always Sometimes Never 
 
Strongly Agree 19 21 0 40 
Agree 32 32 0 64 
Neutral 39 42 0 81 
Disagree 30 35 2 67 
Strongly Disagree 14 19 1 34 
Total 134 149 3 286 
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APPENDIX L: Significance in Relationships between Exposure and Civic 
Engagement Attitudes for Table 5.13a 
 
Civic Engagement Attitudes 
(Strongly agree & Agree) 
Television Talk Shows Exposure 
(Always & Sometimes) 
Ratio % Comparison* 
Informed about Egyptian affairs 251 / 286 87.8% a 
Sociopolitical awareness priority 222 / 286 77.8% ab 
Community contribution responsibility 203 / 286 71.0% bc 
Citizens should take action and not wait for 
government  
187 / 286 65.4 bcd 
Discussing sociopolitical affairs 175 / 286 61.2% cde 
Responsibility to vote at presidential elections 159 / 286 55.6% de 
Making a difference in community   158 / 286 55.2% de 
Volunteer to solve community problems  156 / 286 54.5% de 
Voting priority 145 / 286 50.7% e 
Responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections 140 / 286 48.9% ef 
Intention to vote at presidential elections  138 / 286 48.3% ef 
Intend to vote at parliamentary elections  104 / 286 36.4% fg 
Opinion expression through media                85 / 286 29.7% g 
Opinion expression to public officials  68 / 286 23.8% g 
 
Calculated Least significant difference (lsd) between any two attitudes = 14.4% (at 
p=<0.05). Any two attitudes are significantly different if the difference is more than 
14.4%.  
* Based on the lsd, percentages followed by the same letter are not significantly 
different. 
 
